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Abstract
Situated between early instances of economic migration from Punjab in the 1920s and the
disintegration of the Labour Movement in the 1980s, this dissertation examines the political and
social formation of Punjabis in twentieth century Britain. This project offers a discursive
corrective to analyses of the British working-class that exclude or ignore the presence of
thousands of nonwhite workers that came to the United Kingdom during that period and offers
an assessment of the multiracial constitution of the British working-class and labour movement.
As a contribution to South Asian history, this dissertation pursues a deterritorialized study of
South Asian and Punjabi history -- as a history of people rather than a place. By bridging the
historiographical divide of partition and independence, this project explores the significant
interplay between the histories and struggles of host and home societies. These struggles were
often mutually reinforcing for migrants, who, because they exist at the interstices of both
societies, were mobilized by events near and far. Rather than insisting on the primary and
definitive importance that one or the other place, native or host society, has on the development
of ideologies, alliances, or cultures, this dissertation posits that they are historically produced, for
mobile people, out of movement, interaction, and experience. Thus, this project centers on
transnational connections and intergroup alliances, what I call migrant internationalism, as an
essential medium through which to understand the history of South Asian migrant workers in
Britain.
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Introduction: Migrant Internationalism from World War One to Deindustrialization
The night of Friday, 4 June 1976, was chilly but dry in London.1 Gurdeep Singh Chaggar
and some friends were walking up The Green, the main road in Southall, West London. Between
the Victory Pub and the Dominion Theatre they were met by a group sympathetic with the antiimmigrant rhetoric of the National Front. While details are scarce and often differ, a fight broke
out between the two. In the melee Chaggar was stabbed and left to bleed to death on the
sidewalk.2 The next day, Suresh Grover came upon the site of the murder -- Chaggar’s body had
been removed but the blood had yet to be cleaned -- and he inquired of the police standing
nearby what had happened. Learning that “just an Asian” had been murdered, Grover
immediately found a cover for the blood in an effort to show some respect for the deceased.3 By
Monday, five young men were charged with Chaggar’s murder and two, Jody Hill and Robert
Hackman, were convicted of manslaughter in May 1977, eleven months after the affray. Due to
their youth and the judge’s opinion that the murder was not racially motivated, Hill and
Hackman were shown leniency and sentenced to a mere four years in prison.4
Even as the murder was under investigation, the perception of police indifference enraged
the South Asian community in Southall. Two days after the murder approximately 200 people
demonstrated at the local police station and several were arrested. Clearly, the murder and the

“Weather Forecast and Recordings,” The Times (London, England), 4 June 1976.
Diana Geddes, "Asians clash with police in protest over killing,” The Times (London, England), 7 June 1976. Also
see A. Sivanandan, “From Resistance to Rebellion: Asian and Afro-Caribbean Struggles in Britain,” Race & Class
23, 2-3 (1981): 141-42; Rajbir Purewal Hazelwood, “A Diasporic Politics of Belonging: Punjabis in Postwar
Britain” (PhD diss, Washington University of St. Louis, 2013), 119-130; Anandi Ramamurthy, Black Star: Britain’s
Asian Youth Movements (London: Pluto Press, 2013).
3
Kavita Puri, “The Pool of Blood that Changed my Life,” BBC News Magazine, accessed 12 January 2019,
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33725217.
4
Robert Parker, "Five charged with murder of Southall Asian youth," The Times (London, England), 8 June 1976;
"Two young men jailed over Asian's death." The Times (London, England), 3 May 1977.
1
2

1

2
police had alienated Indian youth in Southall. “I remember his death. I remember the shock to
the community,” notes Kuldeep Mann. “That was a turning point I think in my memory and for a
lot of people in Southall as well.”5 Evident in Mann’s statement, young Asians in Southall had
been politicized in the aftermath of the murder. At the same time, they grew impatient with the
gradualism of the Indian Workers Association (Southall), a long-established community
organization, because of its reputation for passing resolutions but not engaging in direct action.
By the end of the Sunday demonstration, under the leadership of Suresh Grover and others, the
Southall Youth Movement had been formed and second-generation Asian youth in Southall
entered the struggle against racism and fascism in Britain.6
Chaggar’s murder shook the South Asian community in Southall. According to a 2015
interview with the BBC, Suresh Grover believes that the late 1970s, especially after the murder
of Gurdip Singh Chaggar and, in 1979, the police killing of Blair Peach, both in Southall,
transformed South Asian politics in Britain. “It was the first time young people - mainly Asians
but with a sprinkling of African-Caribbean people from Southall,” he contends, “took to the
streets and organised themselves as a youth movement against racial violence and police
harassment in Southall.”7 While these events in the late-1970s were indeed pivotal for the second
generation, native-born British Asians in Southall, it is easy to overestimate the significance of
Grover’s claim.
As this dissertation details, the history of South Asian radicalism in Britain very often
had young people at its center. Rather than suggesting that the rise of white nationalism and

5

Quoted in Ramamurthy, Black Star, 26.
Campaign Against Racism and Fascism (CARF), Southall: The Birth of a Black Community (London: Institute of
Race Relations, 1981), 52.
7
Puri, “The Pool of Blood.”
6

3
police brutality in the late-1970s radicalized South Asians for the first time after decades of
migration, it is imperative to see these events as adumbrating the political education of secondgeneration British Asians without characterizing all that came before as the mendicancy of
elders. I suggest that this moment has a genealogy rooted in South Asian radicalism in Britain.
The Indian Workers Association, the Association of Indian Communists, and the Black People’s
Alliance of the 1960s and 1970s had been steeped in an ethos of self-defense and anti-fascism
and were themselves the products of communist internationalism, Indian anticolonialism, and
Pan-Africanism of the interwar period. The response to Chaggar’s murder can, therefore, only be
appreciated within the historical context of migrant politics that emerged over the course of the
twentieth century. Thus, while the revolutionary zeal of youth in Southall might have been
transformative for Asian politics in West London, it was not without precedent.
Situated between early instances of economic migration from Punjab in the 1920s and the
disintegration of the Labour Movement in the 1980s, this dissertation examines the political and
social formation of Punjabis in twentieth century Britain. This project offers a discursive
corrective to analyses of the British working-class that exclude or ignore the presence of
thousands of nonwhite workers that came to the United Kingdom during that period and offers
an assessment of the multiracial constitution of the British working-class and labour movement.
As a contribution to South Asian history, this dissertation pursues a deterritorialized study of
South Asian and Punjabi history -- as a history of people rather than a place. By bridging the
historiographical divide of partition and independence, this project explores the significant
interplay between the histories and struggles of host and home societies. These struggles were
often mutually reinforcing for migrants, who, because they exist at the interstices of both
societies, were mobilized by events near and far. Rather than insisting on the primary and

4
definitive importance that one or the other place, native or host society, has on the development
of ideologies, alliances, or cultures, this dissertation posits that they are historically produced, for
mobile people, out of movement, interaction, and experience. Thus, this project centers on
transnational connections and intergroup alliances, what I call migrant internationalism, as an
essential medium through which to understand the history of South Asian migrant workers in
Britain.
Methodology
This study of the South Asian labor diaspora is underpinned by a critical awareness of the
layered identities that influence the creation of communities and political networks. Of
importance in this context is a clear understanding of the kinds of collaboration and resistance
that characterizes South Asian worker politics and experience in Britain. From the early 1920s
onward, interwar internationalism, embodied by the League Against Imperialism and the
Communist International, emphasized that the “communities of belonging” open to South Asian
activists and travelers represented global networks of resistance and de-emphasized state power
and the bounds of national identity.8 However, the breadth of communities that emerged in
Britain after World War I subverted Soviet internationalist hegemony and opened bonds of
affinity that exceeded the struggle for national liberation by uniting disparate projects for social,
economic, and political change. For South Asians in Britain, the goals of nationalism and

Kris Manjapra, “Communist Internationalism and Transcolonial Recognition,” in Cosmopolitan Thought Zones:
South Asia and the Global Circulation of Ideas (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010): 159-177; Partha Chatterjee,
“Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: Some Observations from Modern Indian History,”
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 36, 2 (August 2016): 320-334; Ali Raza examines
how international communism shaped Punjabi interwar politics and the deterritorialization of Punjabi identity: Ali
Raza, “Separating the Wheat from the Chaff: Meerut and the Creation of ‘Official’ Communism in India,”
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East, 33, 3 (2013): 316-330.See also Ali Raza, Franziska
Roy, Benjamin Zachariah, eds., The Internationalist Moment: South Asia, Worlds, and World Views 1917-39
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2015).
8

5
internationalism were not perceived of as mutually exclusive, one parochial and the other
universal. Rather, the two movements were linked through anti-imperialist aspirations in pursuit
of a more just future.9
The emergence of migrant internationalism in metropolitan neighborhoods of
“overlapping diasporas” among Punjabi peddlers and industrial laborers was a manifestation of
colonial internationalism in Britain.10 It articulates the intersection of class mobilization and
militant anticolonialism that emerged in the interwar period and found new life in postwar
British society. A fuller engagement with migrant internationalism among Punjabis in Britain is
an essential step in confronting the long-term radical politics that shaped their transnational
activism as travelers, workers, and revolutionaries. The concept encourages a return to, and a
reassessment of, the power of the Communist International (Comintern) on the lives of workingclass migrants in western European cities as well as the emergence of communist movements in
South Asia and throughout the colonial world.
Migrant internationalism is fundamentally about the nature and condition of South Asian
worker politics that emerged in British cities throughout the twentieth century. Concerns about
proletarianization, working-class consciousness, and the applicability of the concepts of British
Marxist labor historians to the South Asian context has been a fiercely debated topic over the
course of the last forty years. By putting the concepts of affective communities, wherein
apparently disparate individuals are brought together through common experiences, and

G. Thomas Burgess, “Mao in Zanzibar: Nationalism, Discipline and the (De-) Construction of Afro-Asian
Solidarities,” in Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and its Political Afterlives, Christopher Lee,
ed. (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010), 196-234; Manu Goswami, “Imaginary Futures and Colonial
Internationalisms,” American Historical Review 117, no. 5 (December 2012): 1461-1485.
10
Earl Lewis, “To Turn as on a Pivot: Writing African Americans into a History of Overlapping Diasporas,” The
American Historical Review, 100, no. 3 (1995): 765.
9

6
vernacular cosmopolitanism, which fits together the parochial with the universal, with
internationalism, this project charts the ways in which Punjabi migrants in Britain deployed
transnational and interracial political alliances to engage with the labor movement and radical
politics in twentieth century Britain.11 To that end, this dissertation will explore the networks that
working-class Indians created in Britain and the politics these networks facilitated sought the
concomitant destruction of colonialism and imperialism, white supremacy, and racial capitalism.
In the tradition of labor and subaltern historians, this project is built on a close reading of
the records in an attempt to access the mentalities of marginalized people and produce a narrative
of the political and cultural coalitions in which Punjabis participated that broke down the barriers
between host and home and transcended ethnic and national boundaries.12 The Indian migrants,
whose stories, affiliations, and politics, fill the following pages are not, for the most part, wellknown to history. In the interest of reconstructing their networks and their activism, I have made
considerable recourse to surveillance and police documents because these are not individuals
who were widely covered by the press nor did they bequeath their libraries and personal papers
to archives. Nevertheless, I have made every attempt to use the intelligence apparatus to
demonstrate the agency and intentionality of Indian migrant peddlers and workers in Britain

11

Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-De-Siècle Radicalism, and the Politics of
Friendship. (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Pnina Werbner, Anthropology and the New Cosmopolitanism:
Rooted, Feminist and Vernacular Perspectives (New York: Berg, 2008); Kamala Visweswaran, Un/Common
Cultures: Racism and the Rearticulation of Cultural Difference (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010); Walter D.
Mignolo, Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2012).
12
E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964); E. J. Hobsbawm,
Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York: W.W.
Norton, 1965); Gareth Stedman Jones, Languages of Class: Studies in English Working Class History, 1832-1982
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Selected Subaltern
Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class History:
Bengal, 1890-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).

7
rather than to rehearse the frantic search for a “Bolshevik Menace” or the “dark million” that
agitated journalists and policy-makers alike throughout this period. Thus, I have deployed the
meticulous information gathering that the Metropolitan Police and the Indian Political
Intelligence service conducted to reconstruct the kinds of coalitions that Indians created abroad
in pursuit of economic opportunity and anticolonial mobilization. Characterizations of their
politics or movement as extremist or devious by the intelligence community is instructive not
only in terms of how they were perceived by the state, but also, and more importantly, because
these documents reveal much about the materiality of migration. It is in that latter sense that I
hope my use of government archives will be understood.
The title of this dissertation pays homage to the long tradition of radical newsletters and
pamphlets that South Asian migrants published in Britain. Lalkar, which means “challenge” in
many South Asian languages and could also be translated as “red work” in reference to the
aspirations of communist internationalism, was one of the official newsletters of the Indian
Workers Association. First published in 1967 under the editorship of Avtar Singh Jouhl, it sought
to challenge racism in Britain and imperialism abroad -- both of which the paper viewed as
inevitable aspects of late-industrial global capitalism. The first issue resonated with activists for
decoloniality throughout Britain. Self-described “revolutionary Afro-Asian Journalist” Molapo
Q. Molapo, a representative of the Basutoland Congress Party in London, wrote to Avtar Singh
to congratulate him on the inaugural issue and stated that “I have no doubt that your
revolutionary journal will advance concrete contribution towards our noble struggle.”13 Since
Lalkar articulated migrant internationalism in Britain as a mouthpiece of movements for national

13

Molapo to Jouhl, 27 September 1967, Papers of the Indian Workers Association, MS2141 A/4/1/84. The Wolfson
Centre for Archival Research at the Library of Birmingham.
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liberation and democracy, it serves as a fitting encapsulation of the politics of Punjabi migrant
workers in Britain that this project examines.
The core topic of this project was shaped by the work of the Subaltern Studies
collective.14 However, this project rejects the argument that working-class politics, as a
manifestation of subalternity, were articulated in distinct and autonomous domains unconnected
to wider social, political, and economic processes.15 Although the critique of Subaltern Studies is
well-worn terrain,16 it is worth noting that this dissertation, though it is inspired and informed by
the Subaltern Studies corpus, must diverge both from the analysis of South Asian peasant
societies at the center of the first iteration of the Subaltern Studies in the 1980s and from the
notion of the subalternity of Indian elites that informed the crux of the work produced in the era
of postcolonial studies in the 1990s.
Partly the reason for my research’s divergence from early Subaltern Studies work is that
my analysis pertains near exclusively to the twentieth century, whereas the bulk of analysis
published in the 1980s in the Subaltern Studies anthologies considered the eighteenth and

14

Selected Subaltern Studies monographs: Ranajit Guha, Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983); Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A
Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed Books, 1986);Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds, Selected
Subaltern Studies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-Class
History: Bengal, 1890-1940 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its
Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Ranajit Guha,
Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1997); Ranajit Guha, editor, A Subaltern Studies Reader, 1986-1995 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1997); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2000).
15
Ranajit Guha, “On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India,” in Selected Subaltern Studies, ed.
Ranajit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Oxford University Press 1988), 40.
16
Javeed Alam, “Peasantry, Politics, and Historiography: Critique of New Trend in Relation to Marxism,” Social
Scientist 11, no. 2 (February 1983): 43-54; Rosalind O’Hanlon, “Recovering the Subject: Subaltern Studies and
Histories of Resistance in Colonial South Asia,” Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 1 (1988): 189-222; Sumit Sarkar,
“The Decline of the Subaltern in Subaltern Studies,” in Writing Social History (Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1997), 82-108; Vivek Chibber, Postcolonial Theory and the Specter of Capital (London: Verso, 2013).
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nineteenth centuries. Certainly, this project with its emphasis on internationalism in the Punjabi
diaspora could hardly have been set in an earlier time. Much social science analysis has
suggested that Indian immigrants, especially in the postwar era, existed in ethnic enclaves within
British cities. This dissertation argues that, far from being alienated from British society, Punjabi
workers were deeply embedded in British social and political milieus. A necessary component to
individual and collective survival was the ability to integrate with migrants and natives from the
working-class as well as political and social elites. The interpenetration of workers’ domains and
myriad other spheres of religious, political, and social influence impacted the worldview and
activism of those workers. In other words, this dissertation cannot but reject the central thesis of
early Subaltern Studies scholarship that posited an autonomous domain for the subaltern.
Following Rajnarayan Chandavarkar’s pioneering research into worker politics and noninstitutional networks in the Bombay cotton mills and adjoining neighborhoods, this project
contributes to the emerging scholarship on the agency of the Indian working class in the early- to
mid-twentieth century and the changing perception among workers of the ways in which they
could negotiate the conditions of their labor.17 Gopalan Balachandran has brought critical
attention to, and attempted to dislodge, the “conventional assumptions about the centrality of
freedom in capital’s social relationships in the West” in the pre-war era by examining the myriad
forms of unfree and coerced labor in the history of capitalism.18 Thus, a transnational
appreciation of worker social and political formation of Indian migrants in Britain both
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magnifies the importance of the interwar period as a global moment for workers to claim rights
as workers as states and corporations sought to restrict those rights during global economic
depression and the era of western deindustrialization.
Crucially, this work challenges conventional notions of colonial modernity by
demonstrating through a transnational frame that the struggles for representation and political
power overlapped among non-elite populations in South Asia and Northern Europe.19
“Historicism,” Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, “came to non-European peoples in the nineteenth
century as somebody's way of saying 'not yet' to somebody else.”20 This kind of historical
incrementalism contends that non-European people were necessarily incomplete historical agents
when confronted with presumed universal standards of modernity and, therefore, could not
achieve historical developments in advance of Europe. In contradistinction to such a Eurocentrist interpretation of history, Chakrabarty provides the concept of “peasant-but-modern,”
which allows him to argue that the different modernity that was attained in non-European
contexts is modernity nonetheless.21 One of this dissertation’s contentions, however, is that this
alternate modernity is not the only kind of modernity available to non-European societies. Not
only do non-European societies have access to peasant modernity, but also participate in the
global renegotiation of workers' rights at the center of modern history.22
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Through an exploration of transnational politics, this project works toward a
deterritorialization of South Asian history by engaging with the idea of Global Asia.23 In so far
as the numbers of Punjabis migrating to Britain created the category of British Asian history, it
no less contributed to the intertwined issues of colonial capitalism, military recruitment, and
labor formation in South Asia. Therefore, this project is structured around a continuity that is
often elided by histories of South Asia that end with independence and partition in 1947. Since
emigration from India in the interwar period was foundational to settlement and political
formation subsequent to the creation of India and Pakistan, a broader timeframe is essential to
any understanding of the history of the Punjabi left in the twentieth century. Revolutionary
anticolonialism in Punjab emerged through a dialogic relationship between migration and return
and was steeped in the socialist internationalism of the interwar period. Yet, historians have been
slow to incorporate South Asian narratives into understandings of British class formation the
experiences of the diaspora have often been compartmentalized and separated from South Asian
history both processes have the effect of reducing the histories of migrants to a liminality that is
not fully recognized by historians of India or Britain. An important contention of this
dissertation, in contrast, is that the history of Punjabis in Britain must be viewed simultaneously
as integral to South Asian and British history.
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Historiography
Literatures on South Asians in Britain and anti-colonial transnationalism in Britain, the
intersection of which is where this dissertation exists, are often represented at the exclusion of
one another. In the era of Race Relations Studies in Britain, during the 1960s and 1970s, the
primary focus of scholarship was on the ability of nonwhite commonwealth immigrants to
integrate or assimilate into postwar British society. This work was particularly concerned with
the arrival of Afro-Caribbean and South Asian economic migrants who came to Britain in the era
of full employment during postwar reconstruction and took up low skilled employment in
factories, foundries, and municipal transportation authorities. By focusing on race and class
consciousness among these migrants and native-born residents of the United Kingdom some of
this work also queried nascent sociocultural organizations and sought to establish the nature of
black political activism, which emphasized the shared histories of imperialism, exploitation, and
dispossession of Afro-Caribbean, African, and South Asian migrants.24
As the first wave of Race Relations scholarship subsided in the 1980s, historical attention
turned to an earlier epoch to examine the emergence of race and racism in Britain that was tied to
imperial racial ideologies of the late-nineteenth century. While rooted in an examination of the
social and legal contours of Britishness that codified a white national identity, this generation of
scholarship also began considering cross-cultural encounters that facilitated resistance to racially
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exclusive definitions of belonging. Although such work resonates with this dissertation, it differs
because of its limited temporal scope and dearth of archival engagement. This dissertation shares
its point of origin in the interwar period with the first waves of nonwhite migrant workers with
and expands it into an analysis of postwar trends of movement, settlement, and political
formation, two periods which are conventionally kept separate.25 Thus, the effect of this project
is both to demonstrate that migration redefined conceptions of British identity and to expose the
transnational linkages that animated working class radicalism throughout the period of
anticolonial agitation and Western deindustrialization in the twentieth century.
Recent scholarship on South Asians in Britain has moved away from focusing on the
ability of newcomers to assimilate into their host society and the violence inherent in that
process. Much recent work explores community formation and the efforts of migrants to recreate
cultural and religious institutions in Britain. Because of the large Punjabi Sikh population in
Britain, the Sikh diaspora specifically has received significant attention recently in part to offer a
fuller understanding of the Sikh separatist movement for Khalistan that emerged in the 1980s.26
This literature begins with the immediate postwar period of mass migration from colonies and
former colonies to Britain during reconstruction and full-employment. Such studies end with the
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aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 to gesture toward the
rejuvenation of anti-Muslim prejudice as well as attempts by Hindus and Sikhs to differentiate
themselves from Muslims socially and politically. Without the context of earlier migration
patterns, the events of the postwar period can often appear as sui generis, a tendency this project
avoids by beginning with the arrival of Punjabi peddlers and seamen in the 1920s and 1930s.
The depth of belonging that South Asians, including students, dignitaries, and workers,
had on British shores and their contributions to British society and culture was the organizing
theme of the 2007 UK Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) research project titled
“Making Britain: South Asian Visions of Home and Abroad.” Primarily, this project generated
work that intended to exhibit the myriad contributions that South Asians had made to British
culture, literature, and cinema. Due to that focus, the histories that emerged tended to chart the
lives of social elites and their cross-cultural encounters while in Britain.27 Others beyond the
AHRC project have also contributed to emerging scholarship on British class and race prejudice
in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. The Anglo-Indian experience, with the manifold
ways in which these travelers navigated a new and occasionally hostile environment, has been
examined through the lives of students, athletes, and politicians. Certainly, the important work
produced on this topic in the first decade of the twenty-first century has shared many of the
conclusions about South Asian elites in British society and the contributions that they were able
to make because of their class status.28
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The AHRC project, which is the most recent cohort of studies, produced only one
volume, the anthology South Asian Resistances in Britain, 1858-1947, that looked closely at
either anti-colonial mobilization in general or at worker politics in particular prior to the creation
of India and Pakistan.29 There have been some attempts to examine the transnational linkages of
South Asians in Britain in the last several years by scholars unaffiliated with the AHRC project;
however, the scope of these projects has been truncated temporally or topically. The Indian
Workers Association, which figures prominently in the present dissertation, has been a perennial
focus for scholars of South Asian resistance in Britain. Dewitt John published the first booklength study of the organization in 1969 and over the decades it has been a flashpoint for
discussions of South Asian political organizing in Britain.30 Yet, most available work has relied
too heavily on John’s study or has focused on factionalism within the organization to a point that
obfuscates the impact it had on British political culture in the postwar era.31 In the past few
years, the IWA has received renewed interest from academics but the extant literature either
sketches out avenues for possible future research or remains limited to microhistorical analysis
without demonstrating the social and political lineage of South Asian migration to Britain from
the 1920s and 1970s.32
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In the 1980s, attention to the long history of economic migration to Britain from the
Caribbean, Africa, and Asia began to displace the race relations focus on assimilation,
integration, and the impact that nonwhite migration had on British society. The historical
sociology that attends to questions of black and brown proletarianization in Britain and the
formation of African and Asian political and cultural organizations, especially in London and
Birmingham, is foundational to this dissertation. The cross-fertilization between Stuart Hall, Paul
Gilroy, and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS) at the University of
Birmingham and the Institute for Race Relations (IRR) under the leadership of A. Sivanandan
recast the narrative of race relations as one of white British racism and contributed considerably
to understandings of black political agency in this period.33 John Solomos’ extensive work on the
sociology of race and ethnicity in Britain, Tariq Modood’s writing on Islam and multiculturalism
in Britain, and Satnam Virdee’s research that combines the historical sociology of racism and
ethnicity with that of class stratification in Britain extend the research agenda of the CCCS and
the IRR into the twenty-first century.34
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This dissertation, therefore, seeks the company of scholarship that focuses on the political
and social lives of migrants from the colonial and postcolonial world. Recent work has
contributed considerably to understandings of black internationalism and the politics of race in
Britain through examinations of the transnational networks of activist African and Caribbean
intellectuals and workers in the twentieth century.35 In the interwar period, London was both the
center of the British Empire and became a locus of black anticolonial strategizing and decolonial
imaginings. As Afro-Caribbean migrants navigated questions of belonging and citizenship in the
decades after the Empire Windrush dropped anchor at Tilbury Dock, on 22 June 1948, Britain
continued to represent a site of economic opportunity and contested national identity.36 Prior
work on colonial and postcolonial migration to Britain recognizes that Indian anticolonialism and
black politics influenced one another but highlights the internationalist associations of African,
Caribbean, and American intellectuals in the imperial metropolis. Thus, the inter-ethnic and
trans-colonial solidarities between South Asian, African, and Caribbean migrants upon which
much of the anticolonial activism of this period was built has not been adequately explored by
historians. This dissertation offers new insights into that relationship.
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The work of Vaughan Robinson and Rozina Visram moved the field of South Asians in
Britain away from race relations and toward a social history of the centuries-old movement of
servants, soldiers, and statesmen back and forth between colony and metropole.37 Peter Fryer,
Ron Ramdin, and Dilip Hiro also contributed to the study of nonwhite economic migration from
the colonies and commonwealth to challenge further the idea that modern Britain was a
homogenous, white society.38 Yet, by situating these studies within national frames they are
limited in their ability to move beyond the ramifications that nonwhite migration had on British
society. A body of literature whose influence on the current project runs in parallel with studies
of black internationalism and South Asian labor migration to Britain involves what G.
Balachandran has deemed, in a different context, the “New Transnational History” of South
Asia.39 These studies build on histories of South Asian migrants in North America, which
constituted a social history of South Asian migrant labor on farms and in the lumber yards of the
late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries.40 Attention to the transnational linkages of South
Asian political and social formation in the United States has gained prominence in the twentyfirst century and has emerged as a critical site of exchange for scholars of migration, sexuality,
and internationalism.41 Among the most important lessons of this literature for the current project
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are the sophisticated and deeply textured accounts of social complexity embodied in the
communities that South Asian migrants joined and redefined upon arrival.
Though inspiring work has been produced on the social history of African, African
American, and Afro-Caribbean migrants in Britain, the themes covered in recent studies on
South Asian American history -- commercial networks, social activism, and interracial intimacy - have not adequately been discussed in the literature on South Asians in Britain. Therefore, this
dissertation is a contribution to the scant literature on the South Asian diaspora in Britain that
engages with the agency and positionality of migrant workers through descriptions and analysis
of their political and social organizations, their relationships, and their neighborhoods.42 Unique
in its temporal breadth, this dissertation reframes the contributions of Indian activists and
workers in concert with other colonial migrants and white allies as integral to the history of
internationalism and anticolonialism in Britain in the twentieth century. By bringing together
South Asian histories of movement and British histories of race and racism, this dissertation
combines the priorities of the recent research on black internationalism, race in British political
culture and the “lost histories” of South Asian transnationalism.
Chapters
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Chapter One charts the ways in which British policy in Punjab facilitated the emergence
of a Punjabi diaspora and led to the emergence of Punjabi anticolonial politics that spanned the
globe. In the 1930s, Punjabi left politics was characterized by a fluidity between
constitutionalism and insurgency. By foregrounding the importance of mobility to Punjabi
political mobilization, this chapter argues that appreciating the cyclical movement of labor and
revolutionary praxis between India and Europe is integral for understanding the influence that
global capitalism had on the struggle against imperialism in India. Additionally, this chapter
describes how this mobility shaped successive generations of Punjabi radicals through a dialogic
relationship between Indian migrant workers in Britain and the networks in Punjab that sustained
them.
The inter-war history of Indian workers in Britain, primarily seamen who had deserted
dehumanizing conditions on ship to find better wages on shore, forms the core of the second
chapter. While Indian lascars, generally Punjabi and Bengali Muslims, escaped their contracts
due to inhumane treatment, their presence in Britain was not systematically recorded until the
enactment of the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925. This new legal
apparatus caused confusion among Indian residents who in many cases had married local women
and considered themselves British subjects with the right to remain. Lascar recruitment, working
conditions, and settlement patterns, which chapter two outlines, are fundamental to the broader
history of migrant internationalism among Punjabis in Britain. Moreover, this chapter examines
the racial, gendered, and class-based anxieties that were articulated with the advent of nonwhite
settlement in British port towns and industrial cities.
After World War I, Punjabis were caught in the double-bind of colonial capitalism at
home, which made small scale agriculture untenable, and industrial capitalism, in which they
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sought a non-agricultural livelihood. Yet, when Punjabi migrants attempted to participate in the
British industrial economy, they endured racial discrimination in factory hiring and unequal
contracts in the Merchant Navy. Thus, in contradistinction to the exclusionary practices of the
racial capitalism in British ships and factories, chapter three analyzes how working-class
neighborhoods throughout Britain facilitated a migrant economy that functioned as an alternative
to the sea and the shop floor. Specifically, from the mid-1920s escaped Punjabi Muslim seamen
and Sikh travelers formed an Indian peddler fraternity. Furthermore, by conceiving of the built
environment of the neighborhood as a socio-spatial entity enabling “undesirable” migrants to
navigate the fringes of British capitalism and mobilize non-institutional networks for housing,
credit, and work, this chapter demonstrates that the migrant economy subverted prevailing
assumptions of ethnic segregation and exposed the porousness of racial capitalism in interwar
Britain.
In the early twentieth century, Indian students and organizers in Britain had sought to
work within the confines of British social and political institutions in order to bring about
incremental political change in India. However, Punjabis in interwar Britain increasingly sought
a more direct confrontation with British imperial policy. Framed with the trial and execution of
Udham Singh, who murdered former Lieutenant Governor of Punjab Michael O’Dwyer in 1940,
chapter four charts the emergence of revolutionary anticolonialism among Indians in Britain.
Admirers of the San Francisco-based militant anticolonial Ghadar Party, these Punjabis pursued
radical solidarities with Pan-African, Indian nationalist, and British anticolonial movements in
Birmingham, Coventry, and London. This chapter contextualizes Udham Singh’s martyrdom
within the nascent black internationalism symbolized by Paul Robeson and the West African
Students Union and transnational South Asian anticolonialism that memorialized Singh’s
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execution. Furthermore, this chapter suggests that the Indian Workers Association, formed
during the Second World War and Singh’s trial, was integral to articulating a Ghadarite
anticolonialism in Britain.
The story of Udham Singh exhibits the heterodoxy of Punjabi politics in the interwar
period as the trial and appeal were characterized by a broad spectrum of supporters that were
often at odds concerning strategies for Indian freedom, the legitimacy of revolutionary violence,
and the desirability of international communism. Chapter five further outlines the idiosyncrasies
of Punjabi radicalism by examining the salience of non-Stalinist communist internationalism, or
Trotskyism, for anticolonial politics during World War Two. Specifically, this chapter shows the
tactical and ideological uniformity between Punjabis in India and Britain by detailing the
transnational mobilization against the British war effort among Sikhs, who were
disproportionately recruited into military service in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Indeed, as this chapter points out, the anti-war movement, inflected by the sentiment that Stalin’s
Soviet Union had abandoned the colonial world by entering the “imperialist war,” helped to
consolidate South Asian anticolonialists and non-Stalinist British communists under a single
banner in the 1940s.
Chapter six explores the resonance that the Asian-African Conference had in emerging
postcolonial states and among marginalized communities of color Britain during the Cold War.
Held in Bandung, Indonesia, in April 1955, the conference emphasized the creation of a third
way between American and Soviet hegemony, which animated the political alliances of
Commonwealth migrants in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s and structured anti-racism and antiimperialism in Cold War Britain. Through the pamphlets of activist and organizer Chowdry
Akbar Ali Khan, this chapter examines a “praxis of Bandung” that highlights episodes of migrant
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resistance rooted in inter-cultural cooperation and non-violence to demand human and
democratic rights. This study demonstrates the ways in which the spirit of Bandung was
articulated in Britain by Commonwealth migrants in pursuit of international cooperation at the
height of the Cold War.
Yet, the politics of friendship embodied in the Final Communique from Bandung proved
ineffective in the face of racial violence against Indians in Britain and international tensions
between India and China in the 1960s. The consolidation of Maoism in Britain, especially among
Indian migrants, marked a new phase in the struggle against white supremacy in Britain and the
erosion of civil liberties in postcolonial India. Beginning with the 1964 election in Smethwick
and the overt racism of Conservative candidate Peter Griffiths’ campaign, this chapter charts the
trajectory of anti-fascist politics in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, among South Asian
activists in this period, the Emergency governments in India and progressively anti-immigrant
legislation in Britain came to be seen within the same lens of illegitimate state power. This
chapter highlights the Maoist turn among Indian radicals in Britain to understand the
simultaneous and overlapping trends in India and Britain. Motivated by the revolutionary
ideology of Mao, Frantz Fanon’s views on the inevitability of decolonial violence, and the
necessity of protecting one’s rights and community by any means necessary that emerged out of
the American Civil Rights Movement, this chapter argues that the dual mobilizations against
white supremacy in Britain and totalitarianism in India were mutually reinforcing. The rise in
violence against black and brown people in Britain and against adivasis, communists, and trade
unionists in India were met with a growing practice of armed self-defense.
This project does not intend to provide an exhaustive history of the Punjabi community in
Britain. Rather, by investigating communities of working-class Punjabi migrants and British

24
radicals, it elaborates on the continuity of six decades of Punjabi diaspora radicalism, which was
sustained in neighborhoods comprised diasporic communities from Europe, Africa, and South
Asia. This confluence was sustained into the late-1970s when Trade Unionism and the Black
Power movement began to disintegrate while the British New Right became ascendant and the
Khalistani Movement in South Asia forced a reconfiguration of diaspora politics on ethnoreligious grounds. The foundation for militancy among Indian workers in Britain was
underpinned by interwar communist organizations, particularly the Communist Parties of India,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the Punjab-based Kirti Kisan Party, which had begun to
mobilize Indian migrants in British ports by the early-1920s. Thus, the cooperation between
lascars and international communism created footholds in Britain that facilitated the long-term
political education of Punjabi migrants that circulated routinely between British and Indian ports.

Chapter 1
A History of Punjabi Anticolonial Radicalism
In his forward to Pearay Mohan’s An imaginary rebellion and how it was suppressed, a
study that attempts to explain the causes of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919, Lajpat Rai
cautioned the reader that
it should not be forgotten that the Punjab has been seething with discontent for more than
twenty years. With its unique record of services in the cause of the Empire, having
profusely shed its blood in the expansion and protection of British dominions all the
world over, having given its best in developing British colonies and British possessions,
the treatment it has received has been most cruel and bitter.1
In this summary of Punjab’s place in British imperial expansion, Rai notes the important
contribution that the province made to the British Indian Army. Contingents of Punjabi soldiers
were deployed throughout the Empire and were used extensively in World War I and World War
II and as military police in East Asia. Yet participation in the colonial armed forces was not the
only kind of mobility that contributed to the creation of a Punjabi diaspora. The forms of free and
unfree labor that followed colonial expansion -- agricultural migrants in the American
Northwest, seamen in the Merchant Marine, and the indentured servants who built the Uganda
Railway in East Africa, to name a few -- were constitutive of the Punjabi migrant community
that emerged in the early- to mid-twentieth century. The history of free and unfree movement of
labor is fundamental to understanding the political orientations of Punjabi migrants that gave
way to the global anticolonial insurgency that sought to repudiate the imperial world order
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established by the British. It is in this context that I want to explore the impact of British colonial
policy on the Punjabi polity in the first thirty years of the twentieth century, which forced the
migration of Punjabis in search of a sustainable living and underpinned their politicization.
Recruitment of Sikhs into the Bengal Army was limited prior to the mid-nineteenth
century because colonial officials presumed that Sikhs would harbor anti-British sentiment in the
aftermath of the Anglo-Sikh wars that had concluded with the annexation of the province in
1849.2 Thus, the province was mostly demilitarized from 1849-1857, with only a few thousand
Punjabi soldiers recruited. The gradual shift toward Punjab as a site of recruitment was part of a
process that demobilized Bengali soldiers in eastern India who had been central to the mutiny at
Barrackpore and Meerut in April and May 1857. The command of the British Indian Army
turned to Punjab, which was isolated from the events in Bengal and the United Provinces, to
enlist soldiers to quell the rebellion. Punjabis became more heavily recruited in the 1880s during
the “Great Game” with Russia, out of British fears that Russia may invade and due to border
skirmishes with Afghans. In both cases, Punjabi Muslims and Sikhs were well positioned and
had local knowledge that would allow them to effectively defend the borders of British India,
which led to the full incorporation of Punjabis into the amalgamated Indian Army.3 Having
established zones of military recruitment throughout the province in the decades immediately
prior to World War I, the British were able to enlist sixty percent of its soldiers from Punjab,
with most Sikhs coming from central Punjab and Muslims from the Salt Range Tract cities of
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Rawalpindi and Jhelum in western Punjab.4
After 1857, to minimize the threat of mutiny, the British Indian Army adopted a strategy
whereby the rank and file were recruited from heterogeneous ethnic, linguistic, and regional
backgrounds so that “natural ‘race’ antagonisms” could be maintained between South Asian
communities. It is commonplace to observe that the composition of the British Indian Army in
the years leading up to World War I was guided by “martial race” theory, which simultaneously
sought to recruit genetically superior soldiers and those who had remained loyal during the
mutiny.5 However, it is worth considering that, though loyalty and martial race theory were
principal reasons for recruitment and contributed significantly to changing regional and religious
identities in the late-nineteenth century, there were also material reasons for enlistment.6 Tan Tai
Yong reminds us that military recruitment up to the beginning of World War I was tied to
regions that respectively comprised majorities of Muslims, Sikhs, and Hindus. While the reasons
for enlistment were rooted in economic well-being, they were distinct in each region. As such,
Muslims in the Salt Range sought economic opportunity beyond that arid region, Sikhs in central
Punjab enlisted to extricate themselves from the densely populated heavily subdivided
agricultural land, and Hindus in southeastern Punjab, those recruited in the smallest numbers,
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pursued military service as a guard against routine famine there. Moreover, the colonial
government offered land in the canal colonies as a reward for military service, which would have
helped to alleviate each of the foregoing economic conditions that Punjabis experienced, but they
were inconsistently granted after demobilization.7
The relationship between the Punjab and the British Indian Army played a significant
role in the mediation of nascent anticolonial politics in the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Tan Tai Yong has argued that the role of local landed elites in Western Punjab helped to
insulate their spheres of influence from emergent nationalism in the 1920s. Moreover, the
proximity that the recruiting boards maintained with villages facilitated the distribution of antinationalist propaganda.8 Tahir Mahmood has recently examined the importance of landed elites
in Shahpur district in Rawalpindi in not only providing military recruits, but also in competing to
limit the spread of revolutionary and anticolonial disturbances.9 For instance, in the aftermath of
the Jallianwala Bagh massacre, the Shahpur Tiwana Maliks deployed militia to protect the area
from the groundswell of boycotts, civil disobedience, and violence that had been witnessed
elsewhere in the province. Due in part to the determination of the Tiwana family to outdo one
another in the execution of martial law and to the longstanding impact that counter-propaganda
in military recruitment centers had played, there were virtually no disruptions there. 10
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Colonial Expansion, Commodity Agriculture, and Dispossession
In central Punjab, the most fertile region of the province, the population was heavily
concentrated, and the farms were small. The creation of canal colonies in Western Punjab
expanded farming into previously arid areas but the use of this land was heavily guarded and as
much as eighty percent of the newly arable land remained under direct state control.11
Agricultural dispossession, then, was tied to exclusion from the governing process. Indian
participation in the Punjab Legislative Assembly in Lahore was restricted to the nominations of
the Provincial Government, which only selected sympathetic Indians. Therefore, there was little
opportunity to devise a political solution to the issues surrounding land distribution, debt, and
military engagements, all of which affected Punjabis, especially Muslim and Sikh peasants.12
After the annexation of Punjab in 1849, the institution of revenue tax was modified and led to the
concentration of landholding into the hands of a smaller number of prosperous proprietors while
the existing cultivators stayed on as occupancy tenants.13
Though the canal colonies made the region more productive, the available land was finite
and the reward system imperfect. Punjabi agriculturalists who were unable to cultivate in the
canal colonies faced difficulties of producing food along with more lucrative cash crops in a
period of price fluctuation, land shortages, and uncertain yields.14 For these precarious farmers,
moneylenders became an essential source of capital that would both allow them to plant their
fields and pay land revenue to the colonial state. Yet, as Sucheta Mazumdar has pointed out, not
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only would moneylenders often absorb mortgaged land through legal machinations, but they
would also charge exorbitant rates of interest, as high as thirty-six percent per year, that virtually
ensured the land would pass to the creditor upon default.15 While the cycle of credit and debt that
this arrangement created in the short-term helped farmers sustain themselves during lean times,
the pressure to repay loans and subdivide landholdings gradually pushed many farmers off the
land altogether.16
It might be noted here that the waves of Punjabi migration that began at the turn of the
century and continued into the 1950s and 1960s were highly influenced by structural factors that
were heavily inflected by ethnicity. Sikhs and Muslims from Punjab were both heavily recruited
into the British Indian Army after the 1857 revolt and deployed to protect British interests in East
Asia and Africa as colonial police. Though the numbers of Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims in the
British Indian Army and various colonial police were both significant, the proportion of Sikh
enlistment was roughly ten percent whereas the proportion of Punjabi Muslim enlistment was
closer to two percent in 1895.17 While such a high rate of Sikhs went into the military outright,
many Muslims from Western Punjab were recruited into the Merchant Marine. The structural
differences between the two is more apparent in Africa. While Punjabi Sikhs went to East Africa
as cultivators in the 1890s, Punjabi Muslims were typically those indentured on the Uganda
Railway. It was, of course, Punjabi Sikhs who came to the Yuba and Imperial Valleys of
California as cultivators in the first decade of the twentieth century. The distinction in free and
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forced movement between Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims can also be gleaned in interwar Britain
where Punjabi Muslims arrived as lascars, or Indian seamen, and Punjabi Sikhs arrived in Britain
as fare-paying travelers, even though both contributed to the formation of an Indian itinerant
merchant community in the 1920s and 1930s.18 What were effectively class distinctions that
were reproduced by colonial ideologies on ethnicity and religion inform the constitution of the
Punjabi diaspora globally.
The uprising in 1907 was the result of a series of paternalist legislation that the colonial
government enacted in Punjab. According to policy makers, laws such as the Land Alienation
Act of 1900 and the Colonization of Land Bill of 1906 were intended to protect the peasantry.
However, the effect of these bills led to the alienation of large swaths of the countryside by
reducing individual agency over land use and inheritance while simultaneously imposing
burdensome fines and increasing water rates for irrigation in the canal colonies of western
Punjab. In 1907, members from all three major religious communities in the province, Hindu,
Muslim, and Sikh, joined coalesced in a significant, if short-lived, demonstration against colonial
rule in India.19 Though consequences of colonial capitalism on Punjabi agriculture had been dire,
the political effects had only just begun to materialize in Punjabi politics.
In addition to the reorganization of the landowning structure and revenue collection after
annexation, the demands of British trade and global capitalism necessitated the transformation of
Punjab into an area of commodity agriculture. The impact that classical colonialism had on
Indian economic underdevelopment and impoverishment was a point of emphasis for the votaries
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of the “drain of wealth” theory, particularly Dadabhai Naoroji and Romesh Chunder Dutt, among
others, at the turn of the twentieth century.20 With the advent of capitalist agriculture in the latenineteenth century, land use was dramatically changed in Punjab. The agrarian legislation
imposed on Punjab, as elsewhere in India, was part of the British colonial administration’s
attempt to ensure that India remained profitable through heavy taxation and guaranteed returns
on capital investment.21 Even if contemporary Punjabi migrants did not perceive the systematic
exploitation of Indian agriculture as it happened, its effect served to fuel nascent agrarian
agitation in Punjab. By the end of World War I, these upheavals merged with other local and
international concerns that resulted in broad-based anticolonial mobilization among Punjabis.
In the half century following annexation, and crucially in the years after the 1857 Revolt,
India was brought under a system of trade that was organized around the importation of
manufactured goods from Britain and exportation of agricultural raw materials to markets around
the world, especially the United States and continental Europe.22 The commodity agriculture that
India commenced during the “high noon of colonialism” often necessitated monoculture, which
was highly susceptible to failure during droughts and price fluctuation on the world market.
Indeed, the focus on exporting agricultural commodities exacerbated food production for local
markets. For instance, as Mike Davis notes about the Madras Famine that ravaged south India in
the late-1870s, “grain merchants, in fact, preferred to export a record 6.4 million cwt. of wheat to
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Europe in 1877-78 rather than relieve starvation in India.”23 A similar process occurred in Punjab
with the commercialization of agriculture in the latter half of the nineteenth century that emerged
with the ability to export surplus foodstuffs via the newly constructed transportation links that
had connected Punjab to major Indian cities and ports.24 Between the urge to export surplus food
and cultivate increasingly valuable cash crops, cultivators in Punjab became ever-more
precariously tied to the global imperial system.
Punjabis were incorporated into the “webs of empire” -- the ligaments supporting the
British imperial system -- for reasons that buttressed the expansion British political and military
hegemony as well as global capitalist development.25 Yet, the relationship between the Punjab
and the British Raj was a turbulent one. While, on one hand, the Punjab comprised the major
recruiting area for the British Indian Army in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, it
also came to present serious challenges to British colonial power in the early twentieth century.
The importance of these connections did not elude Lajpat Rai, a leader of the revolutionary
Indian nationalism that emerged in the aftermath of the first partition of Bengal in 1905 and,
later, of the Hindu reformist Arya Samaj. In his foreword to Mohan’s book, he suggests a
periodization for the consolidation of anticolonial politics in Punjab by alluding to the
longstanding disquiet in the province. For Rai, the disturbances of 1907 were an early attempt to
demonstrate the illegitimacy of the colonial government in Punjab, which was confirmed by the
massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar and the subsequent imposition of martial law in the
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province.
The Jallianwala Bagh Massacre
Though he reflected on the two decades of oppression dispossession in Punjab, Lajpat
Rai’s forward and Mohan’s book were written in response to the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of
1919. An understanding of the causes of the massacre and its ramifications for Punjabi politics
and policy is fundamental to any appreciation of the organizations and campaigns of the Punjabi
diaspora later in the century. In March 1919, the Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act,
more commonly known as the Rowlatt Act and derided by Indians as the “Black Acts,” was a
measure that extended repressive wartime legislation into the immediate postwar peace. It was
rooted in colonial fears of Bolshevik creep following the Russian Revolution and on suspicions
that Indian dissidents would contribute to the destabilization of imperial order. The Act was an
extension of the Defense of India Act (1915), which provided the government with broad powers
of censorship and detention, including the suspension of the right to a trial by jury, during World
War I. Increased food prices and poor agricultural yields in 1918-1919 combined with anger over
the repressive measures and provoked Indian nationalist resistance in the form of civil
disobedience and work stoppages. In 1919 a massive hartal was organized to protest the colonial
government and the ways in which the Acts contravened the liberal-minded MontaguChelmsford Reforms that recommended the slow devolution of political power and the
introduction of the “responsible government” of Indians by Indians.26
Per the authority given to colonial administrators, Punjabi officials renewed their focus
on nationalist and anti-British upheaval. Agitation against the proposal and implementation of
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the Rowlatt Acts incited considerable resistance throughout the country and Punjab was no
exception. The arrest and deportation of Kitchlew and Satyapal, two prominent nationalist
leaders, for giving public speeches in Amritsar and Lahore after Gandhi initiated the anti-Rowlatt
campaign, contributed to disquiet throughout the region and especially in Amritsar.27 On 11
April 1919, Miles Irving, deputy commissioner of Amritsar and staunch critic of Indian selfgovernment, issued a dictum against public assembly and implicitly instituted martial law:
The troops have orders to restore order in Amritsar and use all force necessary. Neither
gatherings of persons nor processions of any sort will be allowed. All gatherings will be
fired on. Respectable persons should keep indoors until order is restored.28
The threat of lethal force apparently did little to deter demonstrators. On 13 April, between ten
and twenty thousand people had gathered in Jallianwala Bagh, an enclosed garden in central
Amritsar. Many had assembled to protest the Rowlatt Acts but there were an untold number of
Sikh pilgrims who had traveled to the holy city of Amritsar in observation and celebration of
vaisakhi. To disrupt the thousands-strong crowd, which subverted both civil and military orders,
Brigadier General Reginald Dyer raided the space with his contingent of non-Punjabi soldiers,
immediately ordering them to open fire.29 This “holocaust of ‘native’ lives” resulted in the
murder of 379 demonstrators with another 1,137 injured.30
Although the Rowlatt Acts provided the legal pretext for martial law in India, it was
officially declared two days after the attack. The massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and subsequent
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imposition of martial law are major touchstones in the history of Punjabi anticolonialism;
however, the colonial response to perceived disturbances may not have been as severe had
Punjab not previously been transformed into the “garrison state” for the British Indian Army.
Purnima Bose instructs that law in a colonial context is complicated by the uneven acceptance of
the state’s authority. Subjects in colonial India unevenly and incompletely received the rights and
privileges that were promised to the British-born population even in times of civil administration.
Martial law was declared in order to quash the struggle for just treatment -- the illiberal response
of an illiberal regime.31 “Never in the history of our connection with England,” reflects Pearay
Mohan, “has the fact of our being a subject race been so offensively brought home to us, as in
the terrible months of martial law.”32 Indeed, with a nod to Mohandas Gandhi, Durba Ghosh has
recently argued that in 1919, “terrorism” describes the function of the government better than
that of violent political revolutionaries.33
State terrorism in Punjab in 1919 comprehensively attacked the honor, belief systems,
rights, homes, and bodies of Indians throughout the province -- but the force of the military was
focused on the central range. A chief complaint against the Rowlatt Acts was that they
undermined the right of a trial by jury. Yet, during the period of Martial Law, the colonial
judicial system was dismantled, and military tribunals were constructed and tried all those
accused of undermining the King’s government. In total, 852 people were accused of committing
crimes against the government, 581 were convicted with 108 being sentenced to death. Eighteen
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people were ultimately executed while the rest of the sentences were commuted by Royal
Amnesty proclaimed in December 1919. 264 people were convicted and transported for life.34
The institution of military tribunals was matched by cases of vindictive deprivation, such
as limiting access to electricity, water, and train travel, as well as corporal punishment. Among
the latter, public flogging appears to have been the most common. Derek Sayer points out that
“ritualistic humiliation” was exacted in myriad ways. High-caste men and professionals were
forced to do menial work, people in Gujranwala were ordered to salute uniformed European
officers, and those in Kasur had to skip rather than walk. Dyer established the “crawling lane” as
a collective punishment for the injury of a European woman during a protest. Here, all those who
passed down the road were forced to do so on their stomachs while being prodded and kicked by
armed soldiers.35
The indiscriminate violence and humiliation in Punjab deployed against the “open
rebellion” that emerged out of the anti-Rowlatt agitation was seldom more dramatic and brazen
than during the aerial bombardment of Gujranwala.36 According to newspaper reports, a
procession of demonstrators had set the Gujranwala train station on fire as part of a spate of
attacks on symbols of colonial rule. To scatter the procession (and allegedly to limit property
damage and loss of life), airplanes were dispatched from Lahore with instructions to “drop a few
bombs on a mob.” During Indian Questions in the House of Commons, Colonel Wedgwood,
Independent Labour Party MP for Newcastle-under-Lyme, asked Edwin Montagu, Secretary of
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State for India, whether airplanes had been used and if any thought had been given to “more
humane” options since “aeroplanes cannot drop bombs accurately and that bombs dropped on
large towns are almost certain to hit the wrong people.” Dismissing Wedgwood’s concerns as
well as the myth of humanitarian colonialism, Montagu flatly responded that “[c]ertainly in this
case the aeroplane was successful in dispersing the mob.”37
The Ghadar Movement and the Emergence of Sikh Radicalism
In early-twentieth century Punjab, demographics and political institutions varied
geographically. Thus, to argue, as Yong and Mahmood have, that western Punjab was
successfully inoculated against the spread of radical ideas because of the forces of a strong
landed elite and the close attention of the military, is not to suggest that Punjab was sheltered
from the disruptions of burgeoning nationalism and militant anticolonialism. Even the 1907
disturbances, which occurred throughout the canal colonies of western Punjab, undermine the
narrative of universal passivity in these areas. They demonstrate that rural elites were not
omnipotent in their spheres of influence and that rural peasants were able and willing to question
the legitimacy of the colonial government when their customary rights to water and land were
threatened. However, as has been the subject of considerable scholarship, central Punjab was
pivotal in the concentration and articulation of national self-determination and revolutionary
communism in this period.38 Since the military recruitment apparatus was most effective in
regions of entrenched landed elite, its power was circumscribed in this Sikh-dominant region.
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The more diffuse nature of political power and influence in the doabs of central Punjab made it
more conducive to demonstrations for democratic governance and freedom from foreign
hegemony. This phenomenon is foundational to the greater likelihood of nationalist and
anticolonial politics entering Sikh political discourse in the early interwar period.39
The Ghadar Party was founded in San Francisco in 1913 by expatriate intellectuals that
sought to organize Punjabi farmers and lumber workers in the Pacific Northwest who had
migrated to the United States to escape economic, political, and social oppression under the
British administration in Punjab.40 From its inception, the Party pursued “militant antiimperialism, economic egalitarianism, and social emancipation,” and outpaced conventional
Indian nationalist organizations in the demand for independence.41 The party was rooted as much
in conditions in Punjab as in the experience of racial discrimination and segregation in the
United States. The use of the term ghadar, meaning ”mutiny” or ”rebellion" in many South
Asian languages, is a reminder of the role that Punjabi soldiers played in quelling the uprising in
1857.42 Although, the Ghadar Party emerged at the intersection of American racism and colonial
oppression, it became a transnational network of nationalists, anarchists, socialists, and PanIslamists that demonstrated the fact that “much of the power of the independence struggle was
incubated outside the territory of British India.”43 Ghadar is most commonly remembered for
conspiring with German sources, smuggling weapons into British India, and foment a mutiny
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among Punjabi troops that resulted in a failed attempt to overthrow the Indian colonial
government in 1914. This plan resulted in the Hindu-German Conspiracy case of 1915, which
was tried at US District Court in San Francisco and, in India, the First Lahore Conspiracy case of
1921. Both cases led to the imprisonment of some leaders and the deportation of many others. In
the short-term, the Ghadar Party was significantly fragmented; yet, in the long-term, it was able
to continue organizing and recruiting from its headquarters at 5 Wood Street in San Francisco,
and from branches across the globe, until the late 1930s.44
Although often considered a failure due to the collapse of the mutiny effort in 1915, the
interwar iteration of the Ghadar Party integrated Punjabi radicalism in North America, Europe,
and India in the interwar period. Ghadar’s contribution to the Akali Movement and the ways in
which its political orientation changed between 1920-1925 marks an important transition period
for the Party as well as those revolutionaries who continued to return and those who had been
detained after 1914. The contact that Ghadarites made with Sikh activists during the Akali
movement further served to transform the landscape for Punjabi resistance in the early-1920s as
the line between Sikh communitarian politics and communist anti-colonialism became more and
more difficult to discern as “communism had become embedded in local spaces” and the Sikh
demand for autonomy in religious practice and gurdwara management slipped between religious
reform and political agitation.45
Being upset both by Government appointed managers of the Darbar Sahib as well as the
provincial Mahants who many viewed as “immoral,” the Sikhs of central Punjab organized
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jathas that consolidated into the Akali movement. Initially, though the colonial administration
perceived a more militant wing of the Akali movement, the Punjab administration suggested that
the movement was non-violent. Nevertheless, the widespread disaffection required comment:
“Even the more sensible Sikhs lost patience with the ordinary civil procedure and the more
extreme men advocated occupation of shrines by force.”46 Among the most prominent nonviolent acts was the decision that Akali leaders made to organize the Prabandhak Committee as a
way of restoring management of the Golden Temple to Sikhs. However, during the
“breakdown”47 of political and social order that the Non-cooperation and Khilafat movements
suggested, the Akalis demonstrated more militancy and began to “declaim violently against
Government, and to speak openly of the coming Raj of the Sikhs.”48 Thus, the Akalis led both a
political and religious reform movement that had anti-colonialism at its heart and had broad
appeal among Sikhs in Punjab.
In 1923, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau (DIB) reported that “the Sikh national
movement has obtained a very firm hold everywhere and a strong conviction exists in the minds
of all Sikhs that Government has deliberately aimed at damaging their religion.” The Akali
movement had achieved a level of penetration in the central Punjab that forced the surveillance
apparatus to acknowledge “Sikhs have adopted an attitude in opposition to Government.”49
Although the Akali movement had broad rural support in Punjab it was in the Babbar Akali wing
that saw the recrudescence of the armed struggle for independence. Highlighting them as a fringe

46

Note on Sikh Question in Punjab, 1919-1922, June 1922, Punjab Proceedings Home Department, P/11277. IOR.
Sumit Sarkar, “The Conditions and Nature of Subaltern Militancy: Bengal from Swadeshi to Non-Co-operation, c.
1905-22,” Subaltern Studies III (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 305-320.
48
Note on Sikh Question in Punjab, 1919-1922. June 1922, P/11277, IOR.
49
“Extracts from Weekly Intelligence Summary for Week Ending 15 May 1923,” Sikh Activities in India, 1922-23,
L/PJ/12/170. IOR.
47

42
group, able to exercise considerable autonomy from the Akali Dal, the mainstream political
representation of the Gurdwara reform movement, and the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak
Committee, Richard King has argued that Babbar Akali reoriented the independence movement,
at least in Punjab, toward revolutionary violence.50
The Comintern and the Sikh Bachelors of Communism
Whereas the orthodox Akali movement had followed a non-violent path consonant with
Gandhian ideals, the Babbar Akalis turned to violence in the face of religious and political
persecution. One of the major reasons for the extremism of Babbar Akali tactics was the
leadership that it received from Ghadar Party revolutionaries. Indeed, the continued prominence
of Ghadarites among Punjabis contributed significantly to support for the movement in the
central Doab as well as in pockets of Punjabis across the globe. In 1926, The DIB noticed that
the Desh Bhagat Sahayak Sabha, a welfare organization that was established to support the
families of Ghadarites who had been executed to transported, had been contributing funds to the
families of Akalis as well.51 Indeed, “the interest in the Babbar Akali spirit displayed by Sikhs in
Canada and America,” HG Haig, secretary of the Indian government’s Home Department, wrote
to the Undersecretary of State for India in that same year, “points to a general revival of the
seditious activity among the Sikhs in those countries which was originally associated with what
is known as the Ghadr movement.”52 Thus, by the middle of the 1920s the colonial government
was aware of the cross-fertilization and interpenetration of Akali and Ghadar resistance that
would shape the remainder of interwar anticolonialism in Punjab.
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The imbrication of Sikh religious mobilization and radical politics in the Punjab can been
gleaned from the cooperation of Akalis and Ghadarites with nascent communist organizations in
the province. The Babbar Akali experiment of melding religious reform with anticolonial
violence was shot through with concomitant organizing between Ghadar leaders and
international communist organizations. Beginning in the 1920s, the joint activities of the Ghadar
leadership and its branch in Afghanistan represented an important locus of militancy just beyond
the reach of the British Raj.53 In 1922, Rattan Singh and Santokh Singh went to Moscow to forge
a partnership between the Party and the Comintern’s University of the Toilers of the East
(KUTV) so that Ghadar Party members could receive formal education in revolutionary history,
trade unionism, and military and vocational training.54 By 1926, the Party supplied the
Comintern with the majority of its Indian students.55 A decade later, of the seventy Indians who
had enrolled at KUTV, twenty-two had come from South America and as many as seventy
percent of all new recruits came from Rosario, Argentina.56 Rattan Singh maintained his position
as “Moscow’s chief recruiting agent where Sikhs are concerned” throughout the 1930s, and his
correspondence revealed much about the training program that had been instituted at KUTV.
In 1931, Rattan Singh and Gurmukh Singh were in Kabul working with the Soviet
Embassy to facilitate the transportation of subversive literature. Importantly, Rattan Singh was
able to enlist Ghadar Party members to work as lorry drivers along the Kabul-Peshawar road to
transmit anticolonial, communist, and nationalist literature. Hoping to block this arrangement,
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the Chief Constable of the Northwest Frontier Provinces suggested detaining lorry drivers on the
suspicion of smuggling cocaine to enable the “detection and seizure of incriminating
correspondence.”57 Nevertheless, fearing the coordination between the Embassy and the Party
and knowing that the Kabul branch had recently adopted the hammer and sickle emblem
confirming that “the movement is definitely Bolshevistic,” the Afghan Government, under King
Nadir Shah and Prime Minister Hashim Khan, deported Rattan Singh to Russia and arrested
Gurmukh Singh.58 Although Rattan Singh’s deportation to Moscow presented a small obstacle to
organizing in Afghanistan, his return to Russia allowed him to resume work within the
Comintern and to help coordinate Indian revolutionaries in Europe.59
The Akali movement had opened space in Punjabi politics for the merger of Ghadar
activists and Sikh “extremists” into more conventionally communist organizations in Punjab
rather than relying exclusively on Moscow for education and training. Mridula Mukherjee points
out that after 1925 the Akalis fragmented into “three broad political trends”: moderates aligned
with the Unionist Party; Sikh communalists took over Akali itself; and anti-imperialists worked
within the Congress, Communist, and Kirti-Kisan Parties.60 Rattan Singh had mobilized Ghadar
resources in support of the establishment of the Kirti-Kisan Party in Punjab in 1926, which from
the outset had clearer ideological connections to international communism and took direct
inspiration from the Russian Revolution.61 The party’s paper, Kirti, was established by well-
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known Ghadarites Santokh Singh, Bhag Singh Canadian, Hardit Singh, and Karam Singh
Chima.62 The June 1926 issue of Kirti carried a tribute to the Babbar Akalis, praising them as
“those brave warriors, and true jewels of the Nation.”63 The cross-pollination of radical politics
in Punjab in the 1920s resulted in an “idiosyncratic” communism and created a larger pool of
recruits for anticolonial activity.
From the onset of the relationship between the Ghadar Party and the Comintern, Rattan
Singh helped to locate Indians in the Western Hemisphere, especially in Argentina, to study in
Moscow. He also dictated the “devious routes” whereby students, so-called “Bachelors of
Communism,” would return to India after completion of the course to contribute to the struggle
against British hegemony.64 In January 1936, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau, JF Cowgill,
wrote that “for the past twelve months or so there has been a continuous stream of these
Moscow-educated Ghadr Party Sikhs...returning to India.”65 An example of complexity of these
“devious routes,” as well as the cooperation of the various organizations participating in the
communist anticolonialism in Punjab, was given in an August 1936 communique:
They are given doctored passports, make way to a French port and sail to Argentina or
East Africa, and apply for new passports to make their way to India; then they work with
the Ghadr network in India and link up with the Kirty Kisan Party [sic], and attempt to
spread communism among the workers and peasants.66
The surveillance of returning migrants in 1931 was a product of the longstanding determination
of Ghadarites to return to India to undermine the colonial government and the military apparatus
in Punjab.

62

Ramnath, Haj to Utopia, 153
Extract, DIB, 30 September 1926, L/PJ/12/118, File 6569(b)/22. IOR.
64
DIB, 2 April 1936 and 25 June 1936, L/PJ/12/284. IOR.
65
Cowgill to IPI 11 January 1936, L/PJ/12/284. IOR.
66
DIB, 13 August 1936, L/PJ/12/284. IOR.
63

46
Even though such effort was made to cover the tracks of Indians returning from Moscow,
many of these would-be revolutionaries were detained upon attempting to enter India, which
“caused as much consternation to the leaders of the Ghadr Party as it has satisfaction to the
authorities responsible for maintaining law and order in India.”67 The leadership of the Ghadar
Party was not only upset that their recruits’ revolutionary careers were circumscribed, but
Comintern officials also grew impatient with the inability of such recruits to contribute to the
revolutionary movement in India. The Comintern determined that the problem was rooted in the
quality of the recruits themselves. Therefore, in the fall of 1936, it requested that all recruits be
sent directly from India, which highlights that the Kirti-Kisan Party had become an effective
instrument for recruiting and training capable agents in the decade since its founding.68
The multiple and overlapping threads of communist anticolonialism in India in the early
interwar period also saw the potential that the Akali movement represented. “The real infidels
are those few Englishmen who oppress India to serve their selfish ends, as also those so-called
Hindus and Mussalmans who serve the English for the sake of lucre and throttle the Sikhs,”
Mahendra Pratap, the self-described President of the Provisional Government of India, which he
founded in Afghanistan in 1915, wrote in a 1924 issue of The Akali. It is the duty of every
follower of Guru Gobind Singh to oppose the real infidels,” he continued. “Rise and obey the
orders of the Guru!”69 Pratap’s interest in the Akali movement was distant and opportunistic. The
reductive nature of his support indicates his inability to move beyond the lure of harnessing Sikh
communalist zeal. Moreover, the notion that all Sikhs were in open rebellion against the colonial
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state is a selective view of Sikh politics in this moment. The Akali movement did not empty the
British Indian Army of its Sikh troops and there was not a single Sikh politics that was either
anti-British or purely sectarian. The cooperation Sikh Akalis showed with revolutionary
organizations clearly indicates that the Akali movement had moved beyond purely communalist
aims. Thus, the claim that all Sikhs were actively engaged with anticolonial politics and that all
Hindus and Muslims were anathema to revolution demonstrates Pratap’s limited concern for the
movement as such and reveals his preoccupation with his own status.
In 1922, the Kabul Branch of the Indian Communist Party showed considerable interest
in the peasant struggle in the Punjab and sought to make inroads with the Akalis. According to
one first-hand account, Sikh agitators made frequent visits to the hub of Indian communist
activities in Afghanistan to procure funds in support of the Akalis. Significantly, some of these
Akalis were associated with the notorious Komagata Maru incident of 1914, wherein hundreds
of Indians, primarily Sikhs, attempted to undermine the Canadian “continuous journey”
regulation. This law effectively banned Indians from coming to Canada by requiring that all
international visitors arrive by “continuous journey” from their place of birth or citizenship. The
Komagata Maru was chartered by Gurdit Singh so that its passengers could abide by the letter of
the law and disembark in Vancouver. However, the Canadian authorities did not permit these
travelers to enter the country and, instead, forced the ship to drop anchor in Burrard Inlet for two
months before being forced to return to India. Upon arrival in Bengal, the passengers were
forcibly put on trains headed for Punjab, which sparked off a serious riot in Budge Budge, near
Calcutta. These events had a radicalizing effect on many of the passengers who became actively
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involved in the Ghadar Movement soon after.70 The presence of Akali Sikhs in Kabul further
highlights the overlapping nature of patronage for revolutionary movements in the Punjab in the
early twentieth century.71
The material and intellectual support that MN Roy’s Indian Communist Party gave to the
fledgling Babbar Akalis made a more critical impact on the arc of the movement. Roy founded
the Communist Party of India in Soviet Tashkent in 1920 and had subsequently found his way to
the KUTV independent of the Ghadar Party.72 Although the CPI was not much more established
than the Babbar Akalis, the connection with the Comintern provided considerable resources for
the peasant movement in the Punjab.73 The Indian Communist Party clearly had a more
sophisticated view of Punjabi political alliances than did Mahendra Pratap. In an article for
International Press Correspondence, Evelyn Roy, MN Roy’s wife, wrote of Mota Singh, a
leader of the militant wing of the Akali movement. According to Roy, the Indian Government
viewed Mota Singh “with greater concern and apprehension that those of Mahatma Gandhi”
because the support he garnered for the Akali movement was perceived to be a danger to the
military recruitment operations among Sikhs in Punjab. From this point, as Roy’s article makes
clear, the Communist Party actively sought to engage revolutionaries from the Akali and Khilafat
movements to direct pan-Islamist and anticolonial tendencies toward international communism.74
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Having infused the Akali movement with revolutionary violence and founding the
Babbar wing, Mota Singh remained the principal contact between MN Roy’s communist group
and the Babbar Akalis after 1922. Khushi Mohammad, one of MN Roy’s emissaries in Kabul,
allegedly witnessed Mota Singh join the Indian Communist Party at Kabul and, having promised
loyalty, the Party “[gave] him a mandate, empowering him to claim assistance from all
Communist organisations in India.”75 At the same time, the Punjab Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) intercepted a letter from Singh that helped to establish direct correspondence
between him and the Soviet Union through Roy. In the letter, Singh referred to “three boxes of
grapes” that he had received. Upon inspection, the CID determined that this was code for three
£100 Bank of England notes that the Russian Trade Delegation in London had sent and that he
had subsequently cashed in Jullundur. These notes were part of a larger payment of £6300 that
had been cashed throughout Punjab as well as in Karachi, Bombay, and Colombo.76 To its
surprise, this revelation convinced the colonial administration that Mota Singh was a paid agent
of the Comintern, which meant that communists had influence over political and social reform
movements that were not explicitly communist.
Beginning in 1923, the British surveillance apparatus in India documented the
consolidation of the communist movement in Punjab, which had previously been feared mainly
in Bengal and Bombay. The government discerned the Punjabi contingent of the Indian
Communist Party was organized and led by Ghulam Hussain and Shamsuddin Hassan under the
direction of MN Roy.77 A major initiative of the Lahore Communist Group was to establish
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Inquilab, a communist propaganda organ, with funds received from the Soviet Legation in
Kabul, Afghanistan, which was populated by translations of MN Roy’s proscribed pamphlets.78
For his work on Inquilab, Ghulam Hussain was arrested under Sections 121 and 124 of the
Indian Penal Code for attempting to wage war against the colonial government and for the
seditious crime of inciting disaffection.79 The government did not, however, consider Ghulam
Hussain a significant player in the Indian communist movement. He was perceived to be well
connected and privy to tactical and strategic information to be a useful government informant.
Thus, in exchange for a lighter sentence, Hussain agreed to testify against leaders of the Indian
Communist Party, particularly Roy’s associate Mohammad Shafiq.80
Although the intent of his testimony was to provide evidence against Shafiq and other
communist agents operating out of a “nest of revolutionary intrigue” in Kabul, Hussain’s
remarks focused primarily on exonerating himself while indicating the level of contact between
the Indian Communist Party and the Akali movement. Foremost, Hussain claimed that by his
involvement with MN Roy and contribution to Inquilab “I never intended anything more serious
than grabbing Bolshevik money.”81 Elsewhere, the CID reported that Hussain had returned to
India “with a good sum of currency notes of £100 each” and that by December 1922, he had
deposited nearly Rs. 20,000 into an Alliance Bank account.82 Hussain sought to represent himself
as a “man of socialist tendencies” but not a doctrinaire communist. Moreover, it was his greed
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and “supine insensibility” that led him to cooperate with the Kabul branch to “rob those who
were themselves living on robbery.” Nevertheless, the time Hussain spent in Afghanistan
provided him with access and insight into the relationship between the communist movement
and events in Punjab.
Conclusion
The mobility of central Punjabi Sikhs has been a routine topic of study, particularly in the
case of Punjabi migration to the United States and the Pacific coast of Canada. These studies
have focused on the early twentieth-century, a period when, according to Maia Ramnath, “the
general Punjabi population was not yet connecting their grievances to a larger, secular and/or
national context.” This chapter, in contrast, offers a genealogy of Punjabi anticolonialism. The
migrants who arrived in Britain in the early interwar period, as demobilized soldiers, seamen
from the Merchant Marine, and itinerant merchants, had both experienced the economic
struggles wrought by colonial commodity agriculture as well as the upsurge in militant
nationalism and anticolonialism that emerged during World War I. Yet, this period of interwar
migration, which was already suffused with politics, nationalism, and internationalism, is a
pivotal and underappreciated period in Punjabi radicalism.
The unevenness of political power and economic stability in Punjab had profound effects
on nascent anticolonialism in India, which served as a foundation on which later militancy
emerged in the interactions between Punjabis who traveled abroad and those who did not. In her
Echoes of Mutiny, Seema Sohi emphasizes the important ways in which Indians were
incorporated into, and victimized by, global market capitalism in the early twentieth century, to
explain the emergence and influence of the anticolonial Ghadar Party. However, to suggest, as
Sohi does, that migrants are politicized in the act of travel and the violence of other places, while
instructive, is insufficient to understand the effect that modes of colonial domination and
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oppression had on interwar migrant, anticolonial, and nationalist politics.83 The creation of
Indian migrant workers in the early twentieth century was an effect of colonial agricultural
policies that maintained persistent undercapitalization on Indian farms, particularly in Punjab,
that fed into a cycle of debt and dispossession.84 Not only had small farmers been undermined by
revenue systems that led to the concentration of farmland into fewer hands, but also the land
promised to demobilized soldiers as a reward for service was dwindling, which contributed
significantly to discontent, which Punjabi migrants took with them when they went abroad.85
While political and economic alienation facilitated the rise of the Punjabi Left, it also led
to the creation of a Punjabi migrant population, who both participated in Left politics and
experienced economic dispossession. These processes were the seeds of the revolutionary
internationalism that began to germinate in places of heavy Punjabi settlement, especially the
American Pacific Northwest, parts of South America, East Asia, and East Africa. It was out of
this ferment that those who ventured to Britain came in the 1920s and 1930s. Importantly, this
later wave of Punjabi migrants would have a different political education that those who traveled
to North America a decade or two earlier. Indeed, the experiences of the earlier generation, and
certainly the interaction between the returned Ghadarites and communists of different stripes,
directly inform the political activities of Punjabis in the interwar period in India as well as in
diaspora.86
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Chapter 2
Restriction, Resistance, and Intimacy: Indian Lascars in Britain
On 29 July 1930, Jan Mohamed, from Danewal, Punjab, was given a Special Certificate
of Identity and Nationality. This document came after more than five years of having his British
nationality questioned and undermined by immigration officials and the Home Office. He joined
the crew of the Finnish ship Navigator in February 1925 and was discharged in Antwerp a month
later. Subsequently, he proceeded to England at his own expense and attempted to land at
Harwich, a port-town just across the North Sea from Antwerp. Yet, since he was only carrying a
Certificate of Continuous Discharge, which provided his biographical details and employment
history as a seaman, rather than a passport, he was deemed an “alien passenger.” Therefore, he
was refused leave to land under Article 15 (1) of the Aliens Order of 1920 and was sent back to
Antwerp. Undeterred, Mohamed reappeared in Britain just a couple of months later and resumed
signing onto ships’ crews. Fed up, after again being refused leave to land at Harwich in 1929
because he lacked satisfactory proof of nationality, he began to apply for appropriate
documentation. On 22 January 1930, after being granted a series of travel documents for nonBritish nationals and being refused a British Passport by the Consul-General in Antwerp, the
Home Secretary for the Punjab Government confirmed his birth in Punjab. Yet, rather than
receiving a passport, he was granted a second-class certificate of nationality reserved for
“coloured” seamen.1
Jan Mohamed’s tortuous journey to affirm his British nationality is representative of the
struggles that colonial subjects endured in the 1920s and 1930s, even if most did not drag on for
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five years. An understanding of lascar recruitment, working conditions, and politics is essential
to the broader history of migrant internationalism among Punjabis in Britain for a few reasons.
First, Punjabi firemen were crucial to lascar recruitment regimes from the middle of the 19th
century and this population was the largest Punjabi community in Britain in the interwar period.
Second, the formulation of the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925 was
premised on the perceived need to stem the tide of foreign sailors deserting ship in Britain and
competing with white seamen for places on ships’ crews or attempting to settle ashore. Third, the
Home Office and police perception that “lascar” was self-same as “Indian” in interwar Britain
led to a broad application of the CASO to non-seafaring Indians. It is important, for this period,
to tease out the ethnic diversity within the Punjabi diaspora in Britain to present a more
sophisticated view of the social and political formation of Indian workers in Britain prior to the
period of mass migration in the 1950s. This chapter will detail the history of lascars in Britain,
with a focus on the networks that were deployed in their recruitment, the conditions of their
employment, and the legal and social impact of their arrival in British ports.
This chapter will, first, examine the emergence steam shipping and the creation of the
colonial seaman, the lascar, as an effective corollary to the colonial laborer, the coolie, and the
codification of a documentary apparatus that monitored lascar movement and protected the
interests of white Britons. As South Asian migrants reaffirmed their right to travel to Britain, the
state sought to restrict access to passports, the only document that would satisfy any suspicion of
one’s British nationality. Second, lascar attempts to organize within Britain and internationally
will be explored, especially in the context of the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union (NSFU)
and National Union of Seamen (NUS). Third, lascar politics beyond trade unionism forms an
important aspect of the experience of Indians in Britain and India. Coordination between the
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Communist Party of Great Britain and the Communist Party of India to mobilize lascars for
revolutionary motives is central to an understanding of lascar political formation in the early
interwar period. In sum, the experiences of the people at the center of this chapter demonstrate an
effective ban on Indian migration to Britain in the 1920s and 1930s and gesture toward postwar
anti-immigration policy in Britain.
“Coloured Seamen” and British Belonging
In the immediate aftermath of the World War I, British policies regarding migration and
identity became semi-permanent mechanisms to police the movements of so-called
“undesirables” within the empire. This shift had a double effect on the hundreds of South Asian
travelers and economic migrants that came to Britain in the interwar period. Although the
Merchant Marine had relied heavily on lascars, the continued distrust of foreigners, combined
with competition for jobs between lascars and demobilized English, Scottish, and Welsh soldiers,
resulted in the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925. This legislation
required all nonwhite seamen provide proof of nationality or, lacking that, to register with the
Board of Trade as non-British aliens so that their movements could be monitored while they
were docked.
The Coloured Alien Seamen Order (CASO) was instituted to protect white British
sailors’ access to jobs on ships in the aftermath of World War I. For Punjabi lascars and other
visitors, the Order had the effect of negating their rights as British subjects to travel freely within
the Empire. Enacted to minimize competition between white Britons and so-called “coloured
alien seamen” from Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean, the Order emerged in the
aftermath of an eruption of racial violence in multiple port cities. Since competition for jobs was
high in the immediate postwar period and native-born English and Welsh often felt entitled to
preference for employment. Therefore, in a few instances the presence of people of color in port
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town vying for jobs with white workers led to bloody riots.2 Moreover, CASO, like Aliens
Orders that had come before, placed the onus to prove one’s British nationality on the individual.
This requirement was complicated for seamen because it was common practice not to issue
passports to seamen and rely on only Certificates of Continuous Discharge, which were not give
the same legal status. Within the Empire, passport officers were specifically directed not to issue
passports to sailors as such documentation was considered unnecessary for the purposes of
following the sea. Finally, the police often required many British colonial subjects, particularly
those with Muslim inflected names, to register under the Special Restriction Order if he could
not adequately document his birthplace and nationality.3
The Special Restriction Order was transformed into a tool to police the intersection of
color and nationality that was used to target individuals who did not appear to be British. This
phenomenon had an immediate impact on Muslims from colonial Punjab. On 20 January 1926,
Robert Gloag wrote to the Secretary of State for India on behalf of forty Punjabi residents of
Glasgow to enquire about the status of British Indians per articles of the Special Restriction
Order. In 1925, CASO was only enacted “where coloured seamen were mostly to be found,” but
on 1 January 1926 it was expanded to cities that had communities of colonial migrants. Thus,
less than a month after CASO arrived, Gloag’s clients had “been called upon by the Aliens
Officer in Glasgow to register as aliens,” demonstrating a zealous approval of the Order by the
Glaswegian authorities.4 Inspector Ewen McCaskill confirmed to the Chief Constable of the
Glasgow Police that “73 coloured persons in Glasgow who failed to produce definite
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documentary proof of British nationality...have been registered here.” In addition, he emphasized
that “all the Lascars, with the exception of three, admitted when registering here that they were
deserters from steamers in United Kingdom ports” who “have been employed since they came to
this country in coal mines, iron works and at peddling.” It is worth noting that desertion was not
a contravention of CASO and the laws against desertion in the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894,
were seldom enforced.5
As this case suggests, colonial seamen needed documentary evidence of their British
nationality or the Special Restriction Order would be applied on a nearly arbitrary basis by local
authorities. Believing this to be the case, the Glasgow Indian Union wrote to the Secretary of
State for India noting that most of these Indians had been born in the Punjab and had been
working in Britain during the war. Furthermore, the letter stated, with a degree of suspicion, that
“it appears to be the intention of the Home Secretary to register these labourers and pedlars as
Alien Seamen which they certainly are not.” With exasperation the letter adds that “in the
Identity Books issued by the local Authorities the nationality and birth places are left blank!”6
The Glasgow Indian Union insisted that it was hardly the fault of the Indians in question that
they were unable to produce satisfactory proof of nationality when the only documents that they
had been provided were woefully lacking in pertinent details.
Nevertheless, though CASO explicitly did not apply to Indian lascars in Britain, whether
they had broken the terms of their contract or not, it was quickly appropriated by the government
as a means of controlling that population. In the fall of 1930, the Chief Superintendent for
Scotland, CT Lane, summarized the procedure for recovering deserters and noted that the police
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respond immediately “when information is received that a strange ‘Native’ has been about.” As a
core aspect of detection and recovery of deserters, Lane observed that “a watchful eye is kept on
the Indian peddling fraternity here all strangers being closely examined.”7 During a meeting at
the Board of Trade on 5 May 1930, which was convened to consider strategies for deporting
lascars, FJ Adams, from the Office of the High Commissioner for India, recounted the procedure
for obtaining certificates of British Nationality. Though the process could last up to four months,
during which time the lascar would generally be treated as an alien and registered under the
Special Restriction Order, Adams cautioned that “where verification is forthcoming it is not
possible to withhold the certificate, by virtue of which the holder becomes immune from
deportation from this country.”8 In other words, when colonial migrants demonstrated birth
within the realm of the British Empire, their rights to remain were validated and their
vulnerability to CASO avoided. From FJ Adams’ perspective it was undesirable that such rights
be affirmed.
The Lascar and Colonial Mobility
The advent of steam-powered shipping in the mid-nineteenth century led to heavy
recruitment of Punjabi Muslim seamen into the merchant-shipping industry to work as firemen in
ships’ engine rooms.9 While in the earlier part of that century, companies were keen to recruit
among Malabaris and Gujaratis, and from other regions with a longstanding seafaring tradition,
steam allowed for a deskilling of mariners and facilitated the devaluing of Indian ocean-going
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labor.10 Ravi Ahuja has observed that South Asian seamen were recruited from a series of rural
“labour catchment areas.” These areas had different effects on crews depending on the port from
which they embarked. Crews out of Calcutta were mostly composed of sailors from eastern
Bengali whereas crews at Bombay were segmented along functional and geographical lines:
Punjabi Muslim firemen, Christian Goanese stewards, and Hindu Gujarati deck hands.
Moreover, cities in western Punjab’s salt tract systematically used as areas for recruiting engineroom crews among discharged soldiers.11 The geographical overlap in systems of recruitment for
the Army and the Merchant Marine is rooted in the perceived loyalty of the residents of this
region but a more convincing explanation is that the economic stability of this area was founded
on military and merchant marine service and that the power in the area was concentrated among
a few rural elites who actively cooperated with the District Soldier’s Boards.12
Punjabi seamen signed onto ships crews under Asiatic Articles, conventionally referred to
as lascar articles, which were instruments of racial oppression used by shipping companies and
protected by the state from the early-nineteenth century into the 1950s and 1960s.13 Unequal
treatment of lascars was established in law under the Lascar Act of 1823, the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1894, and the Indian Merchant Shipping Act of 1923.14 Asiatic Articles stipulated that one
must embark on a roundtrip service, meaning that Indians did not have the prerogative to
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terminate their employment outside of British India. Furthermore, these laws allowed for the
devaluing of Asian labor in virtually every way compared to those who joined crews in Europe.
Lascars were afforded less food, worked more hours per week, and were paid between threequarters to two-thirds that of a European seaman. Even bunk space given to lascars was typically
less than half that given to a European, meaning that a shipping company could house twice as
many lascars as Europeans in the same cubic footage of berths. Considered together, the lascar
was roughly twenty to twenty-five percent cheaper to employ. Thus, it was not uncommon for
shipping companies to discharge their more expensive European crews in Bombay or Calcutta,
as they were not obligated to employ their European seamen for roundtrip journeys, and sign
replacement lascar crews before departing.15
Fears of an influx of “coloured” seamen were paradoxical. As British subjects, Indian
seamen were entitled to passports and freedom of movement within the empire. Yet, as seamen
that right was superseded by the requirements of shipping companies and the Board of Trade for
cheap and nearly captive labor. Due to the CASO, a preponderance of information about Indians
in Britain emerged in the mid-1920s. In May 1930, the Board of Trade examined the question of
lascar deserters working as peddlers in British towns. Specifically, the Board sought a deeper
understanding of the material conditions of lascars and the process by which peddlers were
licensed. A note on the meeting summarizes the reasons why lascars deserted:
Lascar seamen desert their ships in this country either for the purpose of obtaining
pedlars’ licenses, by means of which they are able to earn considerable sums of money
before returning to India, or as a result of inducements held out by keepers of Boarding
Houses for Asiatic seamen, who derive profit from corrupt practices in connection with
the supply of coloured stokehold crews to ships in UK ports.16
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The perception that boarding house keepers with ulterior motives facilitated Indian desertion
emerged in the mid-1920s as Indian Muslim peddlers became more visible. On 3 November
1925, the Secretary to the Commissioner of Police in London wrote to the Secretary of State for
India about the recent increase in applications for peddlers’ certificates submitted by “Lascar and
Indian seamen” and described the process by which lascars would enter the peddling trade; a
process that Ravi Ahuja has termed “networks of the subordinated.”17 The letter draws attention
to the relationship between one applicant, who had resided in London since 1922, and Syud Ally,
the proprietor of a shop and lodging house for Indians. The Secretary observes that “the present
applicant is penniless and Syud Ally is financing him by way of paying the fee for the certificate
and providing him with goods [to sell], on terms favourable to himself.” To protect deserters
from unscrupulous hostel keepers and to protect the sensibilities of Britons in the East End of
London, among whom, the Secretary believed, there was a “general feeling...against men of
colour being empowered as certified pedlars to call at private houses to offer the good for sale.”
For these reasons the Police Commissioner of London undermined the Pedlars Acts and
unilaterally decided to cease the certification of “these Indian natives” as peddlers.18
For its part, the India Office responded to protest the Commissioner’s decision for a
series of interlocking reasons. First, noting that desertion was not a criminal offence, to withhold
such certificates could lead a lascar “to consider himself treated as an enemy of society and will
tend to be more susceptible to undesirable influences.” Second, the India Office abjured a
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general ban on issuing peddler certificates to presumed deserters because the Merchant Shipping
Act of 1894 required that indigent Indians be repatriated at the expense of the India Office,
unless the Shipping Company holding the contract for the lascar and be identified and induced to
repatriate. Finally, in response to the Commissioner’s perception of the “general feeling” that
Londoners are not ready for nonwhite door-to-door salesmen, the India Office observed that
“these men are British subjects, many of whom served with distinction in the War”, and the
Commissioner’s proposal was a clear case of “racial, or colour, discrimination against them.”19
The concern that the India Office displayed for the treatment of Indians in Britain,
whether out of concern for the Indian revenues that might be used to repatriate those who
became destitute or a stance against state-sanctioned racial discrimination, did not resonate with
the Home Office. By the middle of 1930, the Home Office issued a circular directing the Police
to take time to “ascertain how the applicant entered the United Kingdom” before granting a
peddler’s certificate -- a process intended to “discourage desertions from Lascar Articles.”20 To
assist in these efforts, the Government of India issued a Notice to Seamen, which was displayed
in all the major ports of British India, especially in Bombay and Calcutta. The Notice alerted
seamen that “any idea that there is ample opportunity of obtaining employment in the United
Kingdom is wholly erroneous.” Not only did the Notice cite “prevailing unemployment” in
Britain, but also that “special restrictions” had been instituted on the grant of peddler certificates
to Indians suspected of desertion from the 1930s. The police increasingly took up Home Office
instructions: “I seem to remember that Lascar deserters were granted pedlar certificates with
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some freedom on the urgent insistence of the late Lord Birkenhead when he was Secretary of
State for India,” the Assistant Chief Constable for the Metropolitan Police observed in 1933. “As
he is dead, perhaps his wishes can now be disregarded.”21 Although there were multiple routes
for Indians to become peddlers in Britain, a focus of the next chapter, the Home Office and India
Office both sought to restrict lascar mobility out of a belief that colonial seamen were the only
source of Indian peddlers.
Considering the inability of municipalities to induce repatriation, government officials
appealed to the terms of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, which, among other things, outlined
the responsibility that shipping companies had to their crews. According to that Act, shipping
companies were responsible both to report all desertions from their crews as well as to offer all
destitute seamen working passage back to their native countries. However, because there was not
a consistent mechanism to oversee the correct reporting of desertions and because shipping
companies were loath to repatriate any seamen at a potential cost to themselves, the Act was
often unenforceable. In 1930, the Board of Trade contacted many of the shipping companies that
operated in Liverpool as to their procedure for reporting, tracking, and repatriating Indian
seamen. The response was overwhelmingly one of disinterest, stating either that desertions were
not a major concern or that the companies were in a poor position to remedy the situation. For
instance, the Bibby Brothers Company stated that “desertions of Lascars from our vessels are
very rare. Whenever a desertion is discovered we immediately inform the police and they usually
have no difficulty in tracing the culprit.”22 Nevertheless, the representatives of these companies
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were eager to suggest remedies to the non-existent problem. The Thomas and James Harrison
Company thought that harboring Indians without notifying the Merchant Marine should be
illegal.23 The Anchor Brocklebank Line insisted that suspected lascars should be barred from
peddlers’ licenses.24 The P. Henderson and Company went as far as to propose that “a period of
imprisonment might act as a deterrent,” even though such an action would exceed the
punishment outlined in the Act.25 The Ellerman’s City Line was more candid. First, it stated that,
though desertions did occur, they amounted to a negligible proportion of their total crews and
thus went unreported. Second, it reminded the Board of Trade that “it must be borne in mind that
these natives are British Subjects.”26 Yet, though the shipping companies agreed that desertions
were rare and easily traced, the government maintained that it was the cause of the high rate of
increase among the Indian population in Britain.
Unsatisfied by the position that most shipping companies maintained in the face of the
desertion crisis, the Board of Trade held up the Peninsular and Oriental Line as a model of
desertion detection and repatriation, which had resulted in only twenty-eight lascars going
unaccounted in the preceding six years. The scheme was certainly simple: All missing lascars
were reported and their Certificates of Continuous Discharge, often called nullies, were given to
the special agent in port. With this information, the special agent secured a warrant against
Section 221 of the Merchant Shipping Act. Interestingly, this section only provides for the
forfeiture of wages by deserters in Britain; however, if the desertion occurred outside of the
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United Kingdom, the lascar would subject to up to twelve weeks of imprisonment and withheld
pay.27 Warrant in hand, the special agent then set to work tracking down the deserter. If found,
the seaman was taken to court, ordered to pay for all expenses incurred during tracking, and then
ordered to return to his ship or any India-bound ship on that shipping line. Although the
Mercantile Marine Department acknowledged that the system was imperfect, and relied heavily
on a recent nully, it made full use of the Merchant Shipping Act to recover all “illegally landed”
persons. The scheme also required that the shipmaster be willing to pay for the cost of recovery,
which was only returned if the seaman was found and tried.28
Social Welfare, Integration and Interracial Intimacy
Anxieties around lascar desertion and the fear of a growing population of colonial
seamen settling, at least for a time, in British port cities led to the production of innumerable
reports on their numbers and their welfare as a means of monitoring them. Having recently
started studying the living conditions of lascars in Glasgow, the Scottish Board of Health devised
a scheme in 1920 to provide temporary support to lascars in Glasgow with money from the
National Relief Fund on the condition that all those who receive support agree to return to their
home countries.29 However, on this occasion, the “money inducements” offered to lascars proved
ineffective in the repatriation effort. This failure demonstrates, at least in part, that colonial
seamen were committed to remaining in Britain either to sign onto ships on European articles or
because living conditions in in Glasgow, as in Liverpool, Cardiff, and London, were
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comparatively better than those in Bombay or Calcutta.30 The goal throughout the interwar
period, as the Scottish Board of Health proposal indicates, was to facilitate the repatriation of as
many lascars who had landed in Britain as possible to mitigate the size of the community in
Britain; a community believed to be undesirable people prone to destitution and other illicit
habits that undermined core values of British civilization.
Barring legal recourse that would allow the state to actively reduce the size of the Indian
population, the government attempted to confine lascars to ports and struggled to understand
their “social conditions” as a method of control. According to a 1935 study by the Joint Council
of the British Social Hygiene Council and the British Council for the Welfare of the Mercantile
Marine the threat that lascars posed to British society was rooted in the built environment. The
study examined the “poverty and grime” that characterized the areas most heavily occupied by
lascars and noted that “one may search in vain for a tree or any sort of alleviation of this
cheerless outlook.” Without acceptable recreational facilities, the report suggested that lascars
huddled in pubs, which were “more decrepit, more flagrantly the rendezvous of vice, and more
sordid than are the public houses of any other neighbourhood.”31 Attracted to the “possibility of
an easy life of idleness and the comparative wealth that is presented to them by the money
obtainable from unemployment benefit or public relief,” the report asserted that Indian lascars
were increasing “by the hundreds” in Cardiff.32 This judgement was little more than a rehearsal
of the ‘myth of the lazy native’ that Syed Hussein Alatas exploded in his study of colonial
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capitalism, in which he demonstrates that the colonized were necessarily figured as indolent as a
means of justifying colonial expansion.33
For the authors of the survey, the easy “rendezvous of vice” that allowed lascars to return
to their supposed natural state of degradation, not having been “imbued with moral codes similar
to our own,” was a central complaint.34 On its face, this assessment suggests that Indians were
not suited for life in the United Kingdom because of their lack of work-ethic; notwithstanding
the conditions of their labor in the stokehold of steamships where they endured excessive heat
and shift durations from which Europeans were exempt. But the image of the docile and lazy
Indian was combined with British sexual anxieties around the purity of white women. Taken
together, the lascar became both a symbol of decay and a vector of wickedness. Specifically, the
report claims that prostitutes and “women of low type” were uniquely attracted to Indian and
African seamen. The authors evoke their own sexual inadequacy by discussing the sexuality of
colonial seamen much as a zoologist might discuss that of a lion, by reducing it to “mating with
our women” and referring to their children as “male offspring”. The “social evil” that interracial
sexuality presented to the authors of the report, however, was in “the half-caste girl” who was
“characteristically disinclined to discipline and routine work.” Yet, the authors seem to
acknowledge the spuriousness of this claim. Since the proposed social ills that the lascar
population had created were little more than fifteen years old, the report admits that
“proportionately there are more half-caste children below school age than of it.” Therefore, such
assessments of the willingness of children to work or their disposition toward discipline is rife
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with prejudice. Unsurprisingly, the report did not attempt to substantiate the claims of laziness
and indiscipline, but rather deployed racial ideology in the place of evidence.35
The urgency of repatriating any lascar who had landed irregularly or who had become
destitute in Britain was compounded by the relationships that Indian and African seamen had
with white women. Interracial intimacy formed the foundation of racial animosity in Britain in
the 1920s and informed the hysterical rhetoric of government councils ostensibly committed to
lascar welfare. At the close of World War I, the global economic slowdown combined with the
increased population of nonwhite workers contributed to social instability in Britain. In 1919,
race riots occurred throughout the country and occasions of white women socializing with black
and brown men often acted as the spark igniting a tinderbox of racial, sexual, and economic
uncertainties.
Late in the evening of 13 June 1919, a chartered bus was returning to the Cardiff docks.
Its occupants were Arab seamen and white Welsh women who had spent the evening picnicking.
As they disembarked, gangs of white men, many of whom were demobilized soldiers
themselves, set upon the caravan. There were shots fired as some of the Arab seamen were
armed with revolvers and razors. But, as paramilitary contingents of white men continued their
pursuit, the seamen retreated into “the maze of narrow streets abutting the canal,” colloquially
referred to in the press as “Nigger Town.”36 Highlighting the fundamental cause of the violence,
The Daily Express report on the incident commented plainly that “the riots have arisen out of the
growing feeling of hostility towards the blacks mainly because of their association with white

35
36

“Social Conditions in Ports and Dockland Areas,” p. 19, LAB 13/74. TNA.
"Race Rioting at Cardiff," The Times (London, England), 13 June 1919.

69
girls and women.”37 The violence resulted in the deaths of a Welshman, John Donovan, and an
“unidentified negro.”38
The official opprobrium surrounding colonial migration to Britain, along with the “social
evils” they caused, continued unabated throughout the 1920s. In 1929, the Foreign Office began
negotiations with the French effectively to expand their sphere of migration control into French
ports, especially Havre and Marseille. British ministers contended that France had no restrictions
on colonial seamen disembarking there but they theorized that those who landed in France would
then board Britain-bound ships. Through this technique colonial seamen were able to land in
Britain, skirting many of the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Acts, including those holding
shipping companies and the India Office liable for repatriation. In his analysis of the problem of
colonial seamen entering Britain on French ships, John Anderson portrayed it as a twofold issue:
“First, the coloured man is a serious competitor with the white seaman in the labour market”
because white and nonwhite seamen could not serve on the same crew. “The second difficulty is
a social one” Anderson continued, “racial feuds and the intercourse of coloured men with white
women” 39
Over and above the economic competition that lascars presented, the principal concern
surrounded the freedom of regularly landed lascars to establish businesses and employ white
women. Fears that colonial seamen would lure white women into unlawful sexual relationships
abound in the Home Office and various police archives. The Chief Constable of the Cardiff
Police, noticeably exercised by Maltese and Indian owned cafes in the city, moaned that “the
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waitresses or assistants kept in them dance with the patrons, who are mostly coloured seamen,
and as there is usually an inner room at these establishments very little imagination is necessary
to conjure the sequence.”40 Clearly, the Chief Constable in Cardiff presumed that the cafes and
clubs that Indian and Maltese migrants established there were nothing more than brothels.
An investigation into interracial intimacy makes it clear that the police in London were
actively looking for a test case to punish black sexuality and vindicate their presumptions of
degeneracy among lascars and their own sexual inadequacy. In 1937, an Indian boarding house
at 22 Spital Square, London, came to the attention of the Metropolitan Police as a site of
presumed procuration wherein Wassid Miah, a Sylheti seaman, was accused of having sex
outside of wedlock with a 14-year-old girl named Sybil Kent. According to the Police, Miah met
Kent and her friend, Rose Love, in the coastal town of Great Yarmouth, some 120 miles
northeast of London. Though the Police alleged sexual impropriety on Miah’s part, neither Kent
nor Love made any allegations against Miah, except that they had walked along the beach with
him. Nevertheless, the police pursued the case and gave Kent a physical examination that
revealed “no evidence of sexual intercourse.” Love, Kent’s friend, was implicated in a cover up,
having previously stayed with Miah in London. Though there was no supporting evidence,
during this visit, according to the Detective Inspector investigating the case, Miah and Love had
slept together providing her with a reason to protect him. Lacking evidence, the police dropped
the case against Miah. “This is to be regretted” lamented the Detective Inspector in his report,
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“as a prosecution of a man of colour in this district, for attempted procuration of a white girl,
would deter men of colour from associating with young white girls.”41
To be sure, the kinds of relationships that Indian and other colonial seamen formed with
white women had differing degrees of intensity reflected the dynamism of their surroundings.
For instance, women often worked with Indian seamen and boarding house keepers to help them
comply with the provisions of the Aliens Orders. In early 1933, the Limehouse station of the
Metropolitan police wrote regarding the requirement that boarding house keepers keep a register
of their guests stipulated under Section 7 of the Aliens Order of 1920. According to this section,
British subjects were only asked to sign their names and nationality. Yet, as so many lascars and
other Indian migrants were unable to write in English these registers were often unintelligible for
any review by the Aliens Department. As a result, the proprietors were accused of breaking the
rules of the Order. Thus, aware of the stipulations and possible consequences, some boarding
houses relied on “low class English females” who stayed there to maintain adequate, English
language registers. Thus, these relationships were vital to Indians in Britain during the interwar
period because they were a mark of social integration that helped recent migrants to navigate
economic and legal obstacles.
Not only did white women help to keep the books for Indian-run boarding houses, but
they were a perennial presence in new migrants’ attempts to remain in Britain. These lodgings
became a focus for government officials in their attempt to enforce the Aliens Order, which
would ordinarily not apply to Indians in any case, but also in their effort to better understand how
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Indians and other colonial migrants navigated the labyrinthine regulations intended to limit their
presence and mobility in Britain. Boarding houses not only provided short-term lodgings, often
on credit, but gave new migrants access to economic and social networks once in Britain. Since
the Aliens Orders put the onus of proving nationality on the migrant and considering that recent
migrants were not typically proficient in English, appeals to authorities in their home district
often required a go-between who understood the process and could fill-in the form. As was often
the case, compatriots of new migrants helped in this process, both by filling-in forms, if they
were able, or introducing them to white women who were intimately involved with the
community. In 1930, the Liverpool Criminal Investigation Department focused on the
proprietors of a tea shop at 65 Pitt Street, a few blocks the east bank of the River Mersey, for
providing such assistance. In exchange for patronage at her shop, Ethel Mohamed, “the English
wife of Noah Mohamed,” reportedly completed, or helped to complete, applications for
Certificates of Identity and Nationality. If granted, these Certificates allowed migrants to avoid
registering as aliens, even if they did not ensure that the migrant would then be afforded the
rights of a British subject without question.42
Throughout the interwar period, government commentators and various welfare
organizations targeted the relationships between colonial migrants and white women. The
relationships were decried as “social evils” and the women were demeaned as “low type” and
dismissed because “many of these girls come from the provinces.”43 The view that poor and rural
women were dangerously naive extended to their marriages. Remarking on inter-racial
relationships in Cardiff, the Times notes with palpable derision that “some of the women are so
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credulous as to go through a form of marriage according to what they are told is Mohammedan
law.”44 Of course, the collusion between the paper of record, municipal police forces, and the
Home Office to trivialize and pathologize these relationships provides little insight to their
content.
Much as Ethel Mohamed worked with new migrants to navigate the documentary
apparatus to establish their identity, wives of seamen reached out to various ministerial offices of
government to resolve any outstanding doubts about their husbands’ nationality. In 1925, Mary
Fazel wrote to the Secretary of the Colonial Office to enquire about her husband’s status as a
British seaman. She wrote that Fazel Mohamed had presented a Certificate of Nationality upon
landing at Cardiff in 1919. However, the document was disregarded, and he was registered as an
Alien. Her concern for him, especially as an active seaman, and his ability to return to Britain
was at the forefront of her appeal. “I have been married to him seven years, and we have three
children,” she reported, “therefore the knowledge that my husband is not a recognized British
Subject, causes me much consternation, as should anything happen to him in a foreign port his
rights as Britisher would be jeopardised, and consequently my own and our children’s.”45 Mary
Fazel certainly does not resemble the dupe that the government presumed. A year later, her
sophisticated and persistent advocacy for her husband resulted in the issuance of a Certificate of
Identity and Nationality after the Home Department for the Government of India replied, plainly,
that “Fazel Mohammad is a British Indian subject,” having been born in Peshawar.46
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These efforts take on heightened significance because the wives of aliens typically
deprived of their own British citizenship. On 26 May 1930, around 3 o’clock in the afternoon,
Winifred and Abdul Ghani reported to the Fleetwood Section of the Lancashire Constabulary,
just north of Blackpool, to register under the Coloured Alien Seamen Order because they were
“unsure of their nationality.” According to the police records, Winifred Ghani, born Winifred
Jones, worked as a barmaid in a hotel in Blackpool and Abdul Ghani had been signing onto ships
in Liverpool since 1919. They had been married only a few weeks and, even though Winifred
had been born at Sheffield and Abdul at Jhelum in Punjab, his lack of any documentation
convinced them to register and forfeit British nationality -- effectively leaving them stateless.47
Having complied with the Aliens Order, Winifred pursued documentation of Abdul’s birth so
that their nationality could be reinstituted allowing them to remain in England together. In
response to Winifred’s letter for guidance, the Home Office reminded her that it was the
responsibility of any presumed alien to demonstrate British nationality. In this case, it took
nearly three years for the Home Department in Punjab to confirm Abdul’s birth. Even so, the
confirmation of his nationality came with a seed of doubt because “his date of birth which would
not be verified from the birth register” suggested still that any narrative of his life could be
disputed.48
The state remained unmoved by the hardship that surveillance and registration placed on
such marriages.49 Indeed, the authorities remained derisive of these relationships throughout the
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interwar period. Regarding Indians “consorting with white women” in Stepney in 1934, an
Inspector lamented that “police cannot intervene in these cases as often as they would desire as
the white women, usually of a low and degraded type, resent Police interest in their affairs.”50
Moreover, in 1939, while assessing the welfare of seamen in British ports, the International
Labour Office observed that Lascars often “form undesirable associations with white women of
the lowest type.”51 The Police and International Labor Office were joined in their anxious scorn
by the Indian Political Intelligence (IPI) unit, which was devised in order to monitor communism
and nationalism among Indians. The “social problem,” bemoaned the IPI, emerging in
Birmingham was that “many of these Indians have already married or otherwise set up house
with English women.” The state joined in with white supremacist outrage at the proliferation of
inter-group intimacy, but it must be acknowledged as a crucial component not just of
transforming a migrant into a settler but also that the indignance of the state and the violence of
working-class racism was foundational to migrant politics in post-war era.
Lascar Politics: Discipline and Revolution
The conditions on ship and the persistent surveillance on land presented lascars with
considerable reason for discontentment. Since the progressive and long-term erosion of worker
rights at sea and the maintenance of a race-based hierarchy of seamen was not uniformly
protested throughout the period under review it remained a viable system for shipping firms.
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However, the lack of systematic and widespread resistance means neither that the conditions of
employment were adequate, nor that Indians served in obeisance. Indeed, the conditions of
employment combined with the mobility of the lascar to present myriad modes of political action
in the interwar period. In this section, I will detail lascar politics as they emerged in connection
with organized political organizations, the Communist Parties of Great Britain and India, and the
trade union movement. Furthermore, I will examine political activity in response to perceived
breaches of lascar customary rights on ship.
In this context, the National Sailor’s and Firemen’s Union (NSFU) sought to restrict
access to contracts originating in British ports. Lascars, by the contract they signed in India, were
not permitted to land in Britain for discharge and, therefore, their possession of a passport was
deemed unnecessary and not permitted. Instead, the only documentary proof of identity and
nationality that they were granted was a record of their service on ships called a Continuous
Discharge Book, or nully.52 The ways in which the state interacted with lascars in Britain clearly
demonstrates a lack of trust and the reliance on heightened surveillance. According to a
Metropolitan Police report from 1932, “Practically the only means of identifying a Lascar
seaman is by his Nully...which bears a photograph and detailed description of him.” The report
observes that in most cases of desertion, these documents remain on the ship and return to India.
Thus, as the report continues, “unless the seaman gives accurate information about himself he is
in no danger of being identified.” From this view, Indian seamen deliberately deserted without
their nullies to sign onto a ship from a British port and thereby obtain higher wages.53
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The official view of desertion was either opportunistic on the part of the sailor or
exploitative on the part of the boarding house keepers who persuaded Indians to jump ship.
However, the act of desertion was a form of political agency. In 1925, for instance, the Indian
crew of the Tenbergen, deserted upon calling at Leith, Edinburgh’s North Sea port, because the
terms of their engagement had been changed after embarkation. According to the shipping
company, the Indians, who joined the crew at Karachi, protested the revised itinerary that would
take them to Newport News, Virginia, instead of New York City. The stated reason for the
change was the New York fell outside latitudinal parameters that were specified in the contract.
However, the crew alleged to believe that the ship was bound only to Leith and was then to
return to Karachi. According to representatives of the crew, there was no knowledge of the transAtlantic journey and the prospect of visiting New York in the cold of early-spring was
unwelcome. Thus, when the ship arrived at Leith via London, the men escaped the ship after
having a physical altercation with the Captain and First Mate.54
Upon desertion, the Immigration Officer at Leith instructed that the lascars be
remanded to the poorhouse and supported with public funds. Finding the situation untenable and
wasteful, the Chief Inspector of the Aliens Branch at the Home Office contacted the
representative of the Furness Shipping & Agency Company, headquartered in Denmark, which
owned the Tenbergen, alerting them that the sixteen lascars had deserted without any
documentary proof of their nationality and were therefore presumed to be aliens. Therefore, the
purpose of the letter was to request proof of nationality of the men or for funds to be made
available so that they could be repatriated. Curiously, the shipping company responded that,
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since the men had deserted, they were absolved of the requirement to repatriate. Moreover, the
company added that any laws pertaining to the immigration of aliens were irrelevant because the
lascars were British subjects.55
The Tenbergen episode provides a glimpse into the thought-world of lascars and allows
for a slightly more nuanced view of their political agency. As stated, the ship travelled from
Karachi to Leith via London with the disputed onward journey to North America. The desertion
was the result of perceived or real abrogation of the contract. In any case, the trans-Atlantic
voyage seems only to have donned on the crew upon arrival at Leith. Had the sailors realized that
the ship would be sailing to New York, or Virginia as the case may be, London would have been
the optimal opportunity to escape, considering the extensive lascar network in existence there.
Indeed, among Britain’s major ports, Leith is seldom mentioned in connection with lascars,
suggesting that ships with Indian itineraries rarely embarked from there. Even considering the
official understanding of lascar desertions, that they are the result of inducements from Indian
boarding house keepers, the fact that these sixteen men acted alone indicates that lascar politics,
at times, was tied as much to customary rights, as it was to wages, treatment, and outside
agitators.
The interwar period for lascars was often characterized by tensions among labor
organizations. While the NSFU attempted to create an organizational vacuum among Indian
sailors by barring them from membership and actively seeking to restrict their ability to work,
the existence of a global network of lascars combined with communist anti-colonialism sought to
ensure that such a vacuum was filled. In the first instance, the mobility of the lascar offered an
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opportunity to mobilize the colonial working-class against the dual hegemony of Britain and
capital. As early as 1922, Manabendranath (MN) Roy, the founder of the Indian Communist
Party at Tashkent, wrote of the opportunity that sailors presented to the goals of the Party. “Look
at the thousands and thousands of seamen in the harbour of Calcutta,” he wrote to Pulin Das on 6
June, “They can be more useful to the revolution than any other element in the population.”56
Subsequently, as his associates were being arrested for criminal intent under the Bengal
Regulation III of 1818, Roy and Muzaffar Ahmed worked together to develop a system of
communicating with one another through lascars in order to avoid having their communiques
intercepted. This plan evolved into using lascars as couriers of propaganda and weapons while
facilitating the coordination between Indian communists in Europe and the subcontinent.57
Revolutionary activities were concentrated in Dutch and German port cities but the ease
of movement between European ports put the British on high alert. Early reports on the Union of
Eastern Sailors confirmed that none of the shipping lines that were affected by attempts by the
Red International Labor Union (RILU) to mobilize lascars called at ports in India or the UK. 58
Nevertheless, reports that communists were gaining access to shipping vessels disconcerted
British intelligence officers. Muhammed Ali Sepassi, a close associate of MN Roy, upon being
expelled from Kabul in 1922, travelled to Europe, first to the Soviet Union and then to Germany.
While in Germany, he was reported to have taken the alias Ibrahim and “endeavor[ed] to spread
disaffection among Indian seamen at Hamburg.”59 Around the same time, Mubarak Ali and Obed
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Hussain operated what the Public and Judicial Department referred to as the Hamburg
Institution, where lascars could purchase cigarettes and liquor. Through the Hamburg Institution,
Obed and Ali claimed to have sent more than 1500 pistols to India via lascars. Though the
surveillance officer reporting on this smuggling operation believed that it was purely for the
private profit of the lascars, it exposed the degree of revolutionary potential that existed on
merchant ships.60
Importantly, Indian communists in Europe were deeply entrenched in the revolutionary
politics of the interwar. In Germany, associates of MN Roy coordinated with and sought support
from the Berlin Indian Committee, which was headed by Virendranath Chattopadhyay, known as
Chatto for short. The BIC created a hub of interaction between European and Indian radicals in
Central Europe that was a common meeting site on the route to and from Moscow. In Britain,
Roy maintained close connections both with the leaders of the Communist Party of Great Britain
as well as with Indian students and professionals. In both cases, the interconnections between
Indian and European communism, often supported by the Communist International, facilitated
the promulgation of radical politics and propaganda among Indian mariners on ship and in
boarding houses in London, Liverpool, Rotterdam, and Hamburg. Engagement with the Union of
Eastern Sailors in Dutch ports was soon replicated in British ports with the continued support of
the RILU and Indian communist operatives.
Interwar lascar organization was structured by myriad nodes of international
communism. The interactions between South Asian communists were largely funded and
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facilitated by European Communist Parties. The ways in which these South Asian organizations
formulated their party apparatus was clearly directed by European forms. However, the
relationship between the European and South Asian iterations of interwar communist
anticolonialism and global socialism should be seen neither as a network in which European
political forms single handedly gave rise to Indian radicalism nor to suggest a complete and
thorough-going ideological identity among these various strands. Nevertheless, the reliance on
European organizations, especially the RILU and the Federation of Transport Workers, for funds
and regional networks is unavoidable in the case of lascar political organization and
radicalization. As the revolutionary potential that communist operatives saw in lascars switched
from a focus on their mobility, as carriers of proscribed items, to their dispossession in port and
alienation from white society, efforts to unionize took precedence. In this iteration of lascar
politics, Indian and British communists hoped not only to appeal to seamen in terms of improved
working conditions, including increased pay, reduced working hours, and support for
unemployment and injury but also to fashion a radical vanguard out of the lascars. In this
iteration, the organization of colonial sailors would have the effect of undermining imperialism
and fascism by refusing to transport arms or coordinate with racially segregated unions.61
Perceived and real coordination between lascar labor organizers and the Soviet Union,
especially through the Profintern (or Red International Labor Union) animated the British
surveillance apparatus. In 1923, Shapurji Saklatvala, the communist Member of Parliament for
Battersea North and nephew of industrialist JN Tata, led the transformation of the Lascars
Welfare League into the Indian Seamen’s Association. This Association, which was known
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variously as the International Oriental Seafarers’ Union and the Eastern Seamen’s Union, was
active in the major British ports of London, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Cardiff. It sought to
organize Indian seamen to secure better conditions on ship, which, theoretically, would have
militated against the urge to desert, and in port. From its inception, the organizers of the
association understood the global character of the lascar workforce endeavored to coordinate
with the RILU, which had previously worked with lascars on the continent. In May 1923, the
Indian Political Intelligence reported first that the Indian promoters of the Indian Seamen’s
Association hoped to secure the financial support of the RILU. Later in the same month, the
intelligence service noted that four members of the Soviet organization and fifty lascars
participated in a meeting of the organization in London, during which the constitution of the
Association was drafted.62 Even though official affiliation was not agreed to, the close
coordination between the Indian Seamen’s Association and the Soviet body led some observers
to comment that the organization appears to be “merely the Oriental Branch of the RILU.”63
In 1924, NJ Upadhyaya, a recent arrival from Gujarat, was selected to help organize the
Indian Seamen’s Association and discipline communism among Indian workers in Britain. Yet,
from the outset, some believed he was a curious choice because of his limited English
proficiency and discomfort engaging with other Indians in Britain. “Though he is known to quite
a few of our Comrades,” Adela Knight, who had taken him into her home upon his arrival in
England, observed in a letter to Saklatvala, “he [has] never associated with any of his
Compatriots and I cannot understand why but he seems nervous of his own here but fearless of
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the English.”64 Because of his fearlessness, Knight recommended that Upadhyaya be given the
chance to work among Indian sailors in London. Saklatvala, in turn, accommodated Knight’s
wishes and offered Communist Party support to Upadhyaya in the mid-1920s.
Upadhyaya commenced a decade of campaigning for the Indian Seamen’s Union and the
Communist Party of Great Britain simultaneously. He made public addresses under the auspices
of the International Class-War Prisoner Aid in Glasgow arguing for the cooperation between
trade unions, British communists, and lascars.65 In addition, he sought to establish Marxist study
circles for Indian students in London to encourage revolutionary consciousness among the Indian
bourgeoisie at British universities who could then assist in the organization and mobilization of
Indian sailors. In this latter initiative he received the diligent assistance of a woman that New
Scotland Yard referred to only as Miss Hillman, who distributed communist propaganda and
solicited donations at meetings of the Indian Communist Study Circle.66 Although he worked
tirelessly and received the assistance of Indian politicians and activists, as well as British
sympathizers, the misfortunes of the Communist Party in the interwar period militated against his
success. Upadhyaya’s frustrations were tied to the general downward trend in Party membership
in the 1920s due mainly to the its inability to cooperate with other major parties in British
politics at the time. Moreover, struggles to induce Indian migrants, especially lascars, to Party
membership, much like union membership, were compounded by the costs of membership,
which surely helped to dissuade lascars, who had been systematically underpaid, from joining.
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Undeterred, Upadhyaya made every effort to court lascars as potential party members,
catering events and supplying tea at Party expense.67 Attempts to mobilize Indian mariners, if not
through the Party or official union membership, continued in the form of mass meetings. In May
1926, he hoped to convene a lecture titled “India and Humanitarianism” at the Minerva Cafe in
London. Unfortunately, the lecturer and chair, both of whom were Indian, neglected to attend
due to fears of deportation under the prevailing Emergency Powers Act that had been declared in
response to the Trade Union Congress’ General Strike in support of coal miners.68 At the same
time, he began circulating a flier, first in English but then in Urdu, that outlined the benefits of
the Indian Seamen’s Union. This circular began by noting the unequal conditions of lascar labor,
that their depressed wages contributed to the profits of shipping companies, and the lack of any
provisions for injury compensation or retirement. To achieve parity, the flier continued, lascars
need to unionize and “put forward one united demand on behalf of all of us.”69 His efforts to
recruit Indians for Party and union membership by distributing fliers and selling pamphlets had
mixed results. It appears to have helped to expand the salience of these organizations among
Indians while institutions serving Indian mariners in Britain, such as the Asiatic Seamen’s Home
in the East End of London, banned him from entering.70
A year later, having just returned from India, he set his sights on Liverpool where he
combined public lectures and visits with lascars in their homes and on ships to distribute
literature and discuss the merits of unionization. On 30 April 1927, the Liverpool and District
Economic League noted with concern that Upadhyaya had mustered forty Indian seamen for a
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labor demonstration, which was coupled with increased activism in the city in protest of the
Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act and its numerous proscriptions on strike activity.71 On
May Day he addressed a gathering of a couple dozen Indians in Cleveland Square and rehearsed
the indignities that working-class Indians faced under the Colored Aliens Seaman Order claiming
that Indians were “socially despised” in an era of state sanctioned racism and tacitly accepted
segregation. Workers’ Life, a newspaper published by the CPGB, reported on the mass meeting
and printed the resolution adopted at its conclusion demanding that the Home Office cease the
application of CASO to Indian residents, that police cease harassment on the presumption that
Indians are aliens, and the Indian National Congress acknowledge the persecution of Indians in
Britain and advocate on their behalf. Finally, the meeting resolved to establish the Liverpool
Indian Association to protect Indians in the city and organize strike actions.72 Ultimately, due to
the difficulty of growing a dedicated trade union movement among lascars and a lack of official
backing from seamen’s and communist organizations, the Liverpool Indian Association and the
Indian Seamen’s Union foundered.73
Even though individual campaigns demonstrated varying degrees of success and failure,
Upadhyaya’s work for the Indian Seamen’s Union in Britain received considerable attention
from the India Office. In December 1927, it emerged that Upadhyaya had successfully enlisted
Abed Ali to work as a courier for him while he served on the crew of the s.s. Manora between
London and Bombay. In this way, Upadhyaya was able to introduce union and so-called
“seditious” publications into India to further the goals of the Indian Seamen’s Union and the
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Communist International.74 By 1928, the ISU boasted a membership of 1400. Considering the
expansion of the Union and Upadhyaya’s overall subversive influence, the India Office
corresponded with IPI and the Home Office regarding the possibility of deporting him under the
Aliens Restriction Order of 1920 because he was born in an Indian Princely State. Ultimately,
the Home Office pointed out that to deport him as an alien because of his status as a protected
person would have substantiated the claims of Indian Princes to be Independent Sovereigns.
Moreover, the threat that Upadhyaya posed and the fact that another organizer would have been
found easily for the ISU, the idea of deportation was dropped.75 Though it was deemed
unnecessary to deport him, Upadhyaya remained under surveillance for years afterward. In
August 1933, IPI insisted that he “continues to promote Communist activities amongst Indian
lascars. It is desired by means of this check to maintain a watch on his movements and it should
therefore be continued."76 To that end, MI5 authorized the Postmaster-General to "detain, open
and produce for my inspection all postal packets and telegrams addressed to [Upadhyaya]."77
Unionization and collective action among Indian seamen remained the goal of many
communist and anti-colonial activists in Britain and India but there remained a constant tension
between the improvements to working conditions promised by organization and the legal
ramifications that individual sailors and crews faced. In August 1935, the fire men on the City of
Roubaix refused to work claiming exhaustion. As penalty for “willful disobedience to the lawful
commands of the master and officers of the vessel,” contrary to the Merchant Shipping Act of
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1894, each of the thirty-one firemen on the crew was sentenced to fourteen days in prison. Had
the action been an approved strike by a recognized union, the sailors would not have been
incarcerated but the cooperation of the British seamen’s unions was still not forthcoming.
Therefore, as punishment for protesting the conditions of their work -- which was nothing more
than base insubordination -- rather than face penalties within the framework of their
employment, the state intervened and demonstrated the uneven acknowledgement of workers’
rights to strike according to perceptions of nationality and, more importantly, the intersection of
racial animus and class privilege.78
From the mid-1930s, Surat Ali, a former lascar himself, and the Colonial Seamen’s
Association took up the mantel of lascar organizing in the 1930s, after Upadhyaya's descent into
obscurity. The Colonial Seamen’s Association insisted that “seamen from the colonies must
organize in order to put a stop to colour discrimination in British ships,” which was precisely
Upadhyaya’s message. Although the call for improved working conditions and pay parity were
the common demands of organizations working on behalf of lascars, it was the coming of war in
1939 that prompted widespread resistance among lascars. In October 1939, forty-four lascars
were sentenced to two months imprisonment for striking work on the crew of the Clan Alpine.
These sailors demanded a fifty percent increase in pay, better food, and a bonus.79 In other cases,
lascars were under the impression that they were to be given a one hundred percent increase in
pay, which they believed had been given to the crew of the Oxfordshire in 1939. News of the
agreement with the Oxfordshire spurred Indian seamen to refuse work and leave ship unless
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similar pay raises were secured. Considering that “a feature of the strike movement among the
Indian seamen has been the absence of any practical encouragement or assistance from the
British Labour Movement,” these actions often had the same result: the shipping company
refused any increases and sought the support of the local magistrates and the Board of Trade to
either induce the men to work or send them to prison.80
The fact that war-time perils gave Indian sailors more of an impetus to mobilize in their
economic self-interest was met with the British state’s need to ensure a functional Merchant
Marine for the deployment of soldiers and the distribution of munitions. The enforcement of the
Merchant Shipping Act became a mechanism to compel non-combatants to serve -- and die -- in
the war. The choice that lascars had to make was between striking, ostensibly for increased pay,
or go to sea at the risk of encountering German U-boats and the Luftwaffe. While they were
simultaneously reduced to the enemies of global trade, the war against fascism, and Nazis all at
once, the strategies of resistance that they employed had been learned from communists and
trade unionists. Though the politics of self-preservation, anti-imperialism, and Communist
Internationalism are difficult to disentangle here, it is important to recognized that ideology
figured into lascar resistance alongside demands for remuneration and safety. The persistent
work among lascars in port by communist operatives like Upadhyaya and Surat Ali, and their
ability to connect the demand for better work conditions to the socialist revolution, hearkens to
the early 1920s when lascars were suspected as potential conduits for radical propaganda and
arms that had been proscribed in India but that would help to hasten the end of empire in the
interwar period.
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Conclusion
This chapter has examined the work and social history of Punjabi Muslims who arrived in
Britain as seamen, or lascars, and slowly began to construct networks that facilitated economic
opportunities beyond ship’s engine rooms and British workhouses. It located Indian male sailors
at the intersection of race-, class- and gender-based marginality in the UK during the inter-war
era. It traced why and how the British state enforced such marginalization based on race and
class, which operated through a gender-coded sexual threat that Indian men posed to white
women. At the same time, the relationships between Indian men and British women were
essential to navigating the legal apparatus that was constructed to negate their Britishness. The
experience of state-endorsed racial anxiety, infused with nascent anticolonialism in India, paved
the way for radical internationalist political forces to intervene in the unionization process of
Indian sailors. This intervention created the conditions for the rise of radical internationalist
politics among British working classes of South Asian origin.
As lascars, South Asian travelers and workers had their rights as British subjects
superseded by their contracts that devalued their labor, imperiled their safety, and contravened
their right to free movement within the Empire. They were subjected to policies that undermined
their control over their own employment and restricted their access to normal travel and identity
documents, leaving them bound to their nullies while at sea and in port. While Asiatic Articles
dictated the kinds of work that Indian seamen could do on ship and their recourse to leave in
British ports, the enactment of the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order of 1925
instituted a legal precedent that undermined the British nationality of nonwhite, non-elite visitors
and settlers from the colonies. Designed as a mechanism to reduce the numbers of non-British
workers competing for jobs with native-born British, this law was egregiously applied to British
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subjects of South Asian descent because of the increasing correlation, drawn by civilians and
policy makers alike, between whiteness, English fluency, and Britishness.
CASO and its predecessor, the Aliens Order of 1920, may not have been originally
intended for the "wholesale registration" of Indians in Britain but the effect that this Order had
on policy and the British surveillance state was tantamount to wholesale exclusion of workingclass Indians, regardless of their ability to provide documentation of their British nationality. The
Board of Trade authorized CASO because of the “accumulation of coloured seamen at ports in
the United Kingdom during and after the war.”81 In 1942, the Order was rescinded because, as
MJ Clauson of the India Office wrote, it was “apparently the only enactment in this country
constituting a colour bar, and the Colonial Office have pressed for its revocation on sentimental
grounds, since it applied to African seamen who are British Protected Persons.”82 Nonetheless,
for seventeen years the matrix of competition, violence, and belonging provided the logic for the
Special Restriction Order – a logic which was underpinned by white supremacy in interwar
Britain.
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Chapter 3
The Punjabi Peddler Fraternity, 1925-1942
On the night of 16 May 1925, John Keen, John McCormack, Robert Fletcher, and a few
of their friends, invaded a house on Water Street in Glasgow, where “a number of Indian
pedlars” were known to live.1 In the melee that ensued, Keen’s mob, armed with knives, sticks,
and stones, attacked Noor Mohammed, Nathoo Mohamed, and four other Indians, while a crowd
gathered outside.2 In the chaos, Keen plunged a knife into Noor Mohammed’s chest. Before
anyone could summon the police, the mob escaped with £18 worth of inventory, including
“jumpers, ladies’ dresses, and scarves, while Noor bled-out on the floor. The gang was
apprehended later that night and remanded in connection with Noor Mohammed’s murder.3 In
September, Keen was convicted and sentenced to death. On the dock, he became disconsolate
and, with tear-soaked cheeks, he declared that his conviction was a travesty of justice.4 Though a
petition for his reprieve received more than 60,000 signatures in a matter of days, Keen was
executed at eight o’clock, Thursday morning, 24 September 1925.5
The Times ran a series of articles tracking John Keen’s fate: noting his tirade in court and
acknowledging the magnitude of the effort to stay his execution. At one point, the paper nearly
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eulogized “the young married man condemned for the murder of an Indian pedlar.”6 Noor
Mohammed, Keen’s victim, received considerably less attention -- not even named in many
cases, just an Indian peddler. True, the paper noted that Mohammed was Punjabi, that at his
death he was 27 years old, and that he walked the streets of Glasgow selling carpets and drapes,
women’s clothing, and, perhaps, some silk. Peddling, the paper suspects, was the cause of Noor’s
death, as Keen and company appear to have intended a robbery and not a murder. It is as if
Mohammed, a Punjabi Muslim, after all, whose presence in Glasgow might have been a result of
desertion in the first place, was complicit in his own murder. As if Keen, a young Scot, was a
victim of circumstance.
From the onset of the 1930s, hostility toward Indians in Britain took on a more general
character. Not only were lascars strictly monitored to minimize the likelihood of desertion, but
also Indians hoping to travel to Britain legally were faced with institutionalized hurdles.
Importantly, the question of obtaining a passport for non-seafaring Indians was suffused with
prejudices against working-class migrants.7 While the government continued to focus on lascars
as the major source of Indian peddlers, restrictions that were placed on South Asian mobility,
especially as it concerns travel to Britain, exposes the nascent trend of fare-paying passengers
arriving in Britain as itinerant traders. Such mobility had given rise to a new demographic texture
among South Asians in Britain, one that moved beyond the narrative of desertion and, instead,
showcases the importance of free movement to the constitution and maintenance of a
community.
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What had been primarily an onshore occupation for lascars and deserters, an almost
exclusively Muslim population, peddling became the chosen occupation of Punjabi Sikh
migrants who had the connections or finances to make the voyage to Britain. This phenomenon
contributed to the diversification of the South Asian peddler community in Britain from the
1930s. As the Indian community changed over the course of the late-1920s and through the
1930s, the response from British popular opinion and policy was one of hostility that was
premised on racial and class prejudices that were built on the foundation of civilizational
chauvinism and colonial ideology and made manifest through violence. This chapter
demonstrates that Punjabi itinerant merchants, just like their lascar predecessors, faced racial
discrimination and institutional exclusion. Yet, through the maintenance of non-institutional
networks for employment, housing, and credit, they persisted in their trade.
Although local police displayed considerable consternation at the uptick in Indian
applicants for peddlers’ certificates, ignorance and lack of interest facilitated the slippage
between lascar, peddler, and Indian. Thus, Indian peddlers operated under constant scrutiny
because of suspicions that only escaped lascars became peddlers. However, in this period, Sikh
travelers were turning up on British shores as fare-paying passengers who sought to enter the rag
trade. These travelers came from different socioeconomic backgrounds and hailed from a
different region of the Punjab. As the previous chapter noted, the preponderance of Punjabi
lascars was recruited from the Rawalpindi district of western Punjab, which also supplied most
Punjabi Muslim soldiers for the British Indian Army. In the case of Sikh peddlers, however, the
clear majority came from the central range, and especially the Doab cities of Hoshiarpur,
Jullundur, and Ludhiana.
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The economic factors for emigration have been detailed elsewhere, but it is worth noting
that, while Punjabis dominated the so-called Indian peddler fraternity in Britain, there were a
variety of routes. First, this chapter will detail the history of peddling and explore some of the
writing on itinerant merchants by Justus Möser and Fernand Braudel. Second, the chapter will
delineate the diversity in the demographic makeup of the community of Punjabi itinerant
merchants to dislodge prevailing assumptions about its history. Third, it will detail the operation
and formalization of peddling among Indians, which began in the early 1920s and continued
through World War II. Lastly, my focus on peddlers will return to questions of criminality
among the peddler fraternity, with particular attention to the story of Nathoo Mohamed, who was
with Noor Mohammad at his death. Narratives of migrant criminality help to reveal modes of
politics that undermined British authority while not being targeted as overtly nationalist or
seditionist.
History of a Migrant Trade
The available literature on the South Asian peddler community is not extensive. Many of
the secondary sources attend to the question of Sikh peddlers, with reference mainly to the small
Bhatra Sikh community in Nottingham.8 Other scholars have given general emphasis to Sikh
peddlers at the expense of the Muslim community.9 The suggestion that non-Sikh peddlers were
marginal to the overall South Asian peddler community is difficult to sustain considering the
wealth of documentary evidence of Muslim peddlers, who, for many areas of Britain, constituted
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the larger contingent of South Asian peddlers throughout the interwar period. Moreover, it must
be noted that there is not reliable evidence to suggest the centrality of the Bhatra community
among Indian peddlers in this, or any, period. The focus of this section, then, is to build on the
previous chapter’s focus on lascar deserters and to explore the emerging diversity of South
Asians peddlers that became more visible in the interwar period. One must approach the question
of Indian peddlers with a degree of nuance that allows for simultaneous and interacting
communities of South Asians who did not follow the same route to Britain. To that end, this
section highlights the need to disaggregate the South Asian peddler community in Britain to
appreciate the diversity of experience, prospects, and politics possible within what has hitherto
been considered as an undifferentiated mass.
Peddlers have been marginal figures within capitalist society for centuries and their
potential for destabilization has followed them throughout. In the late-eighteenth century, Justus
Möser, a Westphalian social conservative who regarded nascent capitalism with steadfast
suspicion, was an early critic of itinerant door-to-door traders. In his view, capitalist
accumulation undermined hierarchy and threatened social order. The peddler, in the German
hinterlands, was an agent of capitalist expansion and facilitated the emergence of consumerism at
the expense of the “artisan-citizen and the independent peasant.”10 The peddler carried foreign
goods that substituted for locally made wares, which, Möser feared, caused the peasantry to
question their inherent social station. Coupled with his concern about the creation of new desires
in the eighteenth-century German village, was an anxiety about the cultural difference of the
peddler. Ordinarily, in Möser’s view, the peddler was a foreigner, most often a Jew, preying on
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naive and parochial Germans, competing with local producers, and effectively impoverishing the
region as he traveled along his route.11 Finally, in this portrait of early capitalism, the peddler
jeopardized patriarchal control by appealing directly to women at their door, in the absence of
their husbands, which Möser believed was a transgression against the sanctity of the private
sphere, distracted women from their customary duties, and lead to excessive spending on
inessential luxuries. Cast as a predatory vector of market consumerism, the peddler of Möser’s
era was a figure of dubious character and a harbinger of social decay: a “destroyer of local
culture.”12
In the second volume of his Civilization and Capitalism, Fernand Braudel develops a
critique of the peddler along similar lines; however, he focuses on the utility of the itinerant
trader, not the threats to custom and tradition posed. Braudel praises the peddler’s tenacity and
considers his economic function essential: “They filled in the gaps in the regular channels of
distribution, even in towns, though mostly in villages and hamlets.”13 At his root, the peddler, for
Braudel, was anyone who traveled to sell his skill or stock, whether an itinerant trader or a large
merchant delivering to shops. As is true of Indians in Britain in the early twentieth century, the
seventeenth century peddler that Braudel examines was a figure in flux. He often began as a
traveling salesman, a vestige of centuries old trading practices, and would eventually become a
shop owner or a wholesaler. Moreover, his trade was couched in his abilities to sell himself
before his goods. Braudel asserts that the peddler’s charisma was foundational to his ability to
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“buy his way into poorly served areas and persuade the hesitant.” Importantly, Braudel points out
that peddling is an “eminently adaptable system” and reappears whenever the formal distribution
mechanisms falter or customary authority breaks down, thus it is no wonder that Indian traders
during the depression era of the interwar and into World War II became such a common sight
and, for the government, an intractable problem.14 “For peddling is and always has been,”
Braudel notes in closing, “a way of getting round the sacrosanct market, a way of cocking a
snook at established authority.”15
In 1931, protests erupted in Bolton, a city northeast of Manchester, against an influx of
Indian peddlers selling goods in direct competition with local shops. According to Councilor
Herbert Eastwood, the activities of these Indians added “insult to injury” considering the
“attitude of the Indian Government towards imported Lancashire products.”16 The relationship
between Lancashire and India had been strained for much of the previous decade since import
substituting industries began to flourish in Bombay and Ahmedabad. By 1918 Indian
manufactured cloth largely replaced that of Lancashire for local consumers. A few years later, in
1922, London granted fiscal autonomy to the Indian government, permitting the latter to impose
import duties on British goods.17 The struggles of the Lancashire economy, which had been
propped up by preferential trade terms with India for centuries, created a hostile environment for
Indian outsiders. Considering the low prices that the Indians merchants asked, Eastwood
declared that their trade was “grossly unfair to...all the workers of Bolton.” His sentiment echoes
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that of Laurence Frederic Rushbrook Williams, publicity officer of the Indian Government, who
said, in 1920, “the average workingman is in some danger of...regarding all peoples of India as
highly undesirable niggers whose mission in life is to undersell more civilised countries in the
labour market.”18 Indeed, Rushbrook Williams’ forecast proved to be an appropriate distillation
of British racism in the depression era as well as in the postwar period of immigration control
legislation.19
The story on Bolton, which was reported in the Daily Dispatch, the Manchester
Guardian, and the Manchester Evening Chronicle, depicts the surprise and offence that local
officials and shop owners took at the competition, pursues explanations for the Indian presence
and strategies to undermine their trade. The typical response, invoked by Councilor Eastman,
was to prevent “aliens” from obtaining peddler certificates -- a problematic solution for reasons
described below. Reminiscent of Möser’s lament, for many in Bolton these twenty peddlers
presented a thorough-going challenge to their way of life. Of concern was the ease with which
they approached and addressed local women. “Housewives in Bolton, which depends almost
entirely on the cotton industry,” reports a local newspaper, “have been surprised in the last few
weeks to have offered at their doors cotton, silk, voile, and woolen goods which the Indian
salesmen claim to have been made entirely in India.”20 In a manner that would have pleased
Braudel, these peddlers used their natural talents in pursuit of their trade: “Their good nature and
good temper is helping them to smile their way into the homes of English people, to whom they
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have little difficulty in selling their goods.”21 In Bolton, the Möserian specter of the peddler was
resurrected. However, in this case, their potential to expand capitalism was not the chief
complaint; rather, concerns over the welfare of British capitalism were at the forefront of the
row.
Unwilling to admire the fortitude of these Indian entrepreneurs, the locals suggested that
the Indian migrants were political operatives whose presence was an overt attempt to destabilize
the region. Mr. W. Coucill, a veteran of the cotton industry in Lancashire and Cawnpore,
seriously suggested that “there might be Indians in this country who, posing as pedlars, are
emissaries of the Indian Swarajists.”22 The eminence of Gandhian nationalism in the 1930s was
not lost on the editors of the Guardian either, even if the Manchester papers seem to be making
light of the injury to small town sensibilities. In a satirical consideration of the political motives
of the Indian merchants, prompted, no doubt, by Coucill’s remarks, the paper suggests “[b]efore
we know where we are we may have Bolton launching out on an economic boycott” akin to
Gandhi’s campaign of swadeshi. In an effective summary of classical colonialism in India, the
piece continues, “Lancashire in her present plight has every reason to resent the intrusion of
foreign merchants carrying goods which she herself produces.” With tongue in cheek, the article
concludes “these inconsiderable pedlars, like the Elizabethan traders who after many perils and
difficulties were able to buy and sell in India to their own great enrichment, may be called by
future historians merchant adventurers, founders of an empire.”23
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Legislation for the licensing of peddlers in Britain can be traced back to the seventeenth
century but the specific law that regulated peddler certificates in the interwar period was initially
passed in 1871 and subsequently amended in 1881.24 The Pedlars Act of 1871 made two
important contributions to standardizing peddling in Britain. First, it defined the profession as
anyone who “without any horse or other beast bearing or drawing burden, travels and trades on
foot and goes from town to town or to other men’s houses, carrying to sell or exposing for sale
any goods, wares, or merchandise, or procuring orders for goods, wares, or merchandise
immediately to be delivered, or selling or offering for sale his skill in handicraft.” Thus, a
peddler was an itinerant salesperson, a person who took orders and then delivered the specified
goods, or a door-to-door technician. Second, the Act stipulated the criteria a person must satisfy
to obtain a certificate. Specifically, one must have lived in the relevant police district for at least
a month prior to application and then satisfy the interviewing police officer that one is “above
seventeen years of age, is a person of good character, and in good faith intends to carry on the
trade of a pedlar.”25 Initially a certificate obtained under the 1871 Act was only valid within the
district that granted it, but in 1881 the act was amended so that a certificate was valid throughout
the United Kingdom.26
Though this legislation antedates the first alien restriction laws by more than three
decades it came to be infused with the same suspiciousness of mobility and difference that
marked South Asian migrants in the twentieth century. In 1905 the Chief Constable of Liverpool
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expressed concern over the increase in “[t]he number of foreigners unable to speak English, or
speaking it very imperfectly” who were applying for Certificates. Though for the time he
acquiesced to these applications, he “[began] to doubt the advisability of doing so.”27 Fifteen
years later, London, in confronting the anxieties of a post-war society, also focused on the
“grave” situation of “alien pedlars.” A peddler certificate, according to W. Horwood, the
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, “gives to its holder considerable freedom of
movement which may easily be abused by ill-disposed persons and which, it is conceivable, may
even afford cover for espionage.” Thus, in the advent of new hostilities, the Commissioner
suggested that the authorities should “cease to issue new pedlar’s certificates except to British
born and English-speaking subjects.” Although the Commissioner included the caveat that
certificates should be issued to “British born” people, which would include colonial migrants, his
insistence that they also be “English speaking”, reasserts the fundamental importance of the
English language to British identity.28
Concern over “aliens” becoming peddlers in the prewar era was directed primarily at
travelers from Europe, especially Germany and Russia, but fluency in English as a criterion for
legitimate claims to belonging in Britain undermined Punjabi Merchants in the interwar era too.
JW Hose, the Secretary of the Public and Judicial Department in the India Office made the point
about cultural difference clear: “The Indian of the class referred to [is]...not a desirable resident
in any country of a European type.” Moreover, “[if] he ceased to be an Indian and lived as an
Englishman in England, the case would be different. But the Indian out of his country does not
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assimilate himself with his new surroundings.” Thus, Hose rationalized, the “prejudice of colour
is natural.”29 In these terms, postwar anxieties about non-English speaking peddlers were
reconfigured to place Indians “of the class referred to” beyond the dictates of the good character
clause of the Pedlars Act. Hose’s contention, for which he was certainly not the sole proponent,
permitted the Aliens and Nationality Committee to dismiss the possibility of banning “aliens”
from peddler’s certificates while maintaining that “the Police should exercise special care in
satisfying themselves with regard to the good character and bona fides of alien applicants for
Pedlars Certificates [sic].”30
Britain’s confrontation with foreign migrants and aliens was first codified in 1905 and the
twentieth century was one that saw ever-increasing control over rights of entry and the freedom
to settle of those the state considered not to be British subjects. The central authority over alien
migration was the police, with whom it was decided in the 1914 Aliens Registration Act that all
foreign visitors must register their presence. Initially for the purposes of the Aliens Acts of 1914
and 1920, and later the Coloured Alien Seamen Order, local police were heavily relied on in the
surveillance and control of non-British nationals through the verification of their nationality and
the issuance of certificates of registration. The primary criterion that would satisfy the authorities
of British nationality was a valid British passport. Yet, many Indian travelers were restricted
from obtaining a passport due to their status as sailors and others had passports that port
authorities believed were stolen, borrowed, or otherwise illegitimate. Therefore, the process of
traveling to, or through, Britain during the period between the enactment of the Aliens
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Restriction Act and the era of decolonization was fraught for Indian and other colonial subjects
whose presence was deemed illegitimate.
The Sikh Rag Trade and the Formalization of the Peddler Fraternity
While John Keen’s trial was ongoing, an Inspector at the Aliens Department at the City
of Glasgow Police wrote to his Chief Constable about the illicit activities of Indians in the city.
Along with commenting generally about the behavior of lascars in Glasgow, including fears that
deserters sold revolvers to lascars on ship, he was particularly concerned with Shiv Kiddar, Said
Mohammed Mullah, Mohamed Abbas, and Nathoo Mohamed. According to his department,
these four Indians operated a prostitution ring in Glasgow and cohabited with white women,
some of whom were married and living apart from their husbands. The social problems that
Nathoo Mohamed and his associates presented to the Glasgow authorities led the Inspector to
request that the Special Restriction (Coloured Alien Seamen) Order, which had gone into effect
in a few specified localities in April 1925, be extended to Glasgow.31 Even though the Order was
explicitly not designed to control British Indians, it was extended to Glasgow in January 1926
and the Glasgow police commenced registering as aliens any and all nonwhite seamen who were
unable to immediately produce evidence of British nationality, regardless of present
occupation.32
While the Home Office attempted to devise schemes to restrict access to peddler’s
certificates, particularly to those suspected of deserting ships, local authorities continued to issue
such certificates mostly in accordance with the 1871 Act. In Reading, the continued ability of
Indians to secure certificates led to routine correspondence with the Home Office, which was
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“anxious to discourage [l]ascar seamen from settling down ashore...and engaging in petty trade
as pedlars.”33 Yet, in response to a Home Office circular regarding “lascar deserters” police
districts returned information showing few certificates were issued to ex-seamen. Instead, by the
early 1940s, Jullundur and Hoshiarpur, the predominantly Sikh areas of central Punjab, “had
almost a monopoly in the supply of pedlars to the United Kingdom,” a fact that undermines
suspicions around Muslim peddlers and lascar deserters.34
The gradual increase in the size of the South Asian population in Britain, which was
facilitated through travel endorsements, bridgehead communities, and a network of settled Indian
merchants across the country, was not a welcome phenomenon for Ramsay MacDonald’s Labour
Government. Although the definite number of passport-holding Indian migrants in Britain in the
late-1920s and early-1930s is not readily available, it was, from the Government’s perspective,
excessive and required action. Around the very same time that Bolton was panicking, the
Government officially instructed Consular Offices throughout India not to grant passports to
non-elite travelers. On 4 September 1931, the Foreign Office, therefore, distributed a circular
stating that, while “Indian British subjects of good character and established position...may be
granted ordinary British passports,” those “of a low standard of education and limited
means...should not be granted passports.”35 Since lascars were already disqualified from
passports, this new policy was clearly intended to further reduce the number of Indians in Britain
and restrict their ability to move around the empire as British subjects.36
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Nonetheless, much in the logical vein of the Colored Seamen Order, the Home Office
remained fixated on turning Indian origins into grounds for suspicion. For instance, the
Metropolitan Police returned a register of three Sikhs, Kesman Singh, Ishar Singh, and Arjan
Singh, who had been certified in Buckinghamshire and Reading after producing passports issued
in India.37 Further to this point, in early May 1933, a list of eleven Sikh peddlers, with
certificates issued at Reading, was recorded by the Limehouse Station of the Metropolitan
Police. Though they had not been stamped at the British port of entry, their possession of
passports suggests that they were properly documented travelers. This fact undermined the Home
Office assumption that any Indian peddler in Britain had deserted a ship and ought to be
repatriated if discovered.38
Scrutiny of individual applicants was based on concerns about the overall number of
Indians in Britain. In 1933, Kartar Singh and Company, a Wholesale firm based in Dundee,
applied for a passport to bring Fanasar Singh to Britain so that Kartar Singh could return to India.
Nearly three years later, the Government of Punjab responded to this request and refused to grant
the travel document; a decision presumably based on the 1931 passport restrictions. Kartar Singh
wrote again to the India Office in January 1937 imploring them to approve the passport
application so that he could arrange to return to India. On this occasion, though the Government
of Punjab acknowledged that Fanasar was “an illiterate agriculturist whose services could clearly
be of little or no value in a shop or warehouse in England or Scotland,” the passport was granted.
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This decision allowed Kartar Singh to return to England and have Fanasar Singh come to
Scotland in his stead.39
In other cases, travel facilities were granted or refused in a seemingly arbitrary manner.
For instance, in November 1937, Banta Singh applied for a passport for his brother Partap to
come to Britain as his assistant. The police found that “there is nothing known against the man’s
character here. He appears to be of thrifty habits and is, at present, in a position to maintain his
brother here...” Yet, the report speculates, “Banta Singh will finance him for a start and then
leave him to earn his own living.” Although the lack of a permanent position gave the authorities
pause, the stated reason for concern was that, “this country is becoming over-run with Indian
pedlars to the detriment of local small traders.” To that end, Partap Singh’s passport application
was rejected. Yet, Noor Mohamed’s request to bring his associate Gulam Rasul from Jullundur
to assist him in his work was treated in precisely the opposite manner. Upon further investigation
of Noor Mohamed’s business, the Police realized that the address Mohamed gave for his
operation, 62 Millgate Road in Wigan, was a private home accommodating eight Indians. Even
though the Police endeavored to discredit Mohamed’s business, Ghulam Rasul was granted a
passport.
These cases resonate with postwar attempts by the Home Office to manage the flow
Indian migrants who came to Britain as industrial laborers. However, in the 1950s, there was a
systematic attempt to direct migrants to areas to prevent the perception of an over-population of
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Indians and Pakistanis in any single area. The interwar manifestation of this logic reduced the
management of migrants to a local decision and relied on the perception, as one officer put it,
that “there are...far too many of the type of SINGH here now and I would suggest that every
possible step be taken to prevent any more coming.”40 With this statement, the officer
summarized the perception of the surveillance and police apparatus in Britain -- that too many
Indian migrants were being permitted to enter the country and engage in trade. This stance on
working-class Indian migration persisted into the late-twentieth century.
Over the course of the 1930s the presence of Indian shopkeepers, warehousemen, and
peddlers expanded through family and village networks. As seen above, a particularly important
aspect of this economy was the myriad configurations that sponsorship could take. Among the
most common avenues for expanding this community was for an individual to sponsor a close
relative, often a son, brother, or nephew, to join an established business. Typically, such a
request would originate from an individual, in some cases so that he could return to India. For
instance, Jawala Singh of 25 Clyde Place, Glasgow, requested to bring his son to Britain,
because, as he wrote in his letter to the Under Secretary of State for India, “my wife is dead, and
I wish to have him here under my care, as he is without any guardians now.”41 Yet, the Board of
Trade noted regional differences in the organization of labor in the rag trade. “In Londonderry
and Glasgow,” the Board noted in 1930, “it is known that the employment of...pedlars is
organized from central warehouses or by Head pedlars.”42 Thus, the operation and organization
of the Indian peddler network in Britain was variable as a rule for survival. Having noted the
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intense scrutiny that Indians experienced in Britain between the wars, this section will turn to
questions of supply the peddler’s route.
Foremost, due to the invasiveness of the surveillance apparatus, it must be observed that
Indian trade occurred in an unsettled and necessarily transient manner. Mohammad Tanda’s
dealings in Britain in the 1930s is exemplary of the flexibility and resourcefulness of the Indian
peddler in a hostile environment. Tanda first came to the notice of the police in London in 1931,
while engaged in a small-scale distribution and supply firm with Niaz Ali in Aldgate. The
Metropolitan Police investigated Tanda and Ali because they were suspected of inducing lascars
to desert. However, once these investigations “proved abortive,” Tanda slipped out of the
historical record for nearly a decade.43 Having had his firm disrupted by invasive police
practices, it appears that Tanda was forced out of London in search of a less intrusive
municipality. Accordingly, he reappeared in Glasgow as an associate of Sulman Mohammad
Sharif and Ata Mohammad Ashrif, in a firm that they had formed in 1934. Although Tanda had
evaded the Metropolitan Police, his new trading firm remained under the watchful eye of the
British authorities.
Since there was no recourse to deportation or repatriation for documented and financially
secure Indians, the police pursued any potential lead they could to undermine the function of
Indian peddling enterprises. Therefore, the police focused primarily on circumscribing the labor
supply from India. In 1939, Tanda's firm attempted to sponsor “no fewer than 8” passports for
Indians from central Punjab. The Government of India and the Glasgow City Police found that
many of those who Sharif, Tanda, and Ashrif attempted to sponsor were “men of the agriculturist
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class, of little or no education, and of extremely limited means.”44 The Criminal Investigation
Department (CID) in the Glasgow Police concluded that these migrants were not guaranteed
employment upon arrival in Britain, but instead were being recruited as itinerant traders. “This
type of application by coloured men is becoming very common,” the Superintendent of Police
added, “in the circumstances, they should be discouraged.”45 In accordance with the Glasgow
Police’s recommendations, the Home Secretary notified the India Office that guarantees from
Sharif, Tanda, and Ashrif should not be accepted and travel facilities for prospective associates
of the firm should be refused.46
Among the eight, only Nabi Baksh obtained travel documents because the Home Office
determined that the remainder “are men of the agriculturist class, or little or no education, and of
extremely limited means.”47 Nevertheless, the firm was able to put Baksh to good use. Evidently,
Sharif, Tanda, and Ashrif sent Baksh throughout the United Kingdom to peddle goods. In the
Glasgow Pedlar Registry, Baksh appears in Glasgow in two separate years having come from a
remote police district. He spent 1939, upon arrival in the United Kingdom, in Belfast and in 1943
he carried a peddler’s license from Coventry.48 Basksh’s travels around Britain are indicative of
the ways in which Indian peddlers made their living traversing great distances always to return to
a central hub for restocking en route to a new destination. The Glasgow Pedlar Registry, to
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which this chapter will return, is of unparalleled importance in tracing these movements and
reconstructing the Indian peddler fraternity.
A singular focus on Indian firms, such as Tanda’s, was not enough for the government’s
intention to monitor Indian migrants and the variability and flexibility of the Indian peddler
community exposed the limits of any single mode of control. Although law enforcement believed
that Indian traders were centrally organized and were initially recruited into peddling by lodging
house keepers, the expansion of this community relied on family networks as well as the
entrepreneurial spirit of recent arrivals. Nevertheless, government reports detail one common
trajectory of the migrant economy that Ravi Ahuja has elsewhere described as “the networks of
the subordinated.”49 According to this theory, the peddler was encouraged to buy supplies from a
wholesaler associated the lodging house keeper, or in many cases supplies would be given on
credit “until such time as they are in a position to purchase stock for themselves.”50 In 1936, the
Glasgow police reported the Kaka group not only employed nine Indians, each of whom made a
regular wage and commission, but also two white Glaswegians “who [were] employed as errand
boys.”51 For Malla Singh, in contrast, the most effective arrangement was to purchase stock
jointly with his housemates but sell it independently; rather than to be associated directly with a
warehouse.52 Thus, though warehousing firms helped formalize the Indian peddler economy in
the 1930s and 1940s, the organization and supply of these merchants in Britain between the wars
was neither consistent nor bound to just a few houses. Indian migrants may have been induced to
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peddle as a means of paying down a debt, they might have operated in small groups, sharing the
overhead costs, or they might have been directly employed by established firms.
Peddlers in Glasgow: Housing and the Migrant Economy
The Pedlars Registry that the Glasgow police maintained and preserved for the 1940s has
provided a unique insight into the Indian “rag trade” in Britain.53 Of the neighborhoods where
Indians settled, the Gorbals, the so-called “slum district of Glasgow,” appears typical. This was a
working-class area south of the River Clyde composed of Italians, Eastern European Jews, and
Punjabi Sikhs and Muslims, all of whom engaged the mosaic of unskilled, itinerant, and casual
labor open to them.54 The concentration of migrants facilitated a parallel economy that operated
at the fringes of the industrial capitalism under the auspices of people marginalized within the
British working-class. The built environment of the neighborhood served as a sociospatial entity
that enabled “undesirable” migrants to navigate the fringes of British capitalism by mobilizing
non-institutional networks for housing, credit, and work. The nature of peddling facilitates a
migrant economy that subverted prevailing assumptions of ethnic segregation as well as
preoccupations with material gain and demarcated the limits of racial capitalism in the interwar
period.
The Punjabi peddler fraternity operating in Glasgow has been uniquely well documented
due, in part to the fastidiousness of the City police in its attempt to track down all who were
deemed undesirable migrants. Such police correspondence fills Home Office files on peddlers
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and suspected lascar deserters. The Nationality and Naturalization papers at the National
Archives have been used extensively by historians of the Indian community in Britain. An
equally useful and interesting source is the Glasgow Registry of Pedlars Certificates. Although
all municipal police were charged with the task of issuing peddler’s licenses, the Glasgow
Registry for the years 1939-49 appears to be among the very last of these lists in existence. The
Registry facilitates additional insight into the peddler community. For the period that it
documents, the Registry records the names of nearly 1200 Indians. Some of whom were settled
in Glasgow, with many years of successive registration. Others appear to have peddled as a stopgap between serving on ships’ crews. Still others were long-time peddlers with no clear homebase who had received certificates from Glasgow while passing through along their route. The
Registry adds layers of personal and community information about Indians in the city otherwise
obscured by an over-reliance on periodic police reports.
The Registry allows for the reconstruction of professional biographies for many
individuals who were based in Glasgow and facilitates a more complete understanding of the
operation of the rag-trade in Glasgow. I have already indicated police and government beliefs
about the organization of Indian peddlers, particularly their use of “networks of the
subordinated” by way of Indian boarding house keepers and established peddlers and
wholesalers. However, the information contained in the Registry allows for additional
observations that are helpful to imagine the Punjabi community in Glasgow shorn of the racial
anxieties contained in police and ministerial reports.
First, the Registry contains numerous instances of sequential passports that were issued
from the same city, typically Lahore, on the same day. This suggests that many Indian peddlers
applied for passports and came to the United Kingdom in groups, whether those group were
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organized through a serang or similar recruitment apparatus or simply through a village network
is not easily determined. Though the Registry reveals different patterns for individuals in these
groups after arrival, some of whom would have been dispatched by hiring firms, and others
moved about independently to sell their stock, the fact that they moved together demonstrates
that the intention to peddle was not always, or even often, a spur of the moment decision made
from desperation. Second, the Registry contains information on residential address, which
complicates notions of self-imposed ethnic segregation and can be combined with Valuation
Rolls to describe housing patterns, inter-ethnic cooperation, and the emergence of Indian
landlords. Third, the fact that the Registry contains certificate numbers and place of issue
provides a new view of the kinds of routes that peddlers followed across England, Wales,
Northern Ireland, and Scotland. Finally, information on certificate numbers permits the
researcher to reckon with patterns of certificate renewal that exceeded information on housing
patterns and passport numbers thereby adding nuance to understandings of community formation
after arrival in the city.
A thorough reading of the Registry provides the opportunity to recreate the Punjabi
peddler fraternity in Glasgow in previously unknown ways. By tracing passport numbers in the
Registry from year to year facilitates a better understanding of the consolidation of the
community in Glasgow at handful of addresses. Of the most important, 410 Argyle Street, in
City Centre, and 25 Clyde Place, in the Gorbals, were dominated by Sikh traders. 71 South
Portland Street and 171 Hospital Street were occupied primarily by Muslim traders. However,
over the course of the decade recorded, the Registry demonstrates that the Punjabi community
was not strictly segregated by religion. The transition of 16 Queen Arcade, in the City Centre, is
a good example of this observation. From 1939 to 1944, it was occupied nearly exclusively by
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Sikhs. During that time, of the thirty-two entries at this address, “Ismail” was the only Muslim
name listed. However, of the twenty-seven entries from 1945 to April 1949, thirteen of the
residents were Sikh and fourteen were Muslim. Thus, 16 Queen Arcade was a point of contact
for many new residents from India regardless of perceived markers of identity and affinity.
Nevertheless, perhaps because of the higher proportion of Muslim peddlers in the city,
the housing story that the Registry tells is one that broke down along religious lines. The Muslim
population outnumbered non-Muslims in the Gorbals by a 7 to 2 margin throughout the 1940s.
Thus, at least for Glasgow, although the Sikh contingent has received the bulk of the scholarly
attention, Muslims constituted the larger community of Indian peddlers. The addresses recorded
in the Pedlars Registry further confirms that Indian peddlers were concentrated in the Gorbals,
south of the River Clyde, which accounted for nearly 60% of the names at the twenty most
popular addresses in Glasgow. Almost all popular addresses for Indian peddlers throughout the
city appeared to house primarily Muslims or non-Muslims.
Seldom did an address accommodate large groups from both communities
simultaneously. 16 Queens Arcade, which was in City Centre and was the most populous address
throughout the period is a striking exception. Though it exclusively housed non-Muslim Indians
in 1939, in 1941 and from 1944-1949 it was an inter-religious residence. 410 Argyle St., 50
Milton St., 71 South Portland St., and 136 Hospital St., the latter two situated in the Gorbals,
show similar dramatic fluctuations in religious occupancy. Thus, though the community appears
to have been largely segregated by religion, the more popular residences that housed peddlers
based in Glasgow, rather than transients who moved through Glasgow en route to Dundee,
Inverness, or Coventry, showed a remarkable fluidity in the demographic and religious
composition of their tenants.
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Reviewing the valuation rolls reveals more complexity about the housing distribution
among Indian peddlers in Glasgow. As early as 1939, K. Taylor, Superintendent of the Glasgow
Police, complained that Indians “obtain[ed] the tenancy of houses in the poorer quarters of
Glasgow which they sub-let at exorbitant rentals to our own poor people to their disadvantage.”55
Although there is no record of an Indian owned home in the Gorbals in 1938, per the
Superintendent’s lament, by 1948 there were 21 addresses under Indian ownership.56 Because the
valuation rolls only provide appraisals and not actual rent rates, it is difficult to assess Taylor’s
allegations of extortion. What is apparent is that the non-Indian tenants of Indian landlords in
1946 numbered 28 whereas Indian tenants of Indian landlords amounted to just 3.57 However,
observing that Punjabi Muslim and non-Muslim migrants in Glasgow tended not to live together
does not also suggest that they lived in ethnic ghettos. Indeed, as the proportion of Indian
landlords renting to non-Indians and numbers of Indians living in non-Indian owned properties
indicates, the Gorbals was a site of multi-racial entanglements where popular addresses for
Indians also housed Jewish, Italian, Irish and Scottish -- men and women -- laborers, travelers,
and traders.
Punjabi Muslims and non-Muslims appear to have lived separately but there are instances
of cooperation that extend beyond living arrangements. Other historians have noted the
relationship between Ali Mohammed Painter and Kartar Singh Seran, who had ties to the same
village in Ludhiana. It is useful to acknowledge the various forms that such relationships took.58
The valuation roles evince a further level of inter-ethnic business partnerships and property
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ownership. For instance, in 1946, Sultan Ahmad Ansari, one of only two Indian property owners
with multiple holdings, owned rooms at 77 Nicholson Street jointly with Shanker Singh and
Partap Singh. Two years later, Ansari’s name had been removed from the deed and his Sikh
associates became to sole owners. Though the rooms had been occupied by a variety of nonMuslim tenants while Ansari was a part owner, after his departure the address began to function
as the Sikh Sabha, or association.59
The valuation rolls do not provide much additional context for the changed ownership.
However, Ansari’s departure could have facilitated the establishment of a religious institution in
several conceivable ways. Hearkening back to the Gurdwara reform movement in Punjab, from
1920 to 1925, perhaps there was anxiety surrounding non-Sikh ownership and Ansari obliged.
Alternatively, Ansari might have sought other real estate opportunities out of a reluctance to be a
partial landlord for a Sikh organization. Finally, the owners might have had a falling out and
Ansari sold his state in the property to his Sikh associates. Interestingly, Chander Parkash, who
had lived at 81 Nicholson under Sultan Ahmad Ansari, moved down the street to 77 Nicholson
after the Sikh Sabha began operating at that address. There is a certain ambivalence to Parkash’s
residence, but it does suggest that housing decisions were neither exclusively, or even typically,
made based on ethnic identity nor were they infused by ethnic antagonisms that later historians
have sought. The course of ownership at 77 Nicholson, in the Gorbals where Muslims were the
predominating property owners, lends credence to Roger Ballard’s assessment that, by the 1950s,
Sikh property ownership increased as a mode of supplementary income by renting out rooms in
“decaying Victorian and Edwardian terrace houses which could be found in the inner areas of
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most British cities.”60 Certainly, the business relationship between Ansari, Shanker Singh and
Partap Singh undermines any facile perception of ethnic segregation among Punjabi migrants in
Britain.
Another avenue for investigating levels of cooperation between Muslim and non-Muslim
Punjabis in the Gorbals, and throughout Glasgow, in the 1940s is to review patterns of certificate
renewal.61 It was common for Indians to use connections to enter peddling and often went with
friends to secure or renew a certificate. The Pedlar Registry includes information on the date that
an applicant received a certificate. For the period between 1939-1949, 458 entries, out of a total
of 1179 (38.85%), were registered in small groups on just 194 distinct days, which amounts to
just under 20% of the total days in the registry that recorded an Indian applicant. Moreover, those
458 entries represent 293 distinct peddlers. Of those, 155 were registered in inter-religious
groups over the ten-year period. More than two dozen of those were registered as part of interreligious groups in multiple years. Considering more than a third peddlers were registered on just
16% of the days in the Registry, these groups, particularly for those who adopted this practice for
multiple years, appear to have been assembled intentionally based on personal affinity or
professional connection. Thus, though most applicants appeared at the police office on individual
bases, it was not necessarily uncommon to visit in groups of two or three on the day of renewal.
Of these group registrations, 56.7% of the groups were comprised of co-religionists and 43.3%
contained Muslim and non-Muslim applicants. The latter percentage indicates that there was
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more inter-religious cooperation among South Asian migrants than the valuation rolls alone
suggest.
The networks that were characteristic of the Punjabi peddler community were not limited
to the inter-religious solidarities rooted in South Asian village and kinship ties. They also
included, almost by necessity, a broader contingent of British society. For instance, police
reports indicate that, although Tanda’s business operations supplied silk to individual Indian
peddlers, the distribution network exceeded bounds of the Indian community. Of unique
importance for many Indian warehousers and wholesalers was coordination with Jewish
distributors. According to the Metropolitan Police, Tanda and Ali purchased their inventory from
three London-based firms: Witkower and Katz, Bronowski and Flatto, and Rewschand.62
Moreover, although the highest concentration of Punjabis in Glasgow in the 1940s was in the
Gorbals area, south of the River Clyde, the valuation rolls of some of the most common
addresses demonstrate that this area housed migrants from Italy, Ireland and Eastern Europe. Not
only did these people share the same neighborhoods, tenements, and landlords (some of whom
were Indian), but they also shared makeshift professions, combining peddling with unskilled
industrial work.
The contours of the peddler’s neighborhood in Glasgow were typical across Britain. In
London, the Police at the Leman Street Station took special interest in Nand Singh’s property at
9 Adler Street. After noting that it was more of a lodging house for Indians than a shop, the
Inspector observed that the address “is a portion of a line of small dwelling houses, shop and
workshop premises, chiefly occupied by poor class Jews of foreign birth or extraction.” But, as
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far as the Inspector could discern, this coexistence was not a coincidence. The “large colony of
British Indians” living in Alder Street was there both because they could purchase their stock
from wholesalers in the area and, crucially, because “the predominating Jewish population do not
object to their presence.”63 Noting, wryly, that the only disturbances in the neighborhood were
the result of Indian men taking up with white women, which was a point of serious contention
throughout the period.64 Thus, the multicultural neighborhoods that peddlers inhabited is further
evidence that early South Asian migrants in Britain were thickly embedded in local communities
and made use of a variety of complicated social relationships to sustain the migrant economy.
Criminality, the Black Market, and Migrant Politics
Nathoo Mohamed, who witnessed Noor Mohammad’s murder in 1925, had purchased a
flat at 6 Brown Street, Glasgow, in 1924 and later obtained a passport issued at Lahore in 1927.
Yet, his efforts to participate in the peddler economy, marked as they were by the suspicion of
deserting his seaman’s contract, provides only a superficial biography. His presence in Water
street in 1925 was an early example of his gravitation toward trouble, both as a victim of racist
assault as well as an alleged purveyor of illicit goods and services. A letter to the Deputy
Commissioner at Jullundur in 1937 provoked renewed interest in Nathoo and exposed a unique
depth of criminality. A request for a travel endorsement for his associate Channan Singh is
revelatory. The police determined that Singh’s poverty and lack of business acumen were
adequate reasons to reject the application. However, his finances and education were the least of
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the reasons why Singh was prevented from joining Nathoo.65 Though sponsoring family
members and neighbors was a common route for Indians to gain travel endorsements to Britain,
Nathoo Mohamed’s background militated against his appeal on Channan’s behalf.
Investigations into Nathoo Mohamed’s past revealed a pattern of illegal behavior that
convinced the Under Secretary of the External Affairs Department, Government of India, that he
was unfit to act as a sponsor.
In 1932, Nathoo had been convicted under the Firearms Act of 1920 of possessing illegal
weapons in Glasgow. This Act was the first act to regulate the sale of arms in general by the
institution of a certificate scheme. A firearm certificate was issued by municipal authorities and
possession of a firearm without this document was proscribed. It would appear, therefore, that
Nathoo Mohamed had not received the appropriate certificate, but the reason for its refusal or
revocation is not stated. Reasons for leeriness are not far to seek. The Firearms Act stipulates that
anyone of “intemperate habits or unsound mind” is disqualified from obtaining a certificate.66
Yet, the Home Office’s assumption that Indians, seamen, and undesirable aliens were one and
the same, the presumption of guilt disallowed Indians from owning firearms by the same logic
that they should be barred from peddler’s certificates. Thus, Nathoo Mohamed, in addition to
peddling, was a suspected deserter from the Merchant Marine, and an alleged pimp, he was
suspected of attempting to smuggle arms into India. It is unclear if his motives were economic or
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political, but such suspicion suggests that he might have been contributing to the wave of
revolutionary violence that had crested in northern India in the late 1920s.67
Nathoo Mohamed’s case is suggestive but atypical.68 However, the image of the Indian
pariah informed the surveillance apparatus for decades. Moreover, the scarcity caused by World
War II caused many peddlers, Indian and white alike, to run afoul of the law. The various
rationing orders resulted in stricter control of consumption and distribution and instituted a
coupon system for all consumer goods, but especially food and clothes. This regime resulted in
greater scrutiny of the business practices of all retailers, and particularly those of informal and
small-scale peddlers.69 This scrutiny was based generally in a mistrust of itinerant merchants,
especially those of Jewish and Punjabi heritage. As Mark Roodhouse has pointed out “small
independent retailers with precarious finances handled a higher proportion of the illegal than the
legal trade.”70 Ballard has observed that Punjabis were particularly successful due to their
business acumen and “their skillful manipulation of prices and credit.”71 Unsurprisingly, the
Home Office and the Glasgow City Police viewed these practices less as cunning and more as
graft. At a meeting in 1942, the District Detectives Conference heard that the “Black Market
activities” were “perpetrated by ‘mushroom’ firms...run by persons of alien origin.”72 Since local
and national authorities always suspected Punjabis of already having deserted, and because the
peddler embodied a threat to social and economic norms, the Board of Trade had strong biases
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against Indian peddlers. Suspecting Indians of wrongdoing was a prominent narrative throughout
the 1930s and 1940s, even as participation in illicit trade, whether willful or otherwise, was
commonplace during the war and not limited to any single group -- native or migrant, consumer
or retailer.73
But the odiousness of the Punjabi trader was especially pronounced in the war years. The
Indian Political Intelligence unit often commented on Sikh unwillingness to contribute to the war
effort, choosing instead to make their fortunes door to door. The fact that many of these Punjabi
travelers likely did contribute during World War I as soldiers went unacknowledged by the
police. The IPI asserted that “all [Indian workers] who can do so gravitating to peddling which
offers enormous financial profits, particularly to those who are prepared to operate on the Black
Market.”74 Yet, while suspecting Indians to be participating in highly coordinated efforts to
undermine the rationing scheme, and thereby the struggle against fascism in Europe, the IPI
insisted that politics were not involved. Scoffing at their imputed laziness and indiscipline, an
intelligence officer commented that Indian peddlers “may and do make fervently patriotic and
anti-British speeches from time to time but the Black Market is their temple.”75
Due to the proportion of Indians among all peddlers in Britain, routinely at twenty
percent of the total number of certified peddlers in Glasgow, and the already high-level of
suspicion that surrounded Indians in Britain, the Board of Trade and the surveillance apparatus
was determined to root out illicit trade conducted by the migrant population. Much like the
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perceptions surrounding the Indian peddler fraternity, the illicit economies of migrants during the
war were perceived as having a significant degree of centralization and organization. In
Southampton, nine Indians were suspected of trading in goods controlled by the Consumer
Rationing Order of 1941 or charging exorbitant prices.76 That a network of nine apparently
localized Indians was the focus of the Metropolitan Police’s Detectives Conference indicates the
level of deviousness that the government ascribed. However, the black market cannot operate in
isolation. As small traders, these Indians needed customers; as wholesalers, they needed retailers.
Though one could try to dismiss the latter relationship by assuming that Indians only supplied
other Indians, albeit a dubious assumption indeed, the former relationship was foundational to
the operation of the black market during the war. In July 1943, Sarwan Singh was fined £100, for
obtaining his inventory of women’s clothes by means outside the parameters of the coupon
rationing scheme and then accepting coupons for men’s clothes as payment. Thus, Singh was
caught in a matrix of illicit trading, having received his stock from a supplier known to him only
as Bill and selling to white women in pubs.77
Where Sarwan Singh’s story is one of entanglement within the larger clothing trade,
Nasir Singh’s fine appears to be one of racial profiling. On 11 January 1944, Nasir was
apprehended at the Nottingham train station with 4,000 clothing coupons and £300 cash. Though
he pleaded ignorance of the coupons, which were in a package that he claimed should have only
contained trousers that he had purchased in London “from a Jew in Petticoat Lane.” Police then
found an additional £1400 in a safe at Nasir’s home. In his defense, he claimed that he was
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holding cash for other Indians in Nottingham who did not own their own safe.78 In addition to his
sterling resources, he had a bank book showing more than 13,000 rupees. Singh’s fraudulent
activity, contested though it was, was not cited as the reason for stopping him upon alighting a
train or seizing his belongings. Even though surveillance officers acknowledged that peddling
could be a lucrative occupation during the war, the police intimated that his success as a peddler,
evinced by his wealth, was further corroboration of his illegal activity. His possession of illgotten coupons separates him from other Indians who may have been stopped at random by
police without any incriminating parcels. Yet, in the context of British concerns about the
presence of Indians and their presumed guilt, it is little wonder that he was stopped, with or
without cause, as many may have been.
The perception of foreignness kept Indians under the eye of the police. The complexity of
rationing and lack of English language fluency left them vulnerable to infractions. According to
Sarwan Singh’s defense attorney, HS Holmes, he relied on the honesty of English-speaking
wholesalers and suppliers to help him operate according to rationing regulations. In Nottingham,
the police ascertained that “a flood of forged coupons” had made its way into the hands of local
traders. Again, since these were described as “very clever forgeries,” it is little wonder that they
would have fooled many small merchants, especially those who were illiterate in English. A
newspaper article detailing the scam focuses on the fate of Fateh Mohammed, who was fined
£150 for having forty-three forged coupons in his possession and observes that several other
Indians had been charged for infringing on the Consumer Rationing Order. The fundamental goal
of the peddler was to sell his stock and whether the bounds of legality were crossed wittingly or
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out of ignorance is often difficult to discern.79 Nevertheless, the profit motive intersected with
the semi-autonomous space that Indian migrants sought beyond segregated and discriminatory
British industry to allow peddlers to help maintain British quality of life during the war while
they operated at the fringes of British society.
As the peddler fraternity was formalized and as Indian cultural institutions were
established, the opportunity to make profit while mobilizing Indian migrants in Britain was
seized. While the surveillance apparatus was ambivalent about the political nature of Indian
peddler participation in the black market, and while others have concluded that the tendency to
evade rationing orders during World War II was a common one, the connections between the
black market and politics among Indians in Glasgow can be gleaned in the Hindustani Majlis. As
the Glasgow Indian Union, which was founded in 1926 to represent the interests of Indian
seamen, laborers, and peddlers in the face of the Colored Alien Seamen Order, lost ground, the
Majlis gained prominence. Originally established as a student organization at Glasgow
University, the Majlis increasingly functioned as a social and professional network for Indians in
the city. An oft-cited source for the coordination between politics and the black market was the
Hindustani Majlis in Glasgow. In May 1944, one of the founders of the Majlis, Surendranath
Joshi, who ran a shop at 64 Warwick St, reportedly advised his audience to “make all the money
they could via the Black Market or otherwise.”80 At a different meeting, Pakar Singh warned
against “careless talk” on political activities or business interests that could garner the unwanted
attention of the authorities.81
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Though Indians were the target of significant official opprobrium and news coverage,
such attention seems to be out of proportion with the numbers of Indians charged with illicit
trading. According to the Pedlar Registry, admittedly not a complete source on criminal
behavior, Indians were implicated in black market activity only five times in ten years. In the
first instance, Ali Muhammad, who had been peddling in Glasgow for at least one year, was
charged for infringing on the Consumer Rationing Order at Falkirk in 1941, which suggests,
potentially, a lack of familiarity with the rationing scheme as the first Order had been issued that
year. He was fined less than £5 for two counts of using counterfeit coupons, clearly operating at
a lower volume than Sarwan and Nasir Singh. In 1948, Khushi Mohamed, the last-named Indian
charged with illicit activity, was brought up on two counts for which he was fined a total of £7
or, if unable to pay, fifty days in prison. The severity of the sentence, in the postwar period is
difficult to reconcile with the far greater fines given to other Indians where no threat of
imprisonment was made. Conceivably, compared to the others, he had fewer resources with
which to pay the fine and therefore prison was considered a viable punishment. The only Indian
in the Glasgow Register of Pedlars Certificates to be charged on multiple counts in successive
years, was known as Sheru. In 1946, he was charged with three counts of breaking the Consumer
Rationing Order and fined £30. The next year he was fined £50 for an additional three counts.
The dearth of Indians who were charged with anything resembling black market activity suggests
that the focus on them as a group prone to illegal behavior was the product of anxiety about their
presence rather than a systematic attempt to undermine the British war effort.
Conclusion
“An Indian Pedlar’s Life,” an unsigned autobiographical account of migration published
in English by Indian Front in 1934, recounts a narrative of the difficult passage that Punjabis
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made to Britain.82 “The small and uneconomic holdings we had, had at last to be disposed of,”
the anonymous author begins, remarking on the winnowing of property and wealth that many
Sikhs and Muslims experienced because of colonial agricultural regimes. Forced off the land, the
narrator moves step by step through his journey. Attempts to secure a passport and travel
endorsements were thwarted until bribes were paid. Even after documents were secured, the
accommodation on ship was squalid: “The coal dust that was being carried by the wind was
never properly swept up. The seasickness of new men like myself began to be seen on board.
Some of us vomited incessantly. That, too, was not properly cleaned.” Then, in a British port, the
author had no recourse to industrial work because of pernicious and insidious racial
discrimination in factories and foundries. Thus, having no other option, the migrant was forced
to obtain a pedlar’s license and live a life of poverty and dispossession -- transformed into the
emblematic “unclean” Indian.
He describes the racial contempt he experienced and his inability to remit money to his
home in Punjab and concludes: “The only way to get out of this miserable state of affairs is to
organize the workers and peasants in all their different spheres of activity and, with the might of
organisation, to give a death blow to the entire system of society which creates differences
between man and man.” The objective of the short story reveals the political orientation of
Indian Front, which was financed by the Communist Party of Great Britain. However, insisting
that Indian migrants in Britain are reduced to vagabondage and their only salvation is trade
unionism is a reductive portrayal of the social, economic, and political lives of Indian peddlers.
This chapter has examined lives, businesses, and politics in a different manner. Having outlined
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the difficulties that lascars faced in the British labor movement and how the diffuseness of the
peddler community rendered syndicalism an empty promise, this chapter analyzed the ways in
which working-class neighborhoods throughout industrial Britain facilitated a migrant economy
that functioned as an alternative to the sea and the shop floor. By detailing the networks, social
entanglements, and professional fluidity of Punjabi peddlers in the 1920s to 1940s, this chapter
explored modes of everyday resistance that are often underestimated or misunderstood by
conventional methods of political organizing and historical analysis.
This story is indicative, if extreme, of the social and professional fluidity that
characterized early South Asian migrants in Britain. At the core of this fluidity are the noninstitutional networks of the small itinerant merchant. The urge to peddle among the South Asian
migrant population in interwar Britain had manifold reasons. Economic opportunities for
nonwhite migrants were generally limited and went through bull and bear periods based on the
needs of British industry. Therefore, in the face of persistent color discrimination on ships, in
factories, foundries and shops, Indians sought self-employment.83 Other scholars have
commented on the flexibility that peddling affords not only to obtain supplemental employment
in a productive economy, but also to observe rituals and holidays that were not accommodated
within the dominant culture.84
However, there were social and professional reasons as well. The migration of Sikhs and
the recruitment of peddlers by firms run by former seamen, suggest that peddling in Britain was
a preference for many and was not exclusively the last resort of the victims of global capitalism.
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In the interwar period the peddler trade was populated and supplied by working-class migrants
from across Europe, who generally lived in proximity to one another. Indians were no exception
and upon entering a working-class neighborhood in Glasgow, London, Coventry, or Newcastle,
they were easily incorporated into the network of supply and debt that characterized the
peddler’s enterprise.
The Gorbals area of Glasgow functioned as a “social nexus,” typical of many British
cities, that helped Punjabi migrants to navigate credit, suppliers, housing, and welfare. The
peddler fraternity in Britain was an expansive organization that facilitated the movement of
Punjabis from Northern Ireland, the Midlands, London, and throughout Scotland, with the most
popular route for Glaswegian traders being back and forth from Dundee, through Edinburgh. The
Gorbals anchored this community for several reasons. First, as a port city, it was easily
accessible for escaped lascars and fare paying passengers alike. Second, it was common practice
in Glasgow to issue peddler’s certificates to anyone with either a British Passport or a Seaman’s
Certificate, regardless of suspicions that an applicant might have deserted. Third, by the 1940s,
Glasgow had been enmeshed in the broader peddler network for decades. Records of Indian
peddlers date to 1925 -- the grisly murder of Noor Mohammad by John Keen -- and Indian
warehousing and outfitting firms emerging throughout the 1930s. Finally, the Gorbals itself
facilitated the expansion of the Indian merchant community through the acquisition of tenements
that buttressed the incomes and thereby the capacities of warehouses in the area, allowing them
to recruit and sponsor more migrants from Punjab.
Successive waves of South Asian migrants have made a lasting mark on Glasgow. As
noted throughout this chapter, Muslim and non-Muslim peddlers interacted with one another and
the wider British and migrant communities to sustain their trade. Moreover, it has been observed
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that Muslims formed the largest contingent of South Asian peddlers in the city, even though
Sikhs have received more notice. The Muslim community that first came to the Gorbals in the
1920s and 1930s formed a bridgehead for subsequent migration. Although the street plan of the
Gorbals has been transformed in the aftermath of successive urban renewal campaigns in
Glasgow, it is hardly surprising that the central Mosque sits in the area between what was once
Hospital Street and Gorbals Street. Yet, as a permanent reminder of this history of suspicion and
surveillance, the mosque sits in the shadow of the Glasgow Sheriff and Justice of the Peace
Court, the busiest court in Scotland.

Chapter 4
Udham Singh, Diaspora Radicalism, and the Cult of Assassination
On the morning of 13 March 1940, a Wednesday, Udham Singh had planned to visit the
India Office to see about getting a travel endorsement for his passport. But Sir Hussan
Surawardy, advisor to the Secretary of State for India, was out, and Singh decided he had better
things to do than queue for a colonial official. On his way out the door, he glanced at a notice
about a joint meeting of the East India Association and the Central Asian Society being held later
that day at the Caxton Hall in London. His interest was piqued enough to remember the details,
or perhaps he wrote them down, but not quite enough to change his plan for the day. Later, he
told police, “when I left home today I thought I would go see the Paul Robeson picture in the
Leicester Square.”1 But, unfortunately for this story, the cinema had not yet opened when he
arrived. So, instead of viewing Paul Robeson’s The Proud Valley, he went home, retrieved his
.44 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, and walked to the Caxton Hall. On arrival, he stood in the
side aisle of a capacity Tudor Room, waited until the end of the remarks, and approached the
stage with gun drawn. He discharged six bullets. One into Lord Lamington, the Marquess of
Zetland, and another into Sir Louis Dane. While a couple of bullets flew errantly into the stage,
two went into the back of former Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab Sir Michael O’Dwyer, whose
tenure oversaw the Amritsar Massacre in 1919, killing him in an instant.
The assassination of Michael O’Dwyer was an act of revolution borne out of the militant
political philosophy of the Ghadar movement in North America. In the 1930s, Punjabi left
politics was characterized by a fluidity between Ghadarites, Communists, and Congressmen,
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which radicalized peasant politics in Punjab.2 As this chapter demonstrates, Punjabis in interwar
Britain, many of whom had migrated for economic opportunity but had been politicized during
successive upheavals at home, admired Ghadar’s radical solidarities with nationalist and
anticolonial movements. Much of the literature on Ghadar traces the short-term impact of its
failure to foment rebellion among troops in Punjab 1915, the Ailan-i-jang, without investigating
the ways in which Ghadris continued to struggle against British rule until the end of World War
II.3 By focusing on the immediate ramifications of the failed mutiny, such scholarship neglects
the global resonance that Ghadar had within the Indian diaspora, of which Udham Singh is
exemplary. The history of Ghadar’s influence among Indians in Britain goes deeper. The
peripatetic Punjabi radicals in Britain, often working as peddlers and sailors, illustrate that
movement between India, North America, and Europe sustained the Ghadar Party for decades
after its foundational failure and nurtured anticolonial internationalism in Britain.
Inspirations and Inheritances: Before Udham Singh
Among nationalist leaders in India, O’Dwyer’s assassination was anathema to Gandhi’s
campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience. It was, therefore, decried by mainstream nationalist
leaders to exculpate the Indian independence movement from any involvement. Instead of
Gandhian nationalism, other inspirations were posited for Udham Singh. The National Herald
lamented that the assassination would be “widely regretted” and the Times of India noted the
“senseless character of the crime.” Others indicated that there were politics behind the act. After
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voicing its shock, the Lahore-based Tribune suggested that “the assailant drew inspiration from
and was misled by the example of the Irish Republican Army [IRA] and wanted to produce an
Indian counterpart to the assassination produced by that party in England by its recent acts of
terrorism.”4 The Tribune was referencing the IRA’s S-Plan.
Only a month prior to the assassination, two men, Peter Barnes and James McCormack
(also known as James Richards), were hanged for their part in the detonation of a bomb in
Coventry.5 The bombing was an intentional act of sabotage. The IRA’s Sabotage Plan, or S-Plan,
was a reprisal of Irish republicanism that, according to Tony Craig, “specifically set out to avoid
gratuitous collateral damage to civilian life and lives,” while wreaking targeted political
violence.6 While Udham Singh may have been aware that the IRA's S-Plan was responsible for
five murders in Coventry in August 1939 and more than 150 bombings that year, his attack on a
colonial administrator was clearly distinct from the S-Plan’s focus on British infrastructure.
Though the Tribune’s attribution of IRA inspiration to Udham Singh appears to be more
convenient than evidentiary, not to say that anticolonial violence in Ireland had not been
influential in India, the IRA bombings informed the way the British judicial and police apparatus
reacted to Singh. New Scotland Yard issued a series of recommendations for maintaining order
during the trial that also revealed the perceived parallels in Udham Singh and the IRA. “As the
possibility of a further ‘spectacular outrage’ being committed in Court by some disaffected Sikh
cannot be altogether overlooked,” Scotland Yard warned, “[we] will no doubt take such
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precautions as are possible to scrutinise those securing admission; the precedent afforded by
recent IRA trials may prove useful.”7 In part, this appears to be a reference to the “extraordinary
precautions” at the Court of Criminal Appeal in January 1940, when large numbers of uniformed
officers and undercover detectives were placed throughout the courtroom during the appeal of
Barnes and McCormack.8 During Singh’s trial, a discussion of which is below, these precautions
seem to have been unnecessary as very few Indians attended the trial and none of them were
close associates of Singh or other Indian anticolonial or independence organizations in Britain.
Of course, anticolonial violence had been a mainstay of Indian radicals throughout the
early twentieth century. The similarities in the acts of Udham Singh, Madan Lal Dhingra, and
Bhagat Singh have often been compared. Both Dhingra, who assassinated Sir Curzon Wyllie,
aide to the Secretary of State, in 1909, and Bhagat Singh, who was executed in 1931 for his role
in the Lahore Conspiracy Case, acted within the larger organizations with which they were
closely associated. Dhingra's radicalism was the product of his membership of India House while
a student in London under the tutelage of Shyamji Krishna Varma. Indeed, India House and its
journal, Indian Sociologist, were prominent forces for Indian revolution decades before the
demand for complete independence was made by mainstream Indian politicians and activists.9
Moreover, India House served to link Indian revolutionaries throughout Western Europe and
India as it had opened its doors to Virendranath Chattopadhyaya, Har Dyal, and Lala Lajpat
Rai.10
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Similarly, Bhagat Singh, who became synonymous with anticolonial violence in interwar
India, acted as part of the Nau Jawan Bharat Sabha (NJBS)) and Hindustan Socialist Republican
Army (HSRA), which sought to drive the British out through coordinated attacks on colonial
administrators. Bhagat Singh was first arrested for throwing bombs into the Legislative
Assembly in Delhi in 1930. In detention, he was later charged in connection with the murder of
Assistant Superintendent of Police John Saunders, which he had helped to coordinate with the
NJBS and HRSA. The assassination of Saunders was committed as revenge for the death of
Lajpat Rai at the hands of the Lahore police during protests of the Simon Commission, an allwhite governmental commission that was examining possible avenues for political reform in
India.11
Even if "in many respects" the acts were similar, Udham Singh was atypical of these
purveyors of political violence for two reasons.12 First, though Udham Singh was radicalized by
the Ghadar Party and the Jallianwala Bagh massacre of 1919, his attack was independent of any
organized campaign. Characterizations of him as a solo actor stand in contradistinction to the
proximity that Dhingra and Bhagat Singh maintained with their organizations. Secondly, it bears
pointing out that Udham successfully targeted a prominent former colonial official that he
begrudged for sanctioning the Amritsar massacre. In Dhingra’s case, the assassination of Sir
Curzon Wyllie was effectively a case of mistaken identity and the intended target was George
Curzon, former Viceroy of India. Similarly, JP Saunders was not the intended victim of the
NJBS and HRSA. They sought, instead, to assassinate Superintendent of Police, JA Scott, who
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was personally blamed for Rai’s death but was misidentified in the moment. Thus, the case of
Udham Singh is not easily grafted onto anticolonial violence emanating from India or Ireland;
however, both strands facilitated the perception that British imperial authority was in crisis and
Singh chose to act during that breakdown.13
This chapter focuses on the murder, trial, and execution of Udham Singh and the affect
that this highly visible case had on Punjabi migrants in Britain. This examination will enhance
current understandings of the influence that the Ghadar Party had on Punjabis in Britain even
while the Ghadar Party never established a former branch in the colonial metropole. Rattan
Singh, who liaised between the Ghadar Party and the Communist International and established
Ghadar Parties on three continents, was integral to Ghadar mobilization in Britain. Udham Singh
had a twenty-year career of traveling between India, Britain, and the United States, during which
he committed himself to Ghadar militancy and was memorialized as a martyr for Indian
independence. The Indian Workers Association, with which the article concludes, was the
organizational embodiment of the Ghadar movement in Britain and was established by peddlers
and semi-skilled workers who were enamored by the examples of Kartar Singh Sarabha, Bhagat
Singh, Udham Singh, and countless of their relatives and neighbors who had been jailed,
transported, or executed while resisting colonial rule in Punjab. By foregrounding the importance
of mobility, and examining complementary events in South Asia and Britain, this chapter argues
that labor migration between India and Europe and the global transmission of Ghadar Party
publications were integral to anti-colonial mobilization in Britain during the 1930s and 1940s.
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“Fighting the ‘enemy’ in the proper way”
The preponderance of South Asian lascars, peddlers, and students in Britain, rather than
the farmers and soldiers that Ghadar ordinarily recruited, was alone sufficient evidence to
convince Ghadar Party leaders that expansion into Britain was untenable.14 The Ghadar Party of
the late-1930s was a highly centralized, global organization that had been disciplined through
cooperation and coordination with the Communist International (Comintern) and the University
of the Toilers of the East (KUTV) in Moscow. As a result, the majority of Ghadris recruited in
the interwar period came from established networks in South Asia, East Africa, South America,
and California. The distance that these networks created between Ghadar and Indians in Britain
combined with the lack of effective mobilization of Indians by local political organizations helps
to explain the reluctance to expand into Britain. Yet, this skepticism about the mettle of Indians
in Britain, often dismissed as apolitical merchants, failed to deter Ghadar-inspired Punjabis from
organizing. Furthermore, it revealed a thorough misunderstanding of the influence that homeland
politics and anticolonial agitation had on enclaves of zealous Punjabis in Britain.
The two methods of escaping agricultural hardship in interwar Punjab that led to Britain
were employment in the Merchant Marine and establishment of peddler networks. Systems of
recruitment into the Merchant Marine had become highly sophisticated by the end of World War
I. According to Ravi Ahuja, recruitment of Indian seamen, typically called lascars, was
facilitated by “spatial centralization” in the ports of Bombay and Calcutta. Moreover, zones of
military recruitment in Western Punjab, particularly Rawalpindi and Attock, were gradually
transformed into recruitment grounds for Muslim engine-room crews for shipping companies.15
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Central Punjab, an area populated heavily by Sikhs, did not become a locus of recruitment into
the Merchant Marine; however, the economic stagnation of the 1930s compounded long-standing
issues around access to land in the fertile Jullundur doab led many Punjabis from Hoshiarpur,
Jullundur, and Ludhiana to use family and village networks to establish themselves as peddlers
in British cities.16
Although many of the Punjabi migrant workers who came to Britain in the interwar
period came from central Punjab, a region described in 1942 “the birthplace” of the Ghadar
movement, their residence in Britain kept them out of Ghadar’s established recruiting
networks.17 In 1922, the Ghadar Party forged a partnership with the Comintern’s University of
the Toilers of the East so that Ghadar Party members could receive formal education in
revolutionary history, trade unionism, and military and vocational training.18 Over the course of
this relationship there were two primary modes of recruitment to the KUTV. First, the Ghadar
Party supplied most of the Comintern’s Indian students.19 Second, beginning in 1936, the
Comintern resolved that all Indians were to be enlisted in India and then sent to Moscow via
“devious” routes: “These youths are to find their way from India in the first instance either to
North or South America in the guise of labourer or to England as students. From these countries
arrangements will then be made to send them to Moscow.”20 Importantly, this approach made
Britain a central thru-point for Indian recruits, but in neither approach was Britain deemed an
appropriate site for recruitment.
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Emboldened by Soviet propaganda and the emphasis on military training from University
of the Toilers of the East, the Ghadar Party of the 1930s was newly determined to covertly arm
Indians and start a revolution. Therefore, fear of arms smuggling was a high priority for the
British authorities surveilling Ghadarites. In 1916, during the attempt to foment a mutiny among
Sikh troops in India, the Ghadar Party enlisted two ships, the Annie Larsen and the Maverick, to
illegally transport guns.21 Twenty years later, after enlisting the help of Soviet tacticians, the City
of Christchurch, a steamship, had been seized by police in Calcutta with a cache of arms and
noted that “the Indian police have an idea that Gadaries [sic] are secretly gathering arms.”22 In
connection to this, the intelligence apparatus was keen to learn that Udham Singh was arrested
on 30 August 1927, under Section 20 of the Arms Act. His possession of two revolvers, one
pistol, ammunition, and “copies of the prohibited paper, Ghadr-di-Gunj” was taken as evidence
of an attempt to smuggle weapons.23 Udham Singh’s arrest in 1927 highlights the fact that his
radicalization was the product of a long engagement with the revolutionary politics of the Soviet
Union and Ghadar Party and embodies the direct links between India and North America in this
period -- circumventing Britain.
Any consideration of interwar migrant politics must acknowledge the distance between
British political parties and colonial migrants in British cities. The Communist Party of Great
Britain (CPGB) and its anticolonial work has been a topic of debate.24 Though the CPGB and the
Red International of Labor Unions (RILU) supported the International and Oriental Seafarer’s
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Union and sought to use Indian seamen in European ports to smuggle arms and propaganda into
India, both efforts were short-lived and non-systematic.25 By attempting to segregate initiatives
directed at British socialism and anti-colonialism, Indian workers in Britain were overlooked as
potential Party members in the early 1920s and remained outside of the CPGB ambit until the
period of mass migration in the 1950s. The inability or unwillingness of British political parties
to recruit and incorporate Indian migrant workers into their ranks in the early interwar period
contributed to the slow pace of political organization among migrants.
In interwar India, the organized left had contributed to making Punjab a site of
revolutionary politics. Yet, Indians in Britain have remained marginal to the debate surrounding
the interaction between the British left and the struggle against imperialism. As London,
Coventry, and Birmingham became bridgeheads for Indian settlement in the late-1930s, they also
provided the opportunity to mobilize around community-specific issues, especially military
conscription. While mutiny is foundational to Ghadar Party lore, and remained an animating
force throughout the period, by 1937 the march to war had led to a new mode of military
disruption in the form of anti-recruitment meetings in Punjab.26 At the same time, Punjabi
migrants in Britain were beginning to organize around the same principle and soon joined up
with the Independent Labour Party, a staunch critic of the War.27 The confluence of settlement
and increased participation in local political organizations provided a foundation that partially
facilitated the emergence and articulation of a Ghadarite zeal in Britain previously untapped
because of ineffective political leadership and mobilization.
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In May 1939, Charan Singh Chima, a Punjabi Sikh in Coventry who was “anxious to start
a Ghadr [sic] Party group in the U.K,” wrote on behalf of “four or five young men of his way of
thinking” to Rattan Singh, one of the leading lights of the interwar Ghadar Party, for guidance on
establishing a branch in Britain.28 Rattan Singh, listed as R-36 in the Ghadr Directory, was “one
of the most active and dangerous leaders of the Ghadr movement.”29 Chima was aware of Rattan
Singh both due to his leadership role within the Ghadar Party and because of close family
connections. Charan Singh Chima’s uncle, Karam Singh Chima, had participated in the failed
mutiny of 1915 and, though restricted to his village, was an integral link between the Akali and
Kirti movements in 1920s Punjab. For instance, he was jailed in 1920 for “fomenting Akali
agitation” in Jullundur. In 1924 he was arrested for serving on the Shiromani Gurdwara
Parbhandak Committee, an Akali organization which had been banned by the colonial
government. Subsequently, in 1927, Karam Singh Chima became the Vice-President of the Desh
Bhagat Sahayak Sabha, which supported the families of Ghadarites who had been imprisoned,
deported, or executed.30 Karam Singh Chima’s overlapping political and social affiliations was
unsurprising in a period of considerable upheaval. The strength of the Ghadar party, as well as
the salience of Punjabi communism in the 1930s, was due in large part to the ability of its
members to negotiate multiple alliances and leverage them for political ends.31
In a period when attempted unionization of sailors and factory workers was the primary
mode of associational politics for Indians in Britain, Chima and his colleagues sought to harness
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the power of Ghadar to mobilize Indian migrant workers against imperialism, conscription, and
unfair working conditions. These Indian migrants in the English Midlands had been raised in the
ferment of Ghadar-Akali-Kirti agitation of the 1920s and early-1930s and upon arrival in Britain
sought to contribute to these struggles. Yet, Rattan Singh did not enthusiastically endorse their
goals because he believed that there were not enough Indians in Britain who were willing and
able to participate in the struggle “in the proper way”. Nonetheless, he suggested that Charan
Singh Chima organize an “Indian Political Prisoners’ Defense Committee,” which was clearly
inspired by, and potentially modeled on, Karam Singh Chima’s welfare committee.32
A few months later, Charan Singh Chima wrote to Rattan Singh and intimated that he had
abandoned his plans to organize a discrete association, but he hoped to collect funds for
remittance to Punjab from among the Punjabis in the Midlands and would endeavor to continue
“studying the History of the Russian Communist Party.”33 Not only had Rattan Singh evidently
dissuaded Charan Singh Chima from establishing a Ghadar Party branch in the United Kingdom,
but the onset of war also delayed any ideas of contributing to the militant struggle for Indian
independence in Britain. However, by this point Punjabis in Britain had begun to mobilize
politically. The prospect of directly engaging with the Ghadar movement was reanimated amid
the trial, appeal, and execution of Udham Singh. As a preface to Udham Singh’s radicalization, a
return to his failed trip to the Leicester Square Theatre will act as an essential mise en scene to
his enthusiasm for Paul Robeson, an icon of communist anticolonialism and black
internationalism in the 1930s.
“I thought I would go see the Paul Robeson Picture in the Leicester Square”
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The decade leading up Singh’s crime was a period of escalating fame for Paul Robeson,
especially on the theatre circuit in London. In 1930, his portrayal of Shakespeare’s Othello was
greeted with praise and immense box office success. As a performer, his name would have been
ubiquitous throughout the country and, indeed, the anglophone world. This alone, especially in
the aftermath of the racial politics at work in the staging of Othello, makes Udham Singh’s
interest in Robeson’s recent cinematic offering unremarkable.34 But over and above his fame on
stage and screen, the Robeson of the 1930s also entered the world of liberation struggles and
revolutionary politics, which was buttressed by his “discovery of Africa” in the late 1920s.35 His
first foray was with the West African Students Union (WASU) in London, where he communed
with luminaries of African independence movements, while simultaneously engaging with
African seamen in the ports in London, Liverpool, and Cardiff. In this way, Robeson was
entrenched not only in the politics of nationalism but was also exposed to the lives and
limitations of the black working-class in Britain.36
Recent historical research has highlighted the London-based black intelligentsia that
converged in the 1930s and contributed to a new theorization of anticolonialism and African
modernity.37 Although scholars have gestured toward the shared lineages between PanAfricanism and Indian anticolonialism, the overwhelming focus of this literature is occupied
with the manifestation of black internationalism that emanated from African, Caribbean, and
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American intellectuals, students, and activists in the imperial metropolis. Thus, such work has a
blind spot for inter-ethnic and trans-colonial solidarities. In this way, conventional approaches to
black internationalism have prepared the way for more detailed analysis of the forms of
anticolonial activism that engaged Africans, South Asians, and leftists in Britain that emerged in
the interwar period and persevered through the era of decolonization. Robeson’s London was a
thriving site for new organizations that were immersed in the politics of interwar
internationalism, Pan-Africanism, feminism, and communism. The activities of the intellectuals
at the center of these associations produced a London that was both the center of the British
Empire and a locus of anticolonial strategies for decolonial futures.
London in the 1930s is where Robeson received his political education and claimed to
have realized his working-class roots. Susan Pennybacker has discussed the emergence of the
international Scottsboro campaign which brought communists, socialists, and liberals together to
forge an anti-racist movement in Britain under the leadership of, among others, Shapurji
Saklatvala, MP, Willi Munzenberg of the League Against Imperialism, and George Padmore, a
leader of the Comintern’s Negro Committee in Hamburg.38 Parallel with this trans-Atlantic antiracist upsurge was the formation of political and cultural organizations that fashioned space for
African sociability and advocated for the rights of the nascent black community. Marc Matera
has provided a detailed analysis of black political culture and cultural politics and examines the
myriad ways in which people of African heritage in this moment coordinated their struggles
against white supremacy and imperialism and forged new conceptions of African identity.39
Moreover, Willi Munzenburg’s League Against Imperialism was a focal point of the global
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struggle against colonialism in the interwar period. This organization was instrumental in
bringing nationalist leaders from across the colonized world into contact with one another to
articulate the fundamentals of anticolonialism. Indeed, the League Against Imperialism was
foundational to Jawaharlal Nehru’s anticolonial internationalism that emerged in the late-1920s
and informed his intellectual development.40
The momentum of black politics and anticolonialism in Britain in the 1930s inevitably
intersected with other movements for national liberation. The Indian national movement was
certainly a touchstone of many of these movements and there was considerable cross-fertilization
in Britain. Udham Singh’s affinity for Robeson might partly be attributed to latter's friendship
with Jawaharlal Nehru, which was forged out of the coordination of Black and Asian
organizations in London. Among these was the League of Coloured Peoples (LCP), founded in
1931 by Jamaican-born Harold Moody, which included in its mission the aim to “improve
relations between the Races.” From this position, the LCP coordinated with the Coloured Men’s
Institute, which served non-European seamen in London, including Indian lascars. Additionally,
with the India League, considered the London branch of the Indian National Congress, the LCP
co-hosted Mohandas Gandhi and Nehru in London.41 Furthermore, at a 1938 India League
meeting held to honor Nehru’s visit to Britain, Challenge, the newspaper of the Young
Communist League of Great Britain, reported that Robeson stood to address the meeting. “The
struggles that are going on in China, India, Abyssinia, and Spain are one,“ Robeson said, “the
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struggle of the colonial peoples is a struggle for democracy and freedom for all.”42 Nehru and
other Indian intellectuals subsequently supported Robeson’s political awakening, especially in
the form of the revolutionary Unity Theatre.43 Robeson thus served to connect black
internationalism with the questions of Indian independence and proletarian revolution.
Through his interactions with colonial intellectuals and his studies of ostensibly disparate
cultures, Robeson began to reckon with the linguistic, historical, and ideational linkages between
Africa and Asia. Moreover, through his perception of these commonalities he became convinced
of the shared struggles against imperialism, white supremacy, and fascism that were foisted on
these continents and marked their natives. This realization took him to Moscow in the mid-1930s
and gave shape to his burgeoning political awakening. Of his time there, Robeson remarked on
the lack of “color-consciousness” among the younger generation in Moscow.44 He declared “all
the masses of every race are contented and support their government,” which he saw in
opposition to the violent racial oppression in the United States at the same time.45 The mid-1930s
was also the period of greatest interaction between the University of the Toilers of the East and
the Ghadar Party. While there is no evidence that Robeson actively interacted with Punjabi
radicals during his time in the Soviet Union, it is a clear indication of the cross-currents that
connected black internationalism, militant anticolonialism, and proletarian revolution to
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Robeson’s emergence as a political icon by the end of the decade. His ideological awakening and
his travels were foundational to his transformation into an avowed communist who believed in
the emancipatory rhetoric of the Soviet Union.46 In this period, he was among the most
prominent African American communists and his status was magnified by the fight against
fascism in Spain and the growing momentum of anti-colonial movements throughout Africa and
Asia. Certainly, at this moment, he became a model for black internationalism and was a subject
of reverence for Udham Singh and his Ghadarite forebears.
The Proud Valley, the Robeson film that Udham Singh had sought out on the day of the
assassination, had opened just a few days earlier in Leicester Square, London. The film was a
production of Ealing Studios, under the direction of Sergei Nolbandov, and it emerged out of the
revolutionary ethos of the Unity Theatre in London that Robeson joined upon his return to
Britain after a stint with the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. Even before his sojourn in
Spain, Robeson had begun “fostering socially useful art." In Stevedore, Robeson played the part
of Lonnie Thompson who, accused of raping a white woman, enlists the support of white and
black workers to protect him against a lynch mob.47 But the Unity Theatre provided him with an
intentional production company that allowed him to stage productions that highlighted class
solidarity. “Joining Unity Theatre," said Robeson in 1937, "means identifying myself with the
working-class. And it gives me the chance to act in plays that say something I want to say about
things that must be emphasized.”48 The Unity Theatre was established in the tradition of the
“workers’ theatre” in 1936 when, as Colin Chambers suggests, “the left animated the cultural life
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of Britain.”49 The Workers’ Theatre Movement was inspired by the Russian Revolution and
emerged in the 1920s through coordination between the Communist Party of Great Britain, the
Independent Labour Party, and the Council for Proletarian Art.50 The Unity Theatre was steeped
in the Popular Front strategies of the Communist Party that sought to build a left-coalition
against European fascism, rooted in the British labor movement, and made possible by the
contributions of Jewish refugees in London’s East End.51
The path for Proud Valley was laid when Robeson met Herbert Marshall, who later wrote
and directed the Unity production of Plant in the Sun, in Russia. Having committed to
performing with the Unity Theatre as early as 1934, Robeson was cast as the central character in
Plant in the Sun in 1938. The play centers around workers’ politics in a US-based candy factory
and serves as an illustration of the Theatre’s popular front politics as it implores left solidarity
over class and ethnic division.52 One strategy that the play deploys to achieve such solidarity was
in the disregard for race when considering casting, allowing the director to cast Robeson the an
Irish-American teenager Pewee. Similarly, considering that it was the final film that Robeson
produced during his time in Europe before returning to the United States for the duration of
World War II, Proud Valley stands as the culmination of the political education that Robeson
received while living in abroad. It chronicles David Goliath (Paul Robeson), an African
American seaman, as he takes a job in a Welsh coal mine, joins their choir, and forges
friendships with the crew.53 This film was both a testament to the plight of the Welsh coal miner
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and to Robeson’s belief in inter-racial working-class solidarity. The avant-garde casting of Plant
in the Sun is echoed in the aspirational working-class solidarity of The Proud Valley. Both
highlight the anti-racism of the Unity Theatre, which was shaped, in part, by the supposed lack
of color-consciousness of Soviet Union.
The Proud Valley was a testament to Paul Robeson’s radical sensibilities. It was in this
period that he became a convinced socialist and gave his support to the Soviet Union, as the only
place in the world he felt fully accepted in society as a black man.54 Having acted in films that
buttressed racist stereotypes and gave succor to imperialist rhetoric, Robeson reminisced in 1960
that The Proud Valley was indeed “the film I was most proud to make.”55 In a reference to these
previous performances, Robeson said that The Proud Valley would “depict the Negro as he really
is -- not the caricature he is always represented to be on the screen.”56 Robeson's ideological
orientation did not receive unanimous critical praise. The novelist-cum-critic Graham Greene
complained in The Spectator that “too many red herrings scent the story lines...colour prejudice
is dragged in for the sake of Mr. Paul Robeson who plays the part of a big black Pollyanna.”57
The “colour prejudice” that Greene lamented was, of course, at the core of the film’s message. It
served as a response to the processes of marginalization that workers and people of color
experienced. Awareness of this marginalization was clearly articulated when a white miner
exclaimed “well, damn and blast it, man, aren’t we all black down in that pit?”58 The themes that
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the film explores are the product of Robeson’s experiences during nearly a decade of living,
working, and performing in the United Kingdom and coordinating within the labor and
communist movement in the 1930s. If not for the outbreak of war in 1939, which necessitated a
changed ending, as Matthew Sweet has acknowledged, The Proud Valley “would have been the
most uncompromisingly Marxist picture ever produced in Anglophone cinema.”59 Thus, though
Udham Singh arrived too early, this film’s representation of anti-racism and militant worker
solidarity are indicative of the revolutionary anti-imperialism of the Ghadar movement and
provide insight into Udham Singh’s politics.
“I bought the revolver from a soldier in Bournemouth”
Udham Singh occupies a contested place in Sikh, Punjabi, and Ghadar history. For some,
his singular act of political assassination has been dismissed as a “random incident” by a
“vagrant Sikh.” For others, his execution is considered in the context of Sikh martyrdom.60
Though Udham Singh’s treatment as shaheed by historians of the Sikh diaspora reflects the
legitimate embrace of a noteworthy Punjabi by the Sikh community. His status is enhanced by
his well-documented interaction with Sikhs at the Gurdwara in Shepherds Bush, London. Such a
representation echoes colonial racial logic and ignores his own statements about his political
allegiances and his religious beliefs. Rather than a spontaneous act of individual terrorism,
documents from the Home Office, India Office, and Metropolitan Police demonstrate that
Udham Singh systematically targeted Michael O’Dwyer and other colonial administrators,
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revealing a deep attachment to the methods of the Ghadar Party and revolutionary
anticolonialism.61
Udham Singh was born in Patiala state in colonial Punjab between 1901 and 1905. Both
of his parents died while he was a child and he grew up in an orphanage associated with Khalsa
College in Amritsar. Very little is known about his early life. Upon his arrest he claimed that part
of his grudge against Michael O’Dwyer was because family members died at Jallianwala Bagh
but that was never confirmed. Beginning in 1917, he served as a carpenter with a Pioneer Unit in
Basra and then went to East Africa to work in the Uganda Railway Workshops.62 Having served
in the military and worked in East Africa he then sailed for the United States, like so many Sikh
agriculturalists and Indian students had done in the first decade of the twentieth century. His
extended sojourn in the United States was peripatetic. He lived in California where he connected
with Ghadarites, then he worked for a time at a Ford Motor plant in Detroit, and finally landed in
New York City, where he lived for five years. While in New York, he signed onto the crews of
the US Shipping Line under the assumed name of Frank Brazil, allowing him to avoid a ban on
hiring Indians.63 His life prior to coming to England was in many ways typical of Punjabi Sikhs
at the time. However, his proximity to the Ghadar Party in Northern California and his proclivity
to assume new identities indicates that his journey was not altogether routine.
Upon his return to India in 1927, and for the remainder of his life, Udham Singh was an
avowed radical who endorsed revolutionary violence. In 1927, soon after his return home, Singh
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was found with “obscene postcards” in his possession. Not long after that, he was arrested and
imprisoned for five years for possession of arms and proscribed literature. Not only did he
evidently have the means to inflict harm, he had the motivation. Around the same time as his
arrest, he proclaimed that he “intended to murder Europeans who were ruling over India and that
he fully sympathized with the Bolshevics [sic], as their object was to liberate India from foreign
control.”64 More than a decade later, he was working as a carpenter at the Blandford Militia
Camp in Dorset, southeast England. Police noted that, though they were unable to interview his
former landlord, “it is understood that during the time the Allman family lived in Bournemouth
an Indian subject lodged with them and he had strong Communistic [sic] views.”65 Singh worked
at the Camp for nearly two months but was ultimately fired. According to a representative of Sir
Lindsay Parkinson & Company, “it was rumoured that he carried a loaded revolver, that as a
workman he was not satisfactory and that he was bad tempered and quarrelsome,” even though
no one had seen him with a gun.66 During a police interview at the Caxton Hall on the night of
the shooting, Singh commented on the murder weapon and confirmed that he had bought the
revolver from a soldier in Bournemouth: “I bought him some drinks, you know.” There is no
indication beyond his violent rhetoric that his purchase months earlier was part of a plan that
would allow him to satisfy his grudge against O’Dwyer.
In 1934, the Metropolitan Police confirmed that “Udam Singh Sidhu,” of 9 Adler Street,
Stepney, London, had been granted a peddler’s certificate in December.67 Investigations revealed
that “Udham Singh peddles hosiery and lingerie and uses a small car for the purpose; he does not
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appear to be short of money.”68 Peddling, of course, was a common occupation for Indian
migrants in the interwar period because they were largely kept out of industrial work until the
labor shortage that accompanied the onset of war. This area of Stepney was home to “a large
colony of British Indians.” A common lodging house, 9 Adler Street was among the many nodes
within in the Punjabi peddler fraternity. According to Inspector L. Clark, nine British Indians had
applied for peddler’s certificates from this address that year. Five certificates, including Udham
Singh’s, had been granted. The building, according to Clark, was a ramshackle former shop,
where “with the exception of a small portion left uncovered and painted, presumably to admit
light, the shop window of No. 9 is permanently shuttered.” Its inhabitants, he continued, were
“men of low intelligence and social order” appearing “unmistakably dejected and dismal.”
When questioned by police, Banta Singh stated that the men who lived at 9 Adler Street were
self-employed traders who “as a rule purchase their goods from the local wholesalers and arrange
their own sales.”69 After stating his derision for the residents of 9 Adler Street, Inspector Clark
noted that Indians were attracted to this part of Stepney largely because “the predominating
Jewish population do not object to their presence.”70 Thus, to use Earl Lewis’s felicitous phrase,
Stepney was an area of “overlapping diasporas.”71 Here, Indians and Eastern European Jews
created a community that was emblematic of Udham Singh’s overarching commitment to the
international labor movement and the degree to which he transgressed the presumed boundaries
of ethnicity.
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To be sure, Udham Singh’s perception of his religious and ethnic identity was fluid.
While explaining his chosen name to Divisional Detective Inspector John Swain, after he had
been detained in Caxton Hall, Singh recalled “when I was seven I call myself Mohamed Singh. I
like Mohamedan religion and I try to mix with Mohamedans.”72 Furthermore, testifying during
his trial, he underscored his interest in moving beyond the Sikh and Punjabi communities in
Britain. “I have nothing against the English people at all,” he noted, “I have more English friends
living in England than I have in India. I have great sympathy with the workers of England. I am
against the Imperialist Government.”73 By “English” there is every reason to think that Singh
meant “British.” Foremost among these friends, it would seem, was a Welsh woman, Irene Rose
Palmer, with whom Singh had lived, at least periodically, for nearly four years prior to his
imprisonment. A police report from 1936, observes that “it is believed that [Singh] is cohabiting
with a white woman somewhere in the West End of London and working at intervals on ‘crowd
scenes’ at film studios.”74 Later investigations suggested that Singh and Palmer lived together at
25 Werter Road in late-1938. In addition, the police found that Palmer, who adopted the aliases
Mrs. Devi Lakshmi, Mrs. Devi Lakshmi Singh, Mrs. Devi Shankar, and Mrs. Singh, had lived
with two other Indian men at that address between 1937 and 1940.75 Furthermore, Singh had, at
one point, proposed marriage to her, but she declined citing his penchant for travel and his hotheadedness.76
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As an indication of the intimacy of their relationship Palmer continued to care about
Singh’s fate and remained an advocate for him even after his imprisonment. In early April 1940,
Palmer, under the alias Mrs. Shankar, and Framroze Jehangir Patel, a mutual friend, visited
Singh in Brixton Prison. Subsequently, an officer visited the address they provided, 95a
Tottenham Court Road, London. Palmer was the proprietor of an Indian restaurant at this address
and Patel occupied a suite of rooms in the building. In fact, Singh and Palmer first met at this
restaurant, where he was a frequent diner. The officer’s call at the restaurant did not reveal much.
He did record that a picture of Udham Singh was on display in Palmer’s room. Palmer also
seems to have intervened in discussions surrounding Singh’s legal counsel. In late-March, Feroz
Khan Noon, the High Commissioner for India, relayed a message to the India Office, about a
conversation he had with Dr. Bhandari who sought guidance on how to support Udham Singh’s
case. At the behest of the Ghadar Party, Bhandari sought to convince Krishna Menon, the head
of the India League, to contribute to the defense. “Evidently,” Noon reported, “Dr. Bhandari
thinks that his address was supplied to the prisoner by his mistress, a young woman with whom
he had been living before he was arrested. This young woman got Dr. Bhandari’s address
probably from Krishna Menon.” For his part, Noon cited the Indian National Congress’
condemnation of Singh and suggested that he had little sympathy for the accused. The exchange
with Bhandari is remarkable in that he indicated that Irene Palmer was either particularly wellconnected or sufficiently well-informed and persistent to solicit the support of prominent and
well-respected Indians in Britain on Singh’s behalf.77
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Indian communities throughout Britain and North America were mobilized in support of
Udham Singh after his arrest and arraignment. Usually focused on the welfare of Indian seamen
in British ports, Surat Ali initially garnered support for Udham Singh by collecting funds for his
defense in the East End.78 As the campaign to raise funds for Singh’s defense began in Britain,
the Sikh Temple in Stockton, California, a well-established wing of the Ghadar Party, sent a
telegram to Indian representatives in London to enquire about the arrangements for Singh’s legal
counsel. Even though there was “no evidence whatever of recent direct communication between
him and the Party,” Udham Singh instructed his solicitor, Robert Clayton, to respond to the Sikh
Temple and assured him that it “would bring in anything up to £1,000.”79 Soliciting the Ghadar
Party for funds seems to have irritated some Indians connected with Udham Singh’s
representation. It was not, as Robert Clayton had understood, the result of a feud between Sikhs
in the UK and those in California. Rather, in the India Office’s view, “there is no reason to
suppose that anything in the nature of a feud exists” but “the United Kingdom Sikhs are
doubtless not anxious to give the appearance of having relations with a body so notorious as is
the Ghadr Party.”80 Ultimately, the Stockton Temple cabled £150 as an endorsement of Udham
Singh’s act and with a view to buttress the movement through coverage of the trial.81
As early as June, the India Office appeared convinced of both the political salience of
Udham Singh’s case among Sikhs and the utter lack of interest from the rest of the Indian
community in Britain. To that end, the Office suspected that the Sikhs would seek a reprieve and,
“if they failed, Udham Singh would die a martyr’s death, and his photograph would be added to
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the...Hindustan Ghadr.” However, the Home Office claimed, “other sections of the Indian
community in this country, of which the Sikhs form only some 20%, have no sympathy for, or
even interest in, the condemned man.”82 In late July 1940, Krishna Menon worked with Shiv
Singh Jouhl, alternately a peddler and a priest in London, to circulate a Petition for Reprieve
throughout the country. Perhaps anticipating his career as an ambassador for, and minister in, the
post-Independence Indian Government, Menon addressed the Petition to Sir John Anderson and
wrote:
We, the undersigned, loyal subjects of His Majesty George the Sixth, by the Grace of
God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Defender of
the Faith, Emperor of India, humbly pray that you see fit to recommend to His Majesty
that a reprieve be granted in favour of one Udham Singh, otherwise known as Azad
Singh...We fervently believe that such act of mercy, in sparing the life of the aforesaid
Udham Singh, will strengthen the bonds of union between the British and Indian
peoples.83
As Shiv Singh Jouhl began to distribute the Petition for Reprieve, the India Office remained
convinced that “the general view is that outside the Sikh community, very little interest is being
manifested in Udham Singh’s life.”84 Yet, a simple tally reveals that of the Indians who signed
the petition at least 150, more than half, were Muslim.
Interestingly, while Udham Singh may have been “well-known in certain Indian circles in
London” and “equally well-known among Sikh peddlers who lived at Coventry, Southampton,
and other places,” it is remarkable that Ujagar Singh and Kartar Singh Nagra were the only two
signatories from London and Coventry, respectively. The misperception that the India Office had
of Muslim interest in Udham Singh’s fate may have stemmed from the distinct lack of signatures
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from London’s East End. Surveillance reports suggest that Surat Ali advised Indians in the East
End, many of whom were escaped Bengali Muslim seamen, not to sign the Petition. He feared
that supplying one’s full name and address could have elicited unwarranted Police attention to an
already precarious community. Instead, the highest number of signatures came from the
Birmingham, Huddersfield, Southampton, and the Royal Air Force Camp in Melksham,
underscoring that the primary activities of Punjabis in Britain as soldiers, peddlers, unskilled
labor, and escaped seamen.
The moral and monetary support that Udham Singh received from the Indian community
in Britain did not lead to his immortalization. Discharging two bullets from a .44 caliber Smith &
Wesson revolver into Sir Michael O’Dwyer, former Lieutenant-Governor of Punjab, at the
Caxton Hall in London on 13 March 1940 and his subsequent hanging on 31 July 1940 at the
Petonville Prison, gained him notoriety. But the uses to which his name and image were put in
radical publications such as the Hindustan Ghadr and Kirti made him a martyr.
Udham Singh’s Martyrdom and the Cult of Assassination
The Hindustan Ghadr took a keen interest in Udham Singh’s case and both helped to
galvanize transatlantic support for him in the days before his trial and, after his execution,
attempted to cement Udham Singh’s reputation as a revolutionary icon. In May, while Udham
Singh sat in Brixton Prison, the Hindustan Ghadr published an editorial comparing him to
Madan Lal Dhingra and noted that, “in the eyes of crores of inarticulate Indians, Udham Singh
has attained the dignity of martyrdom.”85 The India Office was outraged that the paper would
favorably compare these two incidents and present them as “worthy of emulation.” Indeed, the
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Office suggested that it was engaging in “indirect incitement to further acts of assassination.”86
Later, in the September 1940 issue of Hindustan Ghadr, commenting on Udham Singh’s
execution and its ramifications for British imperial rule in India, the Paper asserted that:
The 31st July 1940 will ever be remembered in Indian history. On this day Comrade
Udham Singh Ji achieved martyrdom. By hanging Comrade Udham Singh Ji the
Farangis...have further augmented their oppressions. The sigh of the oppressed Indians
will ultimately destroy the oppressive Farangis.87
Underscoring the excesses of colonial rule, and the extraordinary power of the insurgent sigh,
this article suggests that Udham Singh’s execution was an example of British tyranny. The full
appreciation and canonization of Udham Singh’s martyrdom, however, seemed to require a
different genre altogether.
Poetry was an important mode of revolutionary expression and political education
throughout Ghadar Party history. Both the Hindustan Ghadr and the Ghadr-di-Gunj routinely
published verse written by its members. Also, while in prison, Udham Singh included some lines
of “national poetry” in a prepared statement that he attempted to read before the judge sentenced
him. An India Office functionary, who attended Singh’s trial and who would have been familiar
with Ghadar publications, remarked derisively that writing and reciting poetry was “not an
uncommon hobby among Punjabis...it is in fact one of the most effective ways of influencing the
ignorant and semi-ignorant, for statement of fact is made subordinate to emotion, rhythm, rhyme
and the interplay of words.”88 Yet, for the Ghadar Party, the violence of colonial rule in India
could only be met with violent resistance. For that reason, Udham Singh was exemplary. The
December 1940 issue of Hindustan Ghadr published an unsigned poem that caused an Indian
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Political Intelligence agent to declare that “it is a long time since the Hindustan Ghadr has
appeared with anything so strongly supporting the cult of assassination.”89 As an ode to
revolution, any question of fact is secondary to the possibility of “making sinners pay the
penalty.” For instance:
By striking with your hand you have made the tyrants pay the penalty
a fine garland of martyrdom is placed round your neck.
You are the perfect hero in the matter of freedom
You have struck down the chains of slavery […]
Hands such as yours seizing the sword
washing away the mark of slavery from the brow […]
Arise, heroes, be steady
the time to introduce freedom has come.
Expel the tyrants, pacify India
there is no time left for delay.
Come, let us annihilate cruel England
you who want to introduce freedom.
Expel the cruel Farangis from your house
consider how to bring about rebellion.90
Moreover, echoing the Ghadar critique of British tyranny, the poem places Udham Singh in a
lineage of “the greatness of those who became martyrs for their country,” which included Kartar
Singh Sarabha, a Ghadarite who was executed in 1915, and Bhagat Singh, Rajguru, and
Sukhdev, executed together in 1931, among others. In this way, the poet indicates that the spirit
of militant anticolonialism had been embodied many times before and that Udham Singh should
not be the last.
The international circulation of its publications was integral to the dissemination of
Ghadar politics to Europe and India. As has been mentioned, Udham Singh was arrested in 1927
under the Arms Act. It was additionally incriminating that he was apprehended while in
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possession of copies of Ghadr-di-Gunj. Also, in the months prior to the assassination, he was in
“regular receipt” of the Hindustan Ghadr.91 These two instances both buttress claims about
Udham Singh’s personal connection to the movement and his underlying revolutionary
tendencies. They also indicate the ease with which these publications were distributed. Because
of the Ghadar Party’s intention to disrupt British Indian soldiers and encourage them to dessert,
the India Office sought to monitor the movement of their publications. In February 1942, for
instance, the Office realized that the Hindustan Ghadr had “played no small part in inducing a
general atmosphere of disaffection” among Sikh soldiers in the Far East.”92 Thus, even as the
British authorities noted the presence of Ghadarite publications in war-zones, the route that the
papers took was difficult to discern and, therefore, difficult to stop.
The India Office acknowledged that the effort to reduce the circulation of the Hindustan
Ghadr was exacerbated because receipt of the paper was not contingent on subscription.
Although it was not home to a single active subscriber, the United Kingdom “receives two or
three dozen copies every month.” The point, evidently, was not for the paper to garner
subscription fees for the Party but simply to maximize circulation. Indeed, the production of the
Paper not only served as one of the Ghadar Party’s primary contributions to the struggle against
imperialism during World War II, but also, more fundamentally, it helped “to keep alight the
flame of...extreme nationalistic ardour of Sikhs abroad.”93 In Coventry, which received bundles
of the paper up until at least 1947, access to the Hindustan Ghadr and the tenets of the Ghadar
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Party played a significant role in the political consciousness and subsequent organization of
Charan Singh Chima and his clique of “extremist Sikhs,” to whom this chapter will now return.94
Conclusion
The Indian Workers Association (IWA), the expatriate organization that Charan Singh
Chima ultimately helped to establish after consulting with Rattan Singh in 1939, was integral to
articulating an anticolonial politics in Britain. Informed by the Ghadar movement, animated by
the trial and execution of Udham Singh, and aligned with the internationalist and national
liberation movements emerging in late interwar Britain, the IWA became synonymous with
South Asian radicalism.95 From its earliest history, the Association threatened to be a
destabilizing force among Indians in the Midlands. Indian Political Intelligence feared that
“under invasion conditions some of them, particularly the Sikhs, might present considerable
danger” to British security.96 Such alarm was founded on the observation that the majority of the
IWA's members were from Hoshiarpur and Jullundur in the central Punjab. The IPI was quick to
note that these areas “have for many years past been hotbeds of violent political agitation, and in
fact represent the birth-place of the Ghadr Party.”97 Furthermore, the Intelligence agency
believed that “it is quite clear...that the leaders of the Indian Workers Association regard it as one
of their functions to educate the Indian workers in this country politically, so that when the time
comes for them to return to India they may be able to take their part in the revolutionary
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movement.” Thus, the India Office coordinated with the Home Office and Chief Constable of
Birmingham to maintain a close watch on the work of the association, most of whom had
congregated in the Midlands for economic opportunity.
In 1945, having taken some time to establish itself within the landscape of Indian
organizations in Britain, the Coventry-based IWA brought out a newsletter, Azad Hind.98 Under
the direction of Kartar Singh Nagra and Vidya Parkash Hansrani, the paper adopted the militant
anticolonialism detailed in Ghadar party publications, making it, in the eyes of the British
intelligence apparatus, “as extreme as anything which has yet appeared in this country in any
Indian language.”99 Indeed, during a meeting of the Federation of Indian Associations in Great
Britain (FIAGB) on 14 April 1946, Kartar Singh Nagra stated that Azad Hind was modeled on
the Hindustan Ghadr and that he hoped to emulate the latter.100 An evocative example of this
confluence can be seen in the reprinting of Banka Singh’s hagiographic verse eulogizing Udham
Singh as “Bawa,” which had been previously published in Ghadar.101
The violent anticolonial rhetoric of the paper, with a circulation in “the London area, the
Midlands and the industrial North,” won it the attention of MI5 and the Home Office sought to
bring charges against it. However, one government minister lamented, “it was doubted whether,
in the event of a prosecution, an English jury could be convinced that the questionable matter
amounted, in fact, to incitement to murder.”102 In any case, the fears that “a second Udham Singh
should arise” due to the encouragement of the paper, led to its characterization as “insidious and
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poisonous propaganda which aims at corrupting the political views of the working-class Indian
in this country and at instilling revolutionary and terrorist ideas.”103 The national distribution of
Azad Hind, which was facilitated by the pockets of anticolonial radicalism that had emerged out
of the formation of the Indian Workers Association, helped it to become one of the most
prominent instruments for introducing Ghadarite militancy to hundreds of working-class Indians
in Britain.
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Chapter 5
Indian Ideology in Mid-Twentieth Century Britain
In July 1936, an array of communist and anticolonial activists in London convened the
Fifth Indian Political Conference. A circular for the event observed that it would be a
demonstration of solidarity between Indian and British organizations that were contributing to
the struggle against the British Empire. The animating cause for the Conference was the passing
of the Government of India Act of 1935, which the circular repudiated as a “fascist constitution.”
Held at the Unity Theatre, a celebrated part of the Workers’ Theatre Movement, the conference
was to be presided over by Rajani Palme Dutt, the leading theorist of the Communist Party of
Great Britain. Although he was absent due to illness, his presidential address was printed and
available for purchase. The resolutions at the conference remind us that the Indian freedom
struggle in Britain was tied in with global anticolonialism. The resolutions accepted at the
conference included statements on Civil Liberties in India, Indian Students in England, and
Indians Abroad. George Padmore, the prominent Trinidadian Pan-Africanist, proposed that “this
Fifth Indian Political Conference deplores the plight of Indian Pedlars and Seamen living in the
East End of London. Being the victims of insidious colour discrimination they are being driven
to the borders of starvation and destitution.” Padmore’s resolution highlights both the
overlapping experiences of nonwhite workers in interwar Britain and the cooperation
demonstrated by Indian, African, and Caribbean anticolonial and nationalist activists and
theorists in their shared struggles.1
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The leadership that Rajani Palme Dutt and George Padmore provided before and during
the conference was indicative of the state of Indian anticolonial mobilization in Britain in the late
1930s. Their presence was emblematic of the course of the movement over the ensuing decade.
In addition to serving as president of the Conference, in 1936 Palme Dutt was the editor of Daily
Worker and a member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party and remained a staunch
supporter of the Soviet Union until his death. In contrast, Padmore had been a committed worker
in the Red International Labour Union in Moscow. But he had recently been expelled from the
Communist Party due to his views on the super-exploitation of black workers, which was a
deviation from prevailing Leninist class analysis.2 In these two leaders, Indian radicals in Britain
were presented with a choice in the mid-1930s that would be wrangled over for the remainder of
the decade. As Dutt was increasingly associated with pro-war Stalinism, Padmore’s politics
embodied a form of anticolonialism that moved beyond the Communist International and offered
a critique of communist imperialism even while he remained sympathetic to the Soviet project.
The focus of Palme Dutt’s Presidential Address in 1936 was on the future of a “united
Anti-Imperialist People’s front in India, capable of defeating Imperialism,” which he believed
was emerging throughout the colonized world. In his view, uniting workers, peasants, and
students under the banner of Jawaharlal Nehru’s Indian National Congress was the only “way
forward ultimately to the victory of the Indian national struggle.” Moreover, he insisted that “all
elements...who are prepared to fight against imperialism without compromise, are welcome to
this common front.” At the same time, those who willingly took up office within the Government
of India, as provided for in the 1935 Government of India Act, rejected the national movement.

2

Leslie James, George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of
Empire (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 38; Mukherji, “Anticolonial Imagination,” 142.

167
“Whoever rejects mass struggle must cooperate with Imperialism,” Dutt averred, “there is no
third course.” This speech anticipated the Congress decision to abandon the Government in 1939
after their electoral victories in 1937 because the United Kingdom declared war on the Axis
power on behalf of the colonies without consulting Indian political leaders. The speech also
predicted the reasons why anti-imperialist forces, including Indian workers, in Britain eventually
moved away from the Communist Party even as its membership swelled after the Soviet Union
entered the war. Though Dutt’s faith in the Soviet Union was unwavering, he understood in 1936
that the Soviet stance was widely perceived as cooperation with imperialism and therefore
anathema to the idea of an Anti-Imperialist People’s Front.3
Padmore’s life in the Communist Party offers a critical response to Dutt’s belief in a
popular front organized around the leadership of the Soviet Union. Early on, Padmore was ardent
worker in the Communist Party of the United States and eventually head of the International
Trade Union Committee of Negro Workers (ITUCNW) and editor of Negro Worker. Yet, by the
mid-1930s his changing views on the status of black workers and the conduct of communist antiimperialism led to his split with the Comintern. Having presented a synthetic analysis of colonial
exploitation and black resistance in the pages of Negro Worker, Padmore grew restless with the
reluctance of the Communist International to adequately support his work. He was particularly
devoted to the development of African communist cadres at the University of the Toilers of the
East. According to Ani Mukherji, Padmore was forced to break with the Comintern in the face of
Hitler’s rise and the Soviet Union’s efforts to develop mutual support systems in Europe against
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Germany. A by-product of the Soviet Union’s focus on Europe was the abandonment of the
ITUCNW and “near desertion of anticolonial work.” From this experience, Padmore learned the
importance of autonomy from Marxist-Leninist organizations in the pursuit of national
liberation, worker solidarity, and racial emancipation. These were lessons that penetrated the
non-Stalinist left in the following decade and especially informed mid-century political praxis
among Indians in Britain.4
Indian Coordination with British Intelligentsia, 1917-1942
In the Britain of the 1920s and early-1930s, the fight for Indian Independence was largely
carried out by social elites and Indian workers were seldom mobilized for anticolonial or
nationalist causes. Yet, there was some attempt to organize Indian lascars. Among the most
prominent examples of this initiative was the Indian Seamen’s Union, under the leadership of NJ
Upadhyaya, who enjoyed the financial backing of Shapurji Saklatvala and the Communist Party
of Great Britain.5 Saklatvala, a relative of the industrialist Tata family and Communist Member
of Parliament for the Battersea North constituency in London, was a mainstay of leftist
anticolonialism in Britain. Through his Workers’ Welfare League of India (WWLI), founded in
1917, he and his associates did much to inform British communists of the condition of Indian
workers. However, the name of the organization notwithstanding, this body did not recruit

Mukherji, “Anticolonial Imagination,” Ch. 3. Quotation from page 149; Brent Hayes Edwards, The Practice of
Diaspora: Literature, Translation, and the Rise of Black Internationalism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2003), 245-305.
5
See chapter 2 above.
4

169
members from the docks or along the peddler’s route. Instead, its ranks were filled by Indian
professionals and sympathetic white Britons.6
In the early-interwar period, the League Against Imperialism (LAI), the Comintern, and
the Independent Labour Party (ILP) provided much of the connective tissue that allowed for the
emergence of the first generation of Indian nationalist and anticolonial organizations to achieve
broad appeal. It is instructive that the LAI, established in Berlin in 1927, had immediate contacts
with Indian nationalists, particularly Virendranath Chattopadhyaya in Berlin, Jawaharlal Nehru
in India, and Saklatvala in London. In addition, the British section of the LAI was led by
Reginald Bridgeman, who also sat on committees for the Indian Swaraj League, covered Indian
events in London for the journal Indian Front, and formed part of the India League leadership
under Krishna Menon in the 1940s.7 The British Section of the LAI also counted NJ Upadyaya
as a branch member in 1928.8 The Chairman of the British Section was James Maxton, ILP
Member of Parliament in the 1930s and an ideological leader of the non-Stalinist left during
World War II.9 Moreover, Indian participation in the Independent Labour Party dates to at least
1920, when Shapurji Saklatvala, CP Vakil, and KS Bhat, among others, sought to push the Party
toward closer coordination with the Comintern when the latter was formed. While the ILP did
not officially affiliate with the Comintern, it did have shared anti-imperialist goals. While the
ILP’s cooperation with Moscow ended at the beginning of World War II, its stance as a
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consistent critic of imperialist war appears to have given it and likeminded organizations greater
influence among anti-war Indian migrants in Britain.
An early statement of the ethos of the Workers Welfare League of India is contained in
the undated pamphlet titled “An Indictment of Slave Labour!” Written by KS Bhat, then
president of the League, this pamphlet is a commentary on colonial capitalist production and the
social and economic alienation that sustained it. “Millions of peasantry and workers in forest
areas and mines are kept illiterate with the deliberate object of exploiting their ignorance; kept
without essential and primary political rights; kept away by force from the influence of their
better-knowledged [sic] countrymen.” The piece directs the British reader’s attention away from
the plight workers in Russian timber yards and towards the “backward condition of life”
prevalent throughout the colonized world. In a passage equating colonial labor practices to
cannibalism, Bhat notes that “rice, wheat, tea, coffee, cocoanuts, various fruits, spices, &c., are
also brought over to Britain from India. Every British home consuming these commodities is
consuming human flesh and blood…” While the piece was an expansive argument against the
extractive industries of classical colonialism, this imagery was certainly not intended for an
Indian audience and plainly does not consider the myriad forms of everyday resistance that were
practiced on colonial plantations.10
Following the Comintern and the Communist Party of Great Britain, The Workers
Welfare League of India believed in a theory of labor politics that elevated collectivization and
unionization as the only legitimate form of resistance. The relationship that this theory created
between western communists and colonized workers was therefore necessarily pedagogical. The
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leaders of the WWLI believed that emancipation for India would only come once Indians learned
how to properly oppose colonial exploitation. Near the end of the decade, in support of this
worldview, another circular emerged as a testament to the work that the WWLI had done among
Indians specifically. In “An Appeal to the Workers of Britain,” signed by Secretary JE PotterWilson, the WWLI solicited support for “in its work of building up ties of solidarity and mutual
assistance between British and Indian workers.” In this appeal, the League touted its
contributions to the growth of trade unionism in India, noting with satisfaction that “during 1928,
three million working days were lost through industrial disputes, more than during the whole of
the preceding five years put together.” However, jealous of its position within the Indian labor
movement, the circular was quick to deride the notion that “it is controlled by any other
organization,” which appears to be an acknowledgement of the closeness between Saklatvala, the
WWLI, and the CPGB.11
Though it tried to sustain an Indian membership through a special Indian Section, the
WWLI only made inroads among Indian academics, politicians, and journalists -- most of whom
were colleagues who operated within the same social world as Saklatvala.12 Regardless of
official affiliations, the WWLI was not unique in its limited appeal to Indians in Britain. While
the WWLI appears to have liquidated in 1932, a similar organization emerged under the
leadership of VK Krishna Menon. According to Paul M. McGarr, Menon became secretary of
the Commonwealth Group of India in 1928 and transformed it into the India League four years
later. Though he did not immediately seek the support of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
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he was emboldened to do so in 1935, after the Seventh Congress of the Communist International
resolved to rejoin the fight against imperialism. A few years later, CPGB and India League
cooperation reached its zenith allowing Menon to be the primary intermediary between the
Indian and British Communist Parties. In this period, Menon’s India League was the most
prominent organization in Britain on the question of Indian independence.13
Menon’s ability to coordinate with Communist and Labour leaders allowed him to
represent India in Parliamentary fora and among the British political elite. Indeed, as late as 1942
the Communist Party reaffirmed the India League’s position as the Indian National Congress
representative in Britain. However, though he was ascendant during this period, the India
League, as with the Worker’s Welfare League before it, made little headway among Indians in
Britain. Therefore, Indians abroad did not consider the India League a vehicle for mass
mobilization. An Indian Political Intelligence report from November 1942 notes parenthetically
that “it has always been held against the India League that it is not an Indian organization and is
‘bourgeois’ in its nature and appeal.”14 Certainly, the League’s preeminence in British politics
caused much consternation among revolutionary Indians in Britain. Challenges to Menon’s
hegemony within British Indian political and social campaigns can be gleaned in the wrangling
for influence during the trial of Udham Singh. In this episode, Menon and Surat Ali, a former
lascar from Bengal, vied with one another to determine who would facilitate Singh’s defense. 15
According to police files, Udham Singh was a personal acquaintance of Surat Ali, even if
the latter believed that Singh was unstable. Just days prior to the attack at Caxton Hall and the
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murder of Michael O’Dwyer, Singh had visited Ali at his home to discuss Indian politics.16
Perhaps due to this connection, Ali later found himself in the position to provide Singh with legal
counsel and sought Bernard Linder’s services. Linder was a solicitor and a known entity among
peddlers and lascars in the East End who “had acted in the past in cases affecting seamen’s
interests.”17 In the days just after the attack, Menon evidently did not consider intervening in
Singh’s defense. However, Feroz Khan Noon, Indian High Commissioner in London, advised the
police that Irene Palmer, with whom Udham Singh had lived off and on for three years, sought
Menon’s help in the defense.18 Moreover, Menon began to appreciate the political capital of the
trial when, in mid-March, he received a telegram from Ajmer Singh, a representative of the
Stockton Sikh Temple and Ghadar Party, asking about Singh’s case.19 Then, on 5 April 1940,
Palmer visited Singh at the Brixton Prison with Framroze Jehangir Patel, who identified himself
as a “solicitor’s clerk to Robert Clayton,” Menon’s choice of counsel.20 Claiming to represent the
Indian community, Patel entreated Singh to allow Clayton to serve as his solicitor because
Linder was “making a mess of the defense.”21 Subsequently, Singh decided to enlist Clayton and,
by extension, Menon for his defense.
The dispute between Menon and Surat Ali demonstrates the vibrancy of Indian politics in
Britain and underscores the myriad spheres of influence that emerged during the formative
period of the interwar. The Udham Singh trial provided a space for these contrasting spheres to
compete for leadership positions among Indians in Britain. However, what it ultimately suggests
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is that the Indian community in Britain was not uniform in its political aspirations or its social
standing. While Surat Ali was consistently working on the part of Indian seamen and peddlers in
London and his attempt to bring Bernard Linder into the case was both an act of familiarity on
Ali’s part and the will of a group of East End Sikhs. Menon, in contrast, was brought into the
case by the force of his political reputation and a belief not in Singh’s guilt or innocence but in
his ability to turn the trial into a spectacle. In this tussle, moreover, VK Menon was ultimately
able to exercise his influence due largely to the persistence of his “emissaries” Irene Palmer and
Framroze Jehangir Patel, who believed, wrongly, in his capacity to win a reduced sentence for
Singh. Menon’s political ambitions and his inability to coordinate with Indian workers in Britain
would, however, lead to his growing irrelevance among them. In turn, Surat Ali, his associates,
and related organizations were able to build on their street-level organizing, attract a larger
following, and achieve greater political salience as the decade, and the war, wore on.
Fourth Internationalism and the Anti-Conscription Movement
During the interwar period there had been considerable coordination among leftist
organizations and political parties in Britain around the question of Indian Independence. Thanks
to the prominence of Indian politicians in the British left, British imperialism and the question of
Indian freedom was a common rallying point for the left, even if it seldom engaged workingclass Indians. Shapurji Saklatvala and Rajani Palme Dutt both used their political capital to push
their organizations toward a recognition of the struggle in India and to declaim the British
Empire. Moreover, the British Section of the League Against Imperialism facilitated the
cooperation of white and Indian leftists, under the auspices of the Communist International, on
the question of Indian independence. Many of these individuals were simultaneously mainstays
of pro-Indian, pro-Soviet, and leftist organizations in Britain. However, the onset of World War

175
II contributed to the dissolution of this leftist unity in Britain. The Communist Party of Great
Britain following the line of the Communist International on both the validity of the war itself as
well as on the position of India and the Indian National Congress within struggle for
international communism. Other leftist organizations, that existed beyond the control of the
Comintern and outside of conventional party politics, were free to follow their own line. In
several instances, this led to the consolidation of power in Fourth International and Trotskyist
organizations that, while focused on communist revolution, remained opposed to the war and
imperialism.
In the 1940s, Indian expatriate organizations in Britain started gravitating toward the nonStalinist left. Among the reasons for this move was the anti-war and anti-conscription stance that
was held in common between the Fourth International organizations and Indian political
organizations. The urge to resist the war for Indians in Britain came, in part, from the Indian
National Congress’ lead in 1939 when it condemned the unilateral declaration of war that the
United Kingdom issued for itself and its colonies. Anger about entering a war without prior
consultation led the Congress to resign seats its seats throughout the government.22 In addition to
Congress’ actions, the Indian left had begun organizing anti-conscription rallies throughout India
and the force of those rallies was echoed among Indians in Britain in the form of nonconscription efforts. Anti-conscription was a force that united many Indian political
organizations in the late-1930s and early 1940s. Though representing disparate political and
social aspirations, the Indian Workers Association, Swaraj House, and the Committee of Indian
Congressmen counseled Indians in Britain in ways to avoid conscription. The chief strategies
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were either to register as Conscientious Objectors or to argue that the National Service Act
should not apply to Indians. The urge to protest World War II was rooted in the perceived
duplicity of the British Government after World War I. Many Indians were under the impression
that serving in good faith would lead to Indian Independence after the Armistice. Because
independence was not granted, many Indians rejected contributing to the war effort in the 1940s.
A point of contact between the anti-war left in Britain and the Punjabi politics that
informed much Indian mobilization abroad was the question of conscription and recruitment into
military service. Not only did Fourth International organizations align with the Indian National
Congress in its unwillingness to be declared belligerents without consultation, but also the antirecruitment agitation in Punjab resonated with Trotskyist policies.23 As the “garrison state,” the
Punjab was the likeliest place to experience a backlash against the military both due to political
and economic pressures. While thousands served in both world wars and in various other
conflicts where the British Indian Army was engaged, there was a ground swell against
recruitment regimes throughout the interwar period that reached a fever-pitch in the late-1930s.
The anti-recruitment movement emerged in the Jullundur Doab, which had served as a site of
anti-colonial resistance for much of the twentieth century. According to the Director of
Intelligence, the campaign to resist military service might have originated with the Communists
and Congress Socialists.24 Certainly, prior to the Soviet Union entering the war, Communists
were prominent anti-war agitators.25 The Punjabi left collectively produced extensive
propaganda that contained anti-war messages. Ailan-i-Jang, a leaflet produced by the
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Communist Party of India in Punjab, had been distributed among soldiers in the 19th Lancers in
Lahore imploring them to desert or mutiny.26
As early as 1937, much of the central tract of Punjab, from Lahore to Hoshiarpur, was
consumed by anti-recruitment meetings. Shalini Sharma instructs that in September of that year
twenty-five meetings were convened--averaging nearly one per day.27 The fervor eventually
resulted in the formation of the League Against Fascism and War. This is an important reminder
that communists and nationalists were able to be anti-war in protest of British imperialism.
Regardless of how the British officials represented it, being against the War was not an act of
complicity with Nazis. Nonetheless, the Punjab authorities made use of the war-time Defense of
India Rules to try to quash the anti-war movement. According to Mridula Mukherjee, the
justifications for imprisonment were manifold, including subversive activities, fomenting
rebellion in military ranks, inciting terrorism, and “disseminating alarmist rumours.”28 This
response gave the Province the distinction, by 1940, of having imprisoned the largest number of
communists and socialists in India.29
In addition to the general increase in mistrust of the military in Punjab, Tan Tai Yong
points out that the “reliability of one of the mainstays of the martial classes--the Sikhs--was
brought into question during the war.”30 According to Yong, Sikhs grew more distrustful of the
colonial government because the war happened to coincide with the rise in pro-Pakistan
mobilization by the Muslim League.31 A more direct influence, however, appears to be the
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sustained campaign by the Kirti Kisan Party to spread discontent among Sikh soldiers. Evidence
for this agitation is borne out by a general uptick in Sikh desertions and the occurrence of
insubordination among Sikh soldiers, first in Egypt in 1939 and then among the Sikh squadron of
the Central Indian Horse in June 1940.32 Because of this widespread disaffection, the military
was forced to suspend Sikh recruitment the following year, which substantially limited the pool
of Indians available for enlistment during the war.
The anti-war position of so-called Trotskyist organizations was a natural umbrella under
which many Indians and Indian organizations began to operate. The anti-war position of the
Trotskyists was consistent throughout the period. At the onset of hostilities in 1939, the
communist world was against World War II as an imperialist war. However, once the Soviet
Union was brought into the conflict in 1941, the Communist International re-branded the conflict
a people’s war and required the contribution and support of all the national parties. At this point,
the ideological division between the Communist International and the Fourth International
became clear. The latter remained a critic of the conflict and implored sympathetic organizations
and activists to maintain strict opposition to entering what was still considered an imperialist
war. The freedom of opinion that Trotskyist organizations exercised in this period was a
manifestation of the anti-Stalin position of the Fourth International. Whereas the Communist
Parties were beholden to the pro-war line of the Communist International, Trotskyist opposition
to the war was rooted in a fundamental distrust of a capitalist war. Moreover, votaries of Trotsky
were doubly suspicion of Stalin’s leadership because the Soviet premier had effectively expelled
Trotsky from the USSR and later had him killed in Mexico.
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Vellala Srikantappa Sastry: “The Most Dangerous Indian in the Midlands”
The marriage of Indian anticolonialism and revolutionary Trotskyism was built on a
foundation of mutual resistance to the Second World War. There were myriad points of contact
between these two political projects. Exponents of both communities believed in the brutal
commonalities of British imperialism and Nazi fascism. Votaries of the Fourth International
maintained that the war would perpetuate capitalist dispossession while Indian supporters of the
Congress Party refused to participate in a war that would not result in their self-determination.
However, the coordination between these movements was not in any sense inevitable.
Representatives of Indian nationalism in Britain had for decades partnered with the Labour and
Communist Parties, both of which, for different reasons, ultimately gave their support to the war.
This support alienated a vocal and organized contingent of Indians in Britain from across the
ideological spectrum. In this moment, the Independent Labour Party, under the leadership of
James Maxton and Fenner Brockway, helped to bridge the gap between the labor movement,
anti-war agitation, and the struggle for national liberation. In 1942, Vellala Srikantappa Sastry,
more commonly known as VS Sastry, emerged as the essential connective tissue between the
British Fourth International and Indian working-class activism.
Sastry’s leadership acumen were well documented during early investigations into the
rise and potential threat posed by Indian organizations in Britain during the war. Originally from
Madras, Sastry first came to Britain in 1936 with hopes of establishing himself as a journalist.
For a short time, he worked with PB Seal in the latter’s Orient Press Service, but long-term work
and ideological disagreements with Seal led Sastry into different sectors. He found steadier work
in the British war-time economy. He Initially worked in the Indian Stores Department and later
moved to the Coventry-based Albert Herberts Ltd. His foray into the industrial economy also
gave him the opportunity to interact with his Indian co-workers. In 1941, he was a shop steward
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at Daimler. According to an IPI history sheet, by the time he started at Daimler “he had already
begun to take an interest in educating the Indian worker politically with a view to preparing him
for the task of bringing about a social, economic, and political revolution in India.”33 Indeed, the
biographical note that IPI prepared goes on to comment on the danger the he posed in the
Midlands because he had “considerable organizing ability” and was “able to infect others with
his own enthusiasm.” To that end, Sastry, having gained some organizing experiencing while at
Daimler, took on the post of General Secretary of the Indian Workers Association in 1942, which
led to the organization’s revitalization.34 During this uptick in organizational activity the IPI
began to track Sastry and his associates with a view to interning them in the event of a German
invasion. Such preparation was necessary neither for politically anemic organizations nor for
those, like the India League, that attempted to make inroads with British political institutions.
Thus, plans for internment are an early indication of the IWA’s revolutionary potential.35
Even though Sastry had demonstrated considerable ability as an organizer, his devotion
to journalism had not disappeared. Rather, his energies had been redirected. In February 1942,
the surveillance apparatus noted that he was distributing copies of Socialist Appeal, the official
journal of the Trotskyist Workers International League.36 A few months later, IPI reported that
Sastry had cemented his commitment to the Fourth International by joining the staff of the paper.
In 1944, the Workers International League and the Revolutionary Socialist League had merged
to produce the Revolutionary Communist Party, which took over production of Socialist
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Appeal.37 As soon as he began coordinating with Trotskyist groups in the Midlands, Sastry was
engaged as a factory organizer. By the end of 1942, Sastry had joined the staff of Socialist
Appeal and commenced organizing a “factory group” in Birmingham under the aegis of the
Fourth International.38 A year later, Sastry had been elected General Secretary of the Indian
Workers Association, made a contributor to the most prominent Trotskyist journal in Britain,
enlisted as a paid organizer for the recently consolidated Federation of Indian Associations in
Great Britain. Furthermore, he attempted to open an accountancy business at 25A Paradise Street
in Birmingham, an address he shared with the IWA, to help defray the rent for the Association.39
Following in the tradition that Menon and Saklatvala established in previous decades,
Sastry understood the importance of working with the British labor movement and revolutionary
political parties. However, for Sastry, as well as for many working-class activists, it was
incumbent on Indians to pursue their political goals through organizations reserved for Indians to
ensure that their they were not diluted. Thus, Sastry sought to facilitate coordination from the
helm of the IWA. In April 1942, Sastry evoked the Workers Welfare League of India’s “An
Appeal to the Workers of Britain” by circulating his “Appeal to Indian Workers.” By asserting
that “the Indian workers are playing an increasingly important role in the movement for national
liberation,” this pamphlet embodied Sastry’s divergence from earlier generations by directly
addressing Indian workers as agents of change. “It is the purpose of the Indian Workers
Association,” he asserts, “to struggle against these hardships and play its part in the British
Labour Movement. To achieve these aims we must bring every Indian worker into the

37

Michael Crick, Militant (London: Biteback Publishing, 2016), Ch. 2.
IPI Report. Indian Notes. 15 December 1942. L/PJ/12/646. IOR.
39
IPI Report. Indian Organizations in the United Kingdom: A Review 1942-43. 19 November 1943. L/PJ/12/646.
IOR.
38

182
organization.”40 Of course, attempts to link the British and Indian labor movements were not
new. The Communist Party of Great Britain had helped establish the Communist Party of India
in the 1920s and maintained much the same approach as that outlined by Sastry. Yet, Sastry’s
break with the Communist Party helps to explain the renewed focus on the Indian worker. At an
Amritsar Day meeting in November 1943, commemorating the Jallianwala Bagh massacre,
Sastry instructed the audience that “Amritsar was a great tragedy. It was more than that, it was
the end of a definite period in Indian Nationalism. It destroyed for the last time the illusions of
many Indian Nationalists that cooperation with British Imperialism would result in Freedom for
India.”41 With this, Sastry impugned the Communist Party’s cooperation with the Allied Forces
after the Soviet Union formally declared war in 1941 as cooperation with British Imperialism.
Thus, to historicize that break, as Sastry does, is to connect his own anti-war position and affinity
for the Fourth International to the events in Amritsar in 1919.
While Sastry rose to prominence in Indian activist circles due in large part to his
organizational ability and revolutionary rhetoric, his participation in the Revolutionary
Communist Party appears to have broadened his tactical arsenal. In March 1944, IPI remarked
that Sastry was “rapidly developing into a political menace” and was considering an effort to
agitate among the Indian “Bevin Trainees” at Nottingham.42 However, this plan appears to have
manifested as part of a broader RCP strategy to disrupt wartime extractive industries. The
defining moment for Sastry’s role in the RCP came in summer 1944 with the imprisonment of
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his associates Jock Haston, Roy Tearse, Heaton Lee, and Ann Keen under the Trade Disputes
Act of 1927 for their role in a strike among Bevin Boys in Newcastle. The Director of Public
Prosecutions, J. Charlesworth, argued that the strike was illegal in the first instance because it did
“not further a trade dispute” but was “for political reasons” designed to “put pressure on the
Government.”43 Although multiple apprentices from the Tyne Apprentices Guild testified that
the strike would have happened without RCP assistance, the state’s case was rooted in the fact
that none of the RCP operatives worked as Bevin Boys. Therefore, it argued, their contribution to
the strike amounted to conspiracy, incitement, aiding and abetting, and furthering an illegal
strike.
The RCP stance toward the conscription of labor was consistent with the Fourth
International position on capitalism and the war. Specifically, the Bevin Boys were part of a
system of unfree labor, known as the Bevin Ballot Scheme, named for Labour Minister Ernest
Bevin, whereby young men were conscripted into work during the labor shortage caused by the
war. As a representative of the Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain, Sastry worked
with the RCP, the Independent Labour Party, and members of the Labour Party to form the AntiLabour Laws Victims Defense Committee, which was meant to be the “conscience of the Labour
Movement since the official Trade Union and Labour leadership was willfully blind to the
implications of this trial.” This Committee hosted events to discuss the excesses of Government
policy toward workers during the war and fundraised to help offset court fees.44 Sastry routinely
reported on the progress of the case for Socialist Appeal and ultimately produced a pamphlet
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published by the Defence Committee. “Today it is Bros. Haston, Tearse, Lee and Keen,” Sastry
cautions, “tomorrow it can be any militant trade unionist or shop steward -- any trade union
secretary or branch official who can be hauled up before the courts and jailed whenever the
vindictiveness of the ruling class leads them to behead and crush the movement of the workers to
resist attacks upon their rights.”45 The four were initially charged with a litany of transgressions
but were only found guilty of aiding and abetting the organizers of the strike, namely Bill Davy
of the Tyne Apprentices Guild.46 Upon appeal, Haston, Tearse, Heaton, and Lee were released
because the Court ruled that their efforts were made prior to the beginning of the strike and
therefore could not, by definition, be held on a charge of furthering an illegal action.
The arrest and trial of his colleagues gave Sastry an opportunity to put his organizing and
journalistic abilities to full use. In this period, he increased his visibility within a militant
organization that had gained prominence among workers and anti-war activists. Indeed, in the
context of Ernest Bevin’s myriad recruitment initiatives, Sastry was able to draw the struggles of
workers and Indians in Britain closer together. By doing so, he effectively lobbied for their
mutual support. Not only did he operationalize rhetoric that Indian activists and their
sympathizers had deployed for decades, but he was also able to demonstrate the usefulness of
broad front coordinating committees that appealed to activists and politicians from across the
political spectrum. This tactic resonated in Socialist Appeal. “Whatever criticisms we have of the
political programme of the different groups who participated in this Defence Committee (the
ALLVDC) ... these comrades showed that they were fighters. The limited unity won on this issue

45
46

Sastry, “A Victory for labour,” 3.
Sastry, “A Victory for labour,” 7.

185
won a labour victory.”47 At the risk of ideological heterodoxy, Sastry’s imprint on Indian
activism was the prioritization of selective broad-front cooperation as an organizing principle
with Indian independence, resistance to war, and labor solidarity as core objectives.
The Rise of Indian Rank and File Organizations in Britain, 1935-1946
The Indian organizations that existed in Britain for much of the interwar period, backed
as they were by the Communist Party of Great Britain and associated anti-imperialist
organizations like the League Against Imperialism, did not show much ability at engaging and
enlisting working-class Indians in their organizations. The Workers Welfare League and the
India League were more concerned with soliciting British support for their campaigns They
sought to contribute to Indian nationalist and labor movements didactically and monetarily. They
did not attempt to actively recruit the politically and economically marginalized Indian worker
who had come to Britain as part of a process of capitalist expansion in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries. Indian political organizing was often supported by the British left if not
effectively incorporated by them. The Indian Seamen’s Union, established in 1927, is an
example of Saklatvala and the CPGB giving financial assistance to Indian organizers devoted to
mobilizing Indian workers. However, the distance that Indians maintained from formal
subscription to British political parties, as well as the obstacles that institutions serving Indian
workers erected to circumscribe activism, had the effect of delaying political organization while
creating the necessary space to allow for quasi-autonomous political organizations to emerge and
participate within the network of anti-imperialist, nationalist, and parliamentary organizations
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that the India League, the Communist Party of Great Britain, and the Labour Party had helped to
create.
Beginning in the mid-1930s, a generation of activists, journalists, professionals, and
workers, many of whom had, in a way, apprenticed with Saklatvala and Menon, began to grasp
for new forms of association to follow a more radical path toward Indian independence, worker
solidarity, and racial emancipation. Among the first of the organizations that articulated a new
political framework was the Indian Swaraj League. According to New Scotland Yard, this
organization was a joint effort between the Communist Party, the League Against Imperialism
and many former allies of Menon’s India League.48 Although the Metropolitan police were
convinced that the Indian Swaraj League “is being used as a facade” by the British left, it was led
by mainstays of Indian nationalism in Britain such as KD Kumria, Suresh (DJ) Vaidya, and
novelist Mulk Raj Anand. Despite the appearance of cooptation of the ISL by the Communist
Party, due to the visible communist presence on the platform of an Indian Independence Day
event in January 1937, the event was chaired by Dr. Saeed Mohamedi and the audience was
overwhelmingly comprised of Indian workers. Suraj-ud Din Piracha, perhaps prompted by the
presence of seamen and factory workers, spoke about the complicity of British workers in the
economic underdevelopment of India and the plight of the colonial working-class. Yet, he struck
a conciliatory note at the end of his address by “appealing for great unity and sympathy between
the workers of Britain and the Indian workers, in order to smash British imperialism both here
and in India.”49 Though Indian Independence Day celebrations were not new to Britain, this
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event marks a transition away from individuals who had monopolized British Indian political
expression and toward a democratization that allowed for the emergence of a plurality of voices.
While the Indian Swaraj League appears to have been relatively short-lived, in existence
for roughly five years, it contributed to a reorientation of Indian political energies in Britain
toward self-sufficiency. The last mention of this organization came in the spring of 1940, in
preparation for May Day, when Suresh (DJ) Vaidya, then secretary of the League, penned a
notice encouraging Indians to join. Here, Vaidya suggested that the organization was founded in
1935 and, as such, functioned as a primary catalyst for the Indian Political Conference held the
following year. Moreover, he reminded the reader that “the membership of the League is
confined to Indians only” in contrast to earlier and competing organizations dedicated to Indian
independence. He also clarified that the decision to admit only Indians was not one based “on
narrow sectarian, racial or other local considerations, but solely with the object of securing that
the decisions and the activities of the League will be in the hands of Indians.” Vaidya insisted
that “the second Imperialist war has brought the forces of British Imperialism into sharp conflict
with the peoples of India,” which, prior to the breach of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, was the routine
anti-war stance endorsed by the Communist International. Vaidya did not dwell on the
circumstances of the war, Soviet Russia’s relationship with Nazi Germany, or the official line of
the Communist International. For him, Indian independence, the excesses of colonial rule, and
the end of imperialism were of paramount importance. By mentioning the Defense of India Act,
which allowed martial rule in India and the suspension of habeas corpus during World War I, he
drew an inherent comparison between British imperialism and German fascism. British rule in
India constituted a “system of exploitation which has forged the chains of our slavery.” Vaidya
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entreats his “compatriots” abroad to join the struggle for freedom; even if, in this brief notice, the
contribution that “we Indians, at present far away from Home” could make is left undefined.50
Understanding that the Communist Party had begun to place less significance on the
struggle against imperialism, especially as the struggle against fascism ramped up in the mid- to
late-1930s, Indian leaders in Britain, while continuing to prioritize an Indian rank and file
membership so that their agenda would not be diluted by other ideological or political concerns,
began to look for new sectors of British politics within which to coordinate. A clear indication of
the rift that was emerging between Indian anti-colonial nationalism and British communism
came in the form of Harry Pollitt’s pamphlet “How to Win the War,” which argued that all
workers were socially, politically, economically, and ideologically bound to support the British
war against fascism. As Andrew Thorpe has pointed out, Pollitt’s position was the product of a
long-term shift within British communism, that mapped onto the priorities of the Communist
International. In short, pro-war communists in Britain facilitated the rise in the “cult of Stalin”
and the concomitant “virulent denunciation of Trotsky” and other anti-war forces.51 The void that
the communists left in their abdication of anti-imperialism was filled by the Independent Labour
Party (ILP). According to Tom Buchanan, the ILP was the “most outspoken voice on imperial
questions in Britain in the later 1930s” both through the establishment of the British Centre
Against Imperialism and by supporting Black and Indian organizations in Britain and struggles
for national liberation abroad.52
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Evidence of the Communist International’s nascent anti-fascism and the frustration that
colonial migrants expressed during the 1930s notwithstanding, the move away from the CPGB
and toward the Fourth International was gradual, partial, and fleeting. Even as the India League
lost its luster, especially among Indian workers outside of London, it continued to serve a
purpose for newer organizations. For instance, the Indian Workers Association, which had been
moribund due to poor leadership and the Coventry Blitz, hosted a joint Independence Day with
the India League in January 1942. Menon attended and addressed the audience about the
Congress’ demand for purna swaraj in 1930 and its continued resonance during the war. Indeed,
Menon’s presence appears to confirm the IPI’s suspicions that the IWA had quickly become one
of the most significant Indian organizations in Britain, which compelled Menon to attend so that
he could attempt extend his influence among Indians in the Midlands.53 Yet, in Menon's absence,
the Midlands remained a hotly contested area where the IWA, the Communist Party, and the
India League contested one another for supremacy. For instance, as a British intelligence officer
had it in April 1942, the Birmingham branch of the India League “is becoming a battle ground
[sic] for the local Communists and Trotskyists” and its local leadership was doing what it could
to minimize Menon’s role in their affairs. Moreover, the Communist Party itself was concerned
about the growing independent influence of VS Sastry and the Indian Workers Association and
sought to take control of the same India League branch in order to stem the tide of Indian
workers who were following Sastry’s lead and giving support to the local Independent Labour
Party and leaving the Communist sphere of influence.54 For its part, the Independent Labour
Party had been making inroads with factory workers in Birmingham and it appears that
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cooperation between the ILP and the IWA was both a matter of shared goals and overlapping
ideology.55
Considering that the CPGB intended to undermine Menon’s leadership in Birmingham
while also attempting to counteract the allure of the Indian Workers Association and the
Independent Labour Party, it sought to make its case to Indian workers in the Midlands through
Surat Ali and his Hindustani Social Club. Intelligence records postulate that Ali’s visit to
Birmingham in April 1942 was “sanctioned, if not prompted, by the CPGB” so that he could
instruct Indian workers there on the Communist position on Indian independence.56 However,
Ali was not an uncritical communist operative among Indians in the Midlands. Instead, in this
moment, his politics and allegiances represented a heterodox orientation toward Party
communism and the Indian anti-war stance. Indeed, his visit to Birmingham appears to have had
the opposite effect to Communist Party hopes. Rather than bolstering support for the League and
the CPGB, May Day events held in the city demonstrated that “The ‘Trotskyist’ Indian Workers
Union seems on the whole to have been more prominent on these occasions then were Menon’s
disciples.”57 Soon after his trip to Birmingham, Ali was at the center of an ideological dispute
with the CPBG during which he accused the Party itself of being non-interventionist, in direct
opposition to the dictates of the Comintern.58 Subsequently, Ali resigned from the Party entirely
when it affirmed that the India League retained official Party support on questions of Indian
independence.59
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Surat Ali, Swaraj House, and the Future of Subject Peoples
Even at the time of his visit to Birmingham, Ali was using the Hindustani Social Club to
coordinate with the Indian political organizations, especially the Indian Workers Association in
Birmingham and the Committee of Indian Congressmen (CIC) in London. While he was
distancing himself from the Communist Party, he began to draw closer to the IWA and,
specifically, to VS Sastry. Initially, Ali sought to work with the CIC, which was organized by PB
Seal and Amiya Nath Bose, the nephew of Netaji Subhas Bose, largely due to geographical
proximity in London. However, Ali was concerned that the CIC followed the pro-Japanese
approach adopted by Subhas Bose and the Indian National Army.60 Therefore, Ali took greater
control of his political ambition by breaking with the CIC and establishing Swaraj House in
1942. Ali enjoined Suresh Vaidya to help manage the organization, which was founded on
militant anti-imperialism and named as if to be the inheritor of the legacy of Shyamji Krishna
Varma’s India House. In its inaugural statement, Ali affirmed that Swaraj House was meant to be
a home for “politically-minded Indians who cherish the freedom of our country and are
supporters of the Indian National Congress.”61 Thus, Swaraj House, like many other Indian
organizations emerging during the war, was a staunch supporter of the Indian National Congress
and it was because of their distrust of Menon’s India League that they grew more and more
frustrated as the League was privileged with the status of INC representative in Britain.
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Surat Ali’s gravitation toward VS Sastry culminated in the establishment of the
Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain (FIAGB) in May 1943. The Federation was to
act as a coordinating committee between Indian organizations that followed similar ideological
lines. By and large, the Federation was an umbrella organization that allowed the Indian Workers
Association and Swaraj House to retain their organizational identity and independence as they
combined their resources and mobilized their membership for joint initiatives. On the founding
of the Federation, the Indian Political Intelligence noted tellingly that “the mere inauguration of
it must be regarded as an achievement for Surat Ali, whose association in office with VS Sastry,
a leading Trotskyist and ILP henchman, is a highly significant indication of the trend of ideas
and activities of Indians in this country.”62 With the Federation, Ali effectively gave Sastry an
expanded platform from which to disseminate his critique.
Under the banner of Swaraj House, Sastry wrote a response to the Government’s White
Paper on India in March 1943 in which he fulminates that “the British Government in India
evidently hopes to whitewash its conduct of the Indian situation before the British public and the
Allied Nations by clumsy reiteration of its own distorted version of the tragic developments in
India.” “It is significant”, he continues, “that the White Paper says nothing about the shootings,
bombings, machine-gunning, wholesale arrests and imprisonments without trial, floggings, and
the imposition of unbearable collective fines on the destitute peasantry comparable only to Nazi
atrocities in occupied Europe.” These comments were reminiscent of the list of complaints issued
by the organizers of the Fifth Indian Political Conference, which also excoriated the British
Government for the “the terror it instituted in the face of the revolutionary struggle.”63 Moreover,
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Sastry’s thoughts on the “problem of the Indian revolution” focused on the flaws of Gandhian
nonviolence and revealed his penchant for permanent revolution by issuing a call for the
immediate arming of the Indian masses. During a Swaraj House meeting in August 1944, Sastry
insisted that “Indians would achieve their independence only by using force.”64 Sastry’s
frustrations with Gandhi were exacerbated by his perception that Gandhi was cooperating with
the British by proposing a path toward partition in his talks with Muhammad Ali Jinnah. Later,
Sastry gave Jinnah’s dissent during the Shimla Conference backhanded praise “for causing its
failure and thus saving India from suicide.”65
In June 1945, Swaraj House, led by Surat Ali, had worked with PAF and WASU to
convene the Subject People's Conference in London. This Conference, also known as the All
Colonial Peoples Conference, is commonly represented as an example of anti-colonial and
nationalist cooperation in London en route to the Manchester Pan-African Congress in October
of that year. Tellingly, historian Leslie James suggests that George Padmore’s “many years of
labour” culminated in the “realization of a large, broad-based pan-African movement” which
manifested as “the British Pan-African Federation and the October Manchester Pan-African
Conference.”66 The convention was purported to be a response to the inaugural conference of the
United Nations held in San Francisco. It afforded Indian, African, and Southeast Asian
organizations in Britain to demand, in unison, an end to imperialism, racism, and discrimination
and the global acknowledgement of national self-determination enshrined in the Atlantic Charter
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of 1941 and the UN Charter of 1945.67 However, the coordination between anticolonial and
nationalist organizations in Britain in preparation for the Subject People’s Conference,
demonstrates that the event moved beyond a narrative of nascent Pan-Africanism in Britain.
Rather it was a step toward the Bandung moment of Afro-Asian solidarity in the post-war world
and anticipated the emergence of the Non-Aligned Movement.68
Swaraj House was vital to the organization and staging of the Subject People’s
Conference. According to Indian Political Intelligence, “all the preliminary ad hoc committee
meetings of the Colonial Conference held in London on 10.6.45 were held at Swaraj House.”69
Thus, the Conference was an expression of trans-colonial solidarities that had been forged in
London and was not exclusively the provenance of African and Caribbean activists. Indeed,
George Padmore had actively coordinated with Swaraj House during the War and members of
Swaraj House, especially Suresh Vaidya, had been working with Padmore since the mid-1930s.
For instance, records show that Padmore attended a celebration meeting at Swaraj House in
celebration of Jawaharlal Nehru’s 55th birthday in November 1944.70 Just over a year later,
Swaraj House hosted the first in a series of demonstrations protesting the use of Indian troops
against the “National Liberation Movements in Indo-China and Indonesia,” which again
demonstrated its links to the Pan-African movement in London. On this occasion, not only did
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Padmore attend, but also WEB DuBois spoke on the failures of British imperialism in Britain
and suggested that “if Britain could do no better than this in two centuries, she should relinquish
her hold on the country and let the Indians see what they could do for themselves.” Both
Padmore and DuBois expressed solidarity between Africa, India, and the people of Southeast
Asia.71
Importantly, the Subject People’s Conference of June 1945 did not mark the fulfillment
of Afro-Asian cooperation in Britain in the 1940s, but rather was a high-water mark of sustained
cooperation throughout the period. Indeed, in October, just after the Manchester Pan-African
Congress, the Coordinating Committee of the Struggle of Subject Peoples hosted a second
Subject People’s Conference at the Farrington Hall in London.72 Further evidence of the
mutuality and reciprocity that these organizations exhibited is embodied in Surat Ali, who not
only was a driving force behind the Subject Peoples’ series of events, but also was one of two
Indian delegates to the Manchester Congress. Indeed, Ali appears to have taken responsibility for
maintaining alliances with Pan-African and Black International organizations after Suresh
Vaidya had returned to India upon his appeal and release. Swaraj House’s Policy Statement of
1945 affirmed its commitment to a “world federation of free nations,” echoing the UN Charter,
by stating that “freedom for India must be a symbol of, and prelude to, the freedom of all other
Asiatic nations under foreign domination.” Upon that foundation, Padmore attended Indian
Independence Day meetings at Swaraj House in January of 1946 and 1947 to “condem[n] British
intervention in Indonesia” and to “deman[d] the immediate cessation of hostilities in Indo-China
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and to the granting of independence to Vietnam.”73 Certainly, the coordination among the British
left, Pan-Africanists, and Indian revolutionaries contributes to the rise of a “spirit of anti-colonial
and anti-imperialist unity” and the mobilization against imperialist incursions in the late-1940s
that moved beyond the territoriality of Africa and India.74
The Indian Workers Association’s Dissidence
While there was a clear Trotskyist trajectory in Indian politics during the war, the
“idiosyncrasies” Punjabi communism were manifest in Britain.75 From its establishment, the
Indian Workers Association was a congeries of disparate political ideologies that made the
intelligence service uneasy. The police and IPI responded to the IWA by developing dossiers on
the “leading personalities” of the association so that “disaffected Indians” might be easily
interned in the event of an invasion. Of the few dozen Indians in Coventry and Birmingham who
routinely attended the Association’s meetings, attention was paid to six: Thakur Singh Basra,
Charan Singh Chima, Karm Singh Overseer, Kartar Singh Nagra, VS Sastry, and Chowdry
Akbar Ali Khan. A demobilized soldier, Thakur Singh Basra was known to subscribe to the
Hindustan Ghadr and was reputed to have been a “very prominent” fundraiser for Udham
Singh’s defense. Charan Singh Chima, the nephew of Karam Singh Chima -- “one of the most
prominent of the Ghadr Party leaders in the Punjab” -- used his uncle’s position to facilitate the
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establishment of the IWA. Karam Singh Overseer was a devotee of Udham Singh and had held a
subscription to Kirti the journal of the Kirti-Kisan Party in Punjab. Kartar Singh Nagra
subscribed to the Kirti Lehar and the Hindustan Ghadr and “had obviously been interested in
revolutionary Sikh activities before he sailed from India.” VS Sastry and Chowdry Akbar Ali
Khan, included in the dossier, were not considered to be orthodox Ghadarites; however, they
coordinated and helped to lead the IWA because their politics overlapped with that movement in
key areas, especially militant anticolonialism and the effort to undermine the British war-effort.76
Public meetings served important functions for the pedagogic mission of the association
because they provided a discrete space to promulgate nationalist and internationalist politics
through rousing speeches, recitation of poetry, chants of inquilab zindabad, and eulogies of
Udham Singh. For instance, at a February 1942 meeting in Bradford, Karam Singh Overseer
proclaimed that Udham Singh “did not care for his own life” and Banta Singh echoed these
remarks and entreated all in attendance that “Everybody should be like Udham Singh. If a man
dies after shooting a man or two, his name will be inscribed in golden words in the pages of
history.” Also, the meeting displayed a deep distrust of the British military apparatus. Banta
Singh noted that Indians had registered for national service but subsequently attempted to attain
the status of Conscientious Objector but were instead jailed for insubordination. Akbar Ali Khan
added to this sentiment but observing that “whenever the British had wanted to make other
countries slaves” they had used Indians to do so. “When Indians can fight for another nation to
make others slaves,” he continued, “then they can fight for themselves.”77 Thus, this event
allowed IWA to echo Punjabi revolutionary sentiment by encouraging Indian soldiers to abandon
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their posts and undermining British imperialism by refusing to maintain the oppression other
colonialized people.
In addition to exalting Udham Singh and imploring Indians to disengage from imperialist
military campaigns, the Indian Workers Association closed ranks with other leftwing Punjabi
organizations by soliciting funds for the Desh Bhagat Sahayak Sabha, which distributed money
to the families of those imprisoned or executed for participating in the Ghadar and Akali
movements in Punjab. Karam Singh Chima, Charan Singh’s uncle, worked closely with this fund
in Punjab and the Indian Workers Association might have begun its existence as the “Indian
Political Prisoners’ Defense Committee” had the war not slowed its development. As early as
1934, the Ghadar Party made special requests for funds, having already distributed nearly Rs.
100,000 from 1922 to 1934, noting that “it is our foremost purpose to help the orphans and the
aged parents of those national heroes who sacrificed themselves to have us freed and to make us
happy.”78 By 1942, the IWA had remitted Rs. 2,000 to aid “the families of the Ghadr party
leaders.”79 Support for the fund was not uncontroversial. Later that year, the Coventry IWA
leadership unilaterally sent “considerable sums” to India without the input of the membership.
Evidently, some argued that such money should be spent primarily on programs to improve
conditions for Indians in Britain, which was a foundational, if competing, concern for the
organization.80 Yet, factional disputes notwithstanding, the IWA continued to send support to the
Desh Bhagat Sahayak Sabha for the duration of the war.
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The heterodoxy of the IWA was also reflected in its leaders. Among them, Charan Singh
Chima’s political activity is exemplary. Chima had become an avowed communist and Party
member prior to reaching out to the Ghadar Party in San Francisco for support in establishing a
branch of that organization in Britain. The cooperation between the Ghadar Party and the
Communist International was vital in the emergence of a militant freedom struggle in Punjab in
the 1920s and 1930s.81 However, after the outbreak of war and the reorientations of the Indian
Workers Association as anti-war and anti-Stalin and the Communist Party of Great Britain as
pro-war and Stalinist, Chima continued to operate within both spheres. What is more remarkable,
perhaps, is that, while serving as the President of the Coventry branch of the Indian Workers
Association in 1943, he also presided over the newly organized Coventry branch of Menon’s
India League, which, by then, was anathema to both the IWA and the Communist Party.82
Considering that the Birmingham branch of the India League had some years previously
started acting independently of Krishna Menon in London, there is little reason to suspect that
Chima had become in any sense a lackey of the League, a votary of its policies, or a defender of
its prominence. Rather, since he continued to share the stage with Sastry and other leaders of the
Indian Workers Association throughout this period, there is reason to believe that he intended to
use the name and resources of the India League for other purposes. To be sure, Chima’s
affiliation with the Indian Workers Association was long-term and resilient. Indeed, Chima
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should be remembered as not only one of the founders of the Association but one of the very few
who served in a leadership capacity in the interwar and postwar iterations of the organization,
after many of his compatriots would have returned to India or retired from politics.83 Therefore,
his status in the League, though it caused some confusion in the intelligence community, did not
suggest a break with the priorities of the IWA or the Federation of Indian Associations in Great
Britain.
Another example of the uneven and incomplete Trotskyism among Indian activists in
Britain was the willingness of Sastry’s IWA to make alliances with the Communist Party out of
political expediency while continuing to criticize its pro-war position as imperialist apology.
Prompted by the circumstances of the Bengal Famine, the IWA began attending and interrupting
public addresses by LS Amery, who at the time was both the Secretary of State of India as well
as a Member of Parliament for the Sparkbrook constituency of Birmingham. During these
demonstrations, Indians and other members of the RCP demanded that the Government confront
its role in the systematic deprivation of Bengal and redirection of foodstuffs to the war effort. 84
At a meeting held in October 1943, Sastry led chants against Amery and the British Government
and demanded the “re-opening of negotiations with the Indian leaders, also the release of
political prisoners.” Moreover, the IWA distributed its flier “British Imperialism Starves Indian
Masses,” wherein the Association argued that “the present famine is deliberately caused to
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destroy the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants.”85 Throughout the following
year, Sastry organized a series of “Quit India” demonstrations that targeted Amery’s public
events. In January 1944, a contingent from the Bradford branch of the IWA traveled to York
again to disrupt public comments about British policy for India and the end of the famine.86
Later, the IPI reported that “Sastry has about 50 Indian Volunteers who are ready to give Mr.
Amery a hostile reception when he next addresses a meeting at Birmingham.”
The mobilization of Indians in the Midlands took on a new significance during the
general election campaign of 1945. Sparkbrook was due to elect a parliamentary representative.
LS Amery was the incumbent and he was challenged by Percy Shurmer from the Labour Party
and the Communist Rajani Palme Dutt. As the initiatives of the Indian Workers Association over
the preceding year suggest, Amery’s seat was particularly vulnerable due to his perceived
culpability during the famine. Dutt was prepared to seize that mobilization as a candidate for
parliament and he made a specific entreaty to the electorate in Birmingham, which was
particularly effective among Indians there. In a campaign publication, Dutt disclaimed Amery’s
tenure as Secretary of State for India as a “crime against democracy.”87 His pamphlet “Mr.
Amery’s Record,” reaffirmed the belief that the Secretary of State for India shared responsibility
“for the grave administrative shortcomings” that caused the famine.88 In a letter to the
Birmingham Post from June 1945, Dutt insisted that responding to famine conditions was a
secondary concern to the circumstances that led to it in the first place. He impugned Amery for
the “failure to fulfil[l] the most elementary responsibilities of Governmental wartime economic
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organization and control in relation to food supplies, distribution and prices;” a failure that
caused more than one million deaths by starvation in 1943.89 Even though there were ideological
differences between Sastry’s Revolutionary Communist Party and Dutt’s allegiance to the
Communist International that had previously caused tensions between these organizations, the
Indian Workers Association instructed its membership to vote for Dutt in the Sparkbrook contest
while elsewhere supporting Labour.90
The Vaidya Affair: Conscription and the Morality of Opposition
Indians in Britain joined with their compatriots in India to deride the war effort along
with any suggestion that Indians ought to contribute. As many anti-conscription meetings were
held in Punjab after Britain declared war against the Axis on behalf of India, the sentiment was
echoed in Britain among the many demobilized Indian soldiers who had made their way to
Britain after serving in World War I. Among the raisons d’etre for the mushrooming of Indian
organizations in Britain in the late interwar period was to protect colonial subjects, especially
Indians, from conscription. Because these organizations specialized in the welfare of Indians
abroad, they developed acumen in the various plausible methods of avoiding conscription.
Through this shared value these Indian organizations drew closer to the Revolutionary
Communist Party and the Independent Labour Party. The most successful option to avoid
conscription was to become a Conscientious Objector based on the acceptable, if misinformed,
premise that South Asian religious traditions unanimously abjured violence.91 The services of the
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Indian Workers Association, Swaraj House, and the Committee of Indian Congressmen were
sought out by Indians in Britain who hoped to avoid conscription under the terms of the National
Service Act. It was Suresh (DJ) Vaidya’s determination to avoid service that became a cause
celebre for those intending to highlight the treatment, and resistance, of Indian subjects in the
metropole.
Having first come to the attention of British surveillance operatives via the relatively
dormant and short-lived Indian Swaraj League, Suresh Vaidya became a prominent figure in
war-time Indian political agitation throughout Britain as one of the organizers of Swaraj House
and the Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain. In 1944, however, he gained notoriety
after he was Court Martialed for “failing to comply with his Calling-up notice.”92 Considering
that, since he was a well-connected and well-informed activist, he would have been aware of the
normal practice of registering as a Conscientious Objector, Vaidya’s transgression seems to have
been designed as a spectacle to test the idea that Indians should be subject to conscription. In the
short-term, the decision had a visible impact. In late-January, the Independent Labour Party, the
Indian Freedom Campaign Committee, and Swaraj House joined forces on Indian Independence
Day and staged a protest to demand Vaidya’s release. During the event, Dr. CB Vakil moved a
resolution decrying the National Service Act and avowing that “this meeting of Indians and their
friends...expressed deep resentment at the way in which Indians are being coerced into joining
the British Army, as Indians are not morally bound to help Britain.”93 The legality of
conscription was not questioned but Vaidya’s act of defiance created space to make an ethical
argument against serving in the British Army and fighting for the perpetuation of the empire.
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Subsequently the Advisory Council and Standing Committee of Swaraj House issued a
statement on the “Conscription of Indians Resident in Great Britain,” to consider the position
that Indians in Britain should take in response to the juridico-legal apparatus of conscription and
objection. According to the authors, the fight against conscription is emblematic of the struggle
for national sovereignty and therefore resistance should not be confined to parameters set by the
British Government”
The Conscientious Objectors Tribunals are, by their statutory terms of reference,
restricted to consideration of exemption from military service solely on objections based
on moral and religious grounds. They are therefore not competent to deal with the special
case of Indians.94
In other words, while Swaraj House had assisted some in obtaining Conscientious Objector
status, Indian activists should declaim conscription on political grounds, reject constitutionalism,
and refuse to work within framework erected by their oppressors. “The Indian people as a whole
do not accept the pacifist position,” the authors of the statement note, offering useful clarification
on what circumstances should be met so that Indians might contribute to the Allied war effort.
Instead, Indians “are anxious to throw their full moral and material resources in the battle against
Fascism on the basis of a treaty of military alliance between a Free India on the one hand and the
United Nations on the other.” This is to say that the war effort was not fundamentally flawed but
that it was untenable for colonized peoples to contribute to the perpetuation of their oppression.
Therefore, only as a free people should Indians enlist in an Indian Army to fight fascism. This
position emphasized that the anti-war stance of many Indians in Britain was tied to antiimperialism. This stance was aligned with the Fourth International perspective on World War II
as an imperialist war. Moreover, Trotskyists also believed in just war and revolutionary violence
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rather than pacifism. Thus, British Trotskyists and Indian activists maintained their anti-war
position barring immediate and radical changes in global power relations and capitalist
expansion.
Though Vaidya’s case was first taken up by his colleagues within Swaraj House, their
connections to the Independent Labour Party facilitated greater awareness of his protest. In
January 1944, George Orwell contributed a commentary on the case for The Tribune. Here,
Orwell espoused the commonly held view that conscripting colonial subjects was a futile
exercise as it could only result in a “few score extra soldiers” who would have no measurable
impact on the war effort. Moreover, by compelling those who object “you”, the British
Government, “antagonize[s] the entire Indian community in Britain -- for no Indian, whatever his
views, admits that Britain had the right to declare war on India’s behalf or has the right to impose
compulsory service on Indians.”95
Vaidya was imprisoned in the Canterbury Jail for the duration of his trial, during which
he was represented by Fenner Brockway. In June, the Appellate Tribunal reviewing his Court
Martial recommended Vaidya’s discharge from the army. Brockway clarified in a letter to the
Tribune that the Tribunal “has taken a broad view in recognising that Indian Nationalism can be
a ground for conscientious objection to military service.”96 Swaraj House hosted an event to
celebrate his release. “Miss Datta,” who presided over the meeting, proclaimed that “India had
need of more men like [Vaidya]. It was examples like his which would inspire Indians to
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continue the fight against British Imperialism.” Dr Kumria, a long-time co-agitator of Vaidya’s,
then commended him for the successful opposition to conscription on “political grounds,”
suggesting that his release and his registration as Conscientious Objector was based on his
determination to fight in the war only as a citizen of an independent India, rather than on a plea
of religious or moral objection to war. With this, Kumria acknowledged that Vaidya had set a
precedent for other Indians to resist conscription on political grounds.97
Conclusion
The mobilization of Indian anti-colonial activists and Fourth International organizations
against the war was expressed in the belief that nations should have the power to exercise selfdetermination regarding declarations of war. Over the course of the conflict, it became clear to
some that the war sought “the redevision of the colonial world” and that resistance to imperialist
war in one instance should lead to struggles against the military imposition of colonial power
anywhere. Such resistance, according to Ajit Roy, a colleague of VS Sastry’s at Socialist Appeal
and the Revolutionary Communist Party, was “in defense of the colonial revolution.”98 In 1948,
Roy insisted that the defense of the colonial revolution required more than narrowly nationalist
campaigns of liberation. Indeed, the struggle against imperialist dispossession anywhere was
sustained by the recognition that the same force was at work in all colonial contexts. “By the
slaughter of the Indonesians,” Roy observed, “they [British imperialists] hope to teach a lesson to
the peoples of Burma, Malaya, and India whose demands for freedom are daily becoming more
insistent.”99 Thus, by the end of the 1940s, self-described subject peoples in London had
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managed to orient themselves away from British party politics, while negotiating the
contributions of white allies, and more fully toward the revolutions of the colonized world.
Although Fourth International groups strived to incorporate colonial labor into their
political platforms, the War provided an opportunity for deeper cooperation between
organizations representing national liberation movements in India, Africa, the Caribbean, and
Southeast Asia. In this way, the anti-war position of Trotskyists and sympathizers with the Indian
National Congress Party, which was based on opposition to capitalist exploitation at the root of
imperialism, was transformed into a struggle against colonialism and a defense of the rights of
nations to self-determination. Nationalist movements had been working in tandem in London for
decades, but the shift in organizational philosophies to prioritize membership of people from the
colonies created momentum for groups like the Pan-African Federation (PAF), the West African
Students Union (WASU), the Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain, and others to
interact directly, Though the Fifth Indian Political Conference was convened under the auspices
of the of the Communist Party of Great Britain and the League Against Imperialism in 1936, the
participation of Rajani Palme Dutt and George Padmore anticipated postwar shifts. By the mid1940s black and Indian organizations managed to retain the support of British trade unionism
and the labor movement while displacing the leadership role they had held.
From the confluence of leftist politics in interwar Britain to their disintegration during the
war, the post-war period allowed for a further recombination of the forces that animated
international anticolonialism. The anti-war stance of the Fourth International re-emerged as
Third Worldism in the early years of the Cold War. Though anticipated by myriad activists and
theorists, the Third World was erected in opposition to the capitalist world led by the United
States and the Soviet communist sphere of influence. It was envisioned as a world of cooperation
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among colonial and decolonial states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. By the early 1960s,
Indians in Britain demonstrated the disparate political paths of Third Worldism. On one hand, the
politics of friendship the emerged out of the African-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955
resonated in the policies and declarations of the Indian Workers Association. On the other hand,
Indians on the far left rebuked the idea of non-alignment and agitated for a clearer revolutionary
posture from postcolonial subjects and the British labor movement. Within this more radical
strain, Maoist insurgency, characterized by the rural revolution and emblematic of a rising Asian
world power that would contest the United States and the USSR, became a mobilizing force. The
momentum that Bandung represented for a diffuse vision for global power was anticipated by
Indians in Britain during World War II who sought a revolutionary path that circumvented
Russia and allowed for a worldview that permitted colonial people to operate outside of the
ideological constraints of Stalinism.

Chapter 6
Peaceful Cooperation and The Spirit of Bandung in the Era of Mass Migration
In the years immediately following World War II, and especially in the aftermath of the
establishment of India and Pakistan in 1947, anticolonial theorists and organizers sought to
mobilize people in support of national liberation movements and against racial discrimination in
Europe and the United States. To that end, in April 1955, Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, and
Pakistan hosted an additional twenty-four African, Asian, and Arab countries at the AsianAfrican Conference for International Order in Bandung, Indonesia. This gathering presented
itself as a parallel entity to the United Nations Organization. The intergovernmental norms that
the UNO represented were fully embraced by the Bandung conference to the point that the
participating countries insisted on automatic membership in the Organization for all states that
satisfied criteria for admission. By extension, considering the global power imbalance, the
Conference contended that more African and Asian states should be given non-permanent seats
on the Security Council. The Conference noted with grave concern the prospects of nuclear
holocaust and insisted the denuclearization was imperative in pursuit of international peace and
cooperation.1 In addition to the attempt to incorporate postcolonial states into the international
order and the pursuit to create new states by supporting nationalist struggles, the Bandung
Conference focused on the urgency of international human rights that was enshrined in the
United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In short, an
internationally codified notion of human rights was an organizing concern for Bandung that was
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bequeathed to activists in Britain who operated within a politico-legal framework in their
opposition to colonialism and racism.2
The hosts structured the Bandung meeting around the Five Principles for the Promotion
of World Peace which had been approved by China and India at Beijing in 1954 to normalize
“trade and intercourse” between the two states with respect to Tibet.3 These Principles, mutual
respect for territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in internal
affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, were based on the idea of the
panchashila, which was an intentional gesture toward Buddhist ecumenicism across South and
East Asia.4 Guided by the Five Principles, the hosts hoped to expand regional cooperation across
the Asian-African world as a way of securing peace and decolonization beyond the geopolitical
priorities of the United States or Soviet spheres of influence during the Cold War.
Though anti-colonialism and anti-racism were the dual guiding political initiatives at
Bandung,5 the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were deployed in the interest of regional
cooperation. At a time when national boundaries had only recently been drawn or were still
being sketched, the integrity of national territory was a paramount concern for national
governments. Prior to the Conference, many in attendance viewed China as the chief threat to
each of the Five Principles. But, as Arif Dirlik suggests, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai was
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able to assuage those fears and transform regional opinion from hostility to “hopeful
acceptance.”6 With China’s participation, the Final Communique highlighted economic
cooperation in the region, which was intended as a counterweight to American and Soviet
investments in the region, and cultural cooperation and exchange intended to strengthen the
bonds within the region in the period of decolonization.
While much has been written on the priorities and disagreements of the Bandung
Conference and the reactions of western governments,7 this chapter will contribute to emerging
scholarship on the resonance of Bandung that followed the conference’s Final Communique as it
circulated across the postcolonial world and mobilized racialized travelers throughout Europe.8
This chapter will highlight the declarations made in the Final Communique because, for
economic migrants, that document was the most widely available resource on the conference
even if, as some have argued, it is not a full or even accurate depiction of the proceedings
themselves.9 Although cooperation between migrants and European anticolonial activists was not
new in the postwar period, Bandung infused the movement with a new lexicon of peace and
friendship. Thus, the political alliances of Commonwealth migrants in Britain in the 1950s and
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1960s must be viewed through the prism of Bandung as an event that helped to structure antiracism and anti-imperialism in Britain.
Among the most important contributions of Bandung was the goal of creating a third way
between USA and the USSR that had not previously animated action. Thus, this chapter begins
in the period just prior to mass migration to Britain from the Commonwealth with the life and
writings of Chowdry Akbar Ali Khan, who anticipated the need for an Asian core of nations to
resist American and Russian hegemonies. Before exploring Bandung political action in Britain,
this chapter examines the era of mass migration and immigration control legislation both to
concretely establish migration patterns in the 1950s as well as to focus attention on antiimmigrant rhetoric and racial discrimination that necessitated migrant political organization.
Ultimately, this chapter will highlight episodes of resistance that were rooted in inter-cultural
cooperation and non-violence. Migrants politics in the postwar period sought to assert human
rights norms and to demand state protections and legal reform against racial violence. By
charting the theory and praxis of these principles within the politics and activism of Indian
migrants in Britain between 1947 and 1965, this chapter will demonstrate the ways in which the
spirit of Bandung was brought to British shores by Commonwealth migrants in pursuit of
international cooperation within a constitutionalist political framework.
The Political Writings of Chowdry Akbar Ali Khan
Among the most prominent organizers of Indian workers and activists in 1940s Britain,
Chowdry Akbar Ali Khan spent the decade after the creation of independent India and Pakistan
developing a theory for Bandung politics that would inform South Asian activism in the 1950s
and early 1960s. Throughout World War II, Khan held a high position within the Coventry
section of the Indian Workers Association. During the reorganization of the Association in 1941-
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42, Khan lived with VS Sastry and Thakur Singh Basra in Coventry.10 Along with his
housemates and the co-organizers of the Association, Khan was considered potentially dangerous
and placed on the list of Indians in Birmingham who should be incarcerated in case of a Nazi
invasion.11 When he first came to the notice of British intelligence agents, Khan appeared to be
of “somewhat superior education” and motivated to help Indians avoid conscription. “Although
he is comparatively young,” observed an Indian Political Intelligence note, “he seems to
command considerable influence among Indian Muhammadans.”12
Near the end of the war, Khan became alienated from the leadership of the IWA and the
Federation of Indian Associations in Great Britain. He moved to London and organized a new
Association, which he called the Mazdoor Majlis, entrenching his political power and extending
the network of organized South Asian workers into Southeast England. According to IPI, Khan’s
London organization was hostile to the IWA in the Midlands and published a few issues of
“Indian Worker,” a newsletter that criticized the IWA leadership in Coventry.13 Apart from
screening Hindi films to crowds of hundreds of Indian seamen and workers,14 Khan’s organizing
took shape in affiliation with the Committee of Indian Congressmen (CIC), which was led by
Amiya Nath Bose, Subhas Chandra Bose’s nephew, and PB Seal. His newfound allies were
ostensibly a strange choice. Bose and Seal had met with Khan and Thakur Singh Basra in
December 1942 about consolidating the IWA and CIC but were rebuffed.15 Thus, in moving to
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London Khan had not only distanced himself from the Birmingham core of Indian working-class
politics in Britain, but he also considered new modes of political activity. His association with
Bose and Seal was remarkable because of their tacit support for the Nazis and Japanese as a path
for Indian independence. He also became more vocally sympathetic to the Soviet Union. In May
1945, Khan wrote a congratulatory note to Stalin: “We rejoice at the victory of the Red Army –
the army of liberation of the oppressed nations. We rejoice at the triumph of socialism over
fascism. We hope that this march of socialism will be triumphant all over the world, and crush
imperialism too, which breeds war and thrives on exploitation of the subject nations.”16 His
support for Stalin and the Red Army in defeat of fascism was anathema to VS Sastry, leader of
the IWA in Birmingham and active contributor to the Trotskyist left in Britain, who believed that
the Soviet Union had betrayed the anti-colonial movement by supporting the British Empire’s
war effort.17
The future of a united independent India was a mobilizing force for many Indian
nationalists, regardless of religious identity or regional heritage, because, in part, it was
fundamentally anticolonial. In 1944, a year after dissociating with the Coventry group, Khan was
again elected to the presidency in Coventry over Dhantu Ram. Curiously, the IPI suggests that
the factions were split by religion, where the Sikhs voted for Khan, a Muslim, and the Muslims
voted for Ram, a Hindu. In this case, it would appear, in contrast to IPI’s interpretation, that
Muslims voted for Ram because he was more supportive of the British during a time when, in
support of the Pakistan Plan, Muslims had pledged loyalty to the British Government and refused
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to cooperate with “anti-British” Sikhs.18 Khan, described in September 1944 as “the bitter antiPakistan pamphleteer,” was welcomed back into the leadership of the IWA by Sikhs in Coventry
who rejected the partition plan.19 The fact that Khan’s political fortunes were tied in large
measure to a worldview that repudiated the arbitrary power of a tyrannical regime foreshadows
the trajectory of his postwar career as a pamphleteer and critic of colonial oppression.
It should be noted that opposition to Pakistan in the mid-1940s was not only a question of
communalism. Chowdry Akbar Ali Khan worked with the admittedly right-wing Committee of
Indian Congressmen and Amir Shah in December 1944 to establish an Anti-Pakistan
Committee.20 Furthermore, at an IWA conference held in conjunction with the British Center
Against Imperialism, Nizam-ud-din asserted that the Muslim League served to “create disunity
amongst Muslims in Great Britain.” The League’s failure was evident in the broad support that
South Asian Muslims in Britain gave to the Indian National Congress prior to partition. 21
As a polemicist and organizer, Khan stitched together his disdain for the Mountbatten
plan for partition with a sustained critique of imperialism throughout Africa and Asia.
Demonstrating against partition did not necessarily indicate religious antagonism; rather, it
signified a principled opposition to British imperialism and communalism. In early January
1946, his pamphlet “Might is Right” came to IPI’s attention, who, in turn, lamented that it
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“missed no opportunity to sling mud at Britain and the British Empire.”22 At the annual general
meeting of the London IWA, Khan insisted that “the Indian Workers Association had always
advocated the establishment of an Indian socialist republic” that was free of communal
prejudice.23 In June 1947, Khan chaired a protest meeting in Coventry convening nearly 100
Sikhs and Muslims to voice opposition to partition. During this meeting, Khan, a native of
Gujranwala in what would become Pakistani Punjab, clarified that his opposition to partition was
personal and that he “regretted the division of his home province” and that he “would never pay
allegiance to any government formed by narrow-minded communalists.”24 Indeed, the method of
partition itself was rejected as an imperialist technique. Jan Mohamed, who chaired the IWA
conference in Birmingham in June 1947, addressed a crowd of nearly 300 and said that he
“would not tolerate the ‘Ulsterisation’ of India.”25 In his pamphlet Auf Wiedersehen, Khan
observed not just that “the vivisection of the Indian mainland is in progress today,” but that
“European imperialism is following the same course everywhere.”26 He echoed the anticolonial
movement in Britain by lambasting the commonalities of imperial powers: “Having been suckled
with the same milk of exploitation of colonial peoples and heartless drive for huge profits all
imperialists are blood brothers.”27
For Khan, India was the model for national self-determination across the colonized
world. “Sometime or other in history the role of taking up the cause of the oppressed people has
been the care of one nation or other,” he posited in August 14/15. It was France during the
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American Revolution and the United States since then. “Today it has fallen to the lot of India to
give fillip to the liberation movements.”28 In another pamphlet from 1953, he argued that “the
freedom of the subcontinent of India has broken the backbone of imperialism and set the forces
of liberty and emancipation free in the occupied parts of Asia and in Africa.” he cited the Mau
uprising in Kenya as evidence of the “forces of liberty and emancipation” in Africa. Believing
that the Mau Mau uprising was a justified resistance to “the colour cult” imposed by the
European ruling class, he asked “who would twist the events of history to differentiate between
the guerrillas fighting against the Nazis in the occupied countries of Europe and the Kikuyu
rising against British Imperialism?”29 In a call to arms against the treatment of the Kikuyu in
Kenya, Khan reiterated the view that imperialism and fascism were ideologies of violence and
domination. Furthermore, in Storm Bound he observed that “imperialism is taking cover behind
the word ‘Communism’ to hide its own hideous rapaciousness.”30 Though Khan rejected Soviet
imperialism, he details with acuity the way in which imperialist administrations use communism
as an excuse for continued interference: “America and her associates claim to be champions of
human rights in the eastern European countries [against Soviet involvement], but the same rights
are being denied by them to the peoples of Asia and Africa.”31
In the era of decolonization, Khan anticipated that African and Asian states would need
to reverse the trend of fragmentation and partition and unite to protect their interests. This belief
in consolidation is resonant throughout the pamphlets that he published in the decade after Indian
independence. While accusing Pakistan of “[h]aving brought an unforgivable calamity upon the
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Muslim inhabitants of the East Punjab,” in his Indian Twins from December 1947, Khan holds
out hope for reunification “so that a sound foundation of federating all Asian countries be laid.”32
In The Subcontinent Today, which he published in 1955 just months after the conclusion of the
Bandung Conference, Khan compared the economic development of India and Pakistan and he
suggested that partition was to blame for many of the problems in both counties. Thus, he
implored them to “come nearer each other to form a sort of confederation, a nucleus for the rest
of the Asian and African countries to coalesce.”33 Yet, continued tensions between India and
Pakistan undermined not only the Bandung injunction for peaceful coexistence, but also, Khan
believed, India’s potential as the “centre of a third bloc” to balance the Soviet Union and the
United States.34 Khan’s writings present a theory of Bandung politics that were to be pursued by
South Asian migrants in the era of mass migration. In the years that Khan was most prolific,
there remained a small population of India-born workers in Britain. But, as the economy reached
full employment and British industry and services sought labour around the world to come and
contribute to its rebuilding, Khan’s theory was operationalized.
Immigration Control: Solving an Imaginary Crisis
The era of mass migration and migrant politics in 1960s Britain were both shaped by the
move toward immigration control legislation by the British Government in the late 1950s.
Threats of immigration control contribute in large measure to the numbers of South Asian
immigrants coming to Britain in the first years of the decade who sought to “beat the ban.” The
perception that immigration control unfairly targeted nonwhite Commonwealth migrants,
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migrants from Canada, Australia, and other “old” Commonwealth countries were exempted, was
foundational to migrant activism. Prior to exploring the particular dynamics of migrant political
behavior as it was shaped by the priorities of Bandung, this section will examine the history of
the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962 and provide a gloss of the alternative strategies that
were considered, the rationales for the Act, and the domestic criticism and retrospective
considerations of the Act’s achievements that began to emerge in 1965. By the mid-1960s it
became clear that Harold Wilson’s Labour Government would retain, and augment, restrictions
imposed by its Conservative predecessor.
The Government, unsatisfied that South Asian and Afro-Caribbean people had continued
to arrive in Britain, noting that immigration from India and Pakistan had “doubled and trebled,
respectively, during the previous two years,” despite non-legislative attempts to limit
immigration, introduced the Commonwealth Immigrants Act for debate on 1 November 1961
and enacted it on 1 July 1962.35 The Act established a voucher scheme for would-be immigrants,
category A for those coming with genuine job offers, category B for those coming with special
skills, category C for those coming without a guaranteed job and without special skills. By June
1964, according to a background note on the act distributed by the Commonwealth Relations
Office (CRO), “there were some 300,000 applications outstanding for Cat. C vouchers, of which
some 90% came from Indians and Pakistanis.” This statistic demonstrates both the inefficiency
of the system at processing voucher applications and the determination of South Asians to come
to Britain and work. Although there was initial criticism of the Act in government, the CRO
satisfied itself that “immigration controls have been operated on a non-discriminatory basis as
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well as much more liberally and humanely than was originally feared, criticism of the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in other parts of the Commonwealth has ceased.”36 This
statement ignores the sustained campaign against the ban on cross-border migration that was led
by recent migrants from South Asia and the Caribbean.
Though the Commonwealth Relations Office defended the Commonwealth Immigrants
Act, it did not believe that it was the ideal or inevitable solution for Britain’s stated population
problems. For the duration of the 1950s, Government ministers sought a different course. In
April 1958, AW Snelling, Commonwealth Relations Officer, wrote to RWD Fowler in Karachi
insisting that “we are determined to put a stop to the wave of immigration from Pakistan into this
country without, unless absolutely necessary, resorting to legislation.”37 A year later, a Working
Party on Commonwealth immigration reported to the Home Office that, believing the situation to
be manageable, “there was no pressing demand for the imposition of controls over the number of
immigrants arriving in this country.”38 In the immediate post-war period, the British government
continued to focus on the Punjabi peddler community as the most acute immigration concern that
South Asia presented. But at this time, the government did not believe that the South Asian
population was overwhelming; rather, it complained, as usual, that peddlers constituted
undesirable migrants for a vague set of reasons.39
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Because of British concerns, the Indian government had attempted to restrict the issue of
passports to would-be migrant workers, reserving the privilege of travel for social and economic
elites. In 1958, Ranbir Singh, Chief Passport Officer for the Government of India, distributed a
“Note on the Government of India’s Policy in Relation to the Issue of Passports for the UK with
particular reference to the migration of Indians,” which was reminiscent of the general
prohibition on the issue of passports working-class Indians that was issued in 1931. In his Note,
Singh noted that in “early in 1955 a firm directive was issued by the Ministry of External Affairs
which had the immediate effect of inhibiting and, but for a few marginal cases pertaining to
forgeries and other types of illicit traffic, preventing the migration to England of Indian nationals
with low educational and financial qualification -- particularly those who were potential peddlers
and hawkers.” Ranbir Singh continued that “as a matter of course, Regional Passport Officers do
not issue passports to those persons who, having educational qualifications less than that of a
graduate and being patently possessed of very limited financial means, seek to go to the U.K. for
employment or allegedly for study or for any other purpose.” Even if, Singh admitted, “some
miscreants have been caught,” he refused to agree with the UK Commissioner’s opinion that
undesirable migration was a commonplace occurrence and, instead, insisted that “illicit
traffic...remains very marginal.”40 The Acting High Commissioner in Delhi sent a telegram to the
Commonwealth Relations Office in November 1958 praising India’s efforts to undermine the
mobility of “undesirable persons” with the establishment of a new protocol for the issue of
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passports. This policy stated that the applicant must provide assurances against requiring state
funds for repatriation in the event of destitution abroad.41
The pretext, then, for restrictive immigration legislation appears, prima facie, based on
the economic strain that nonwhite Commonwealth citizens put on Britain. Concerns over
unemployment, destitution, and repatriation, mixed with the notion that the country was being
overwhelmed by migrants in the 1950s resound in the public narrative that the government
constructed. The propaganda campaign that went into effect in 1958 aimed to discourage people
from migrating from India and Pakistan because of the difficulty that they would experience in
their search for work. In 1961, the Working Party on Commonwealth Immigration reported that
15,700 migrants from India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean arrived in Britain in August of that
year. Yet, “despite this enormous influx it remains true that there is remarkably little
unemployment amongst the immigrants.”42 An additional report by the Working Party observes
that migrants were engaged in industries “where there is an acute labour shortage” and migrants,
therefore, “make a contribution to the productive capacity of the economy.”43 Correspondence
between the Department of Employment and regional offices of the Ministry of Labour give
additional details about the employment of Commonwealth migrants. In these letters,
employment patterns emerge demonstrating the importance of Commonwealth migrants to local
transport and other city services as well as manufacturing and hospital staff. According to the
London and South Eastern Regional Office, “this region was significantly reliant on male
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‘coloured labour’.”44 In addition to the admission that many industries relied on Commonwealth
labour, Exchange Managers later admitted to the Ministry of Labour that “when immigrants first
arrived in a locality there was a general reluctance amongst employers to be the first to engage
them.” Thus, Employment Exchange Managers confirmed that migrants were not unemployed
due to any lack of opportunity or willingness to work but rather because employers colluded
against them.45
Even though the levels of migration from South Asia to Britain were both manageable
and necessary for the British economy, the British Government was determined to reduce to the
lowest possible amount the numbers of Indians and Pakistanis moving to Britain. In April 1958,
IC Edwards, Commonwealth Relations Officer in the Information Department, wrote an Intradepartmental missive to Benjamin Cockram about a strategy to disseminate propaganda “to
discourage the flow of Immigrants” from India and Pakistan.46 Of particular concern, according
to CW Dixon, was to dissuade “unskilled uneducated labourers...migrating to this country and
swelling the ranks of the unemployed” Yet, Dixon admitted that he did not know how many
South Asian migrants were unemployed and observed that “our real need therefore is to have
statistics of the numbers of Indians and Pakistanis who are unemployed.”47 In other words, the
Government sought to solve a problem that it had no proof existed. Malcolm MacDonald, UK
High Commissioner in India, emphasized that the task was all the more difficult because “we
have painted for so many years, through our Information Services, a bright picture of life in the
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United Kingdom, it is obviously impossible and it would be wrong for us to put this process into
sharp reverse.”48 Yet, Gilbert Laithwaite, Permanent Under-secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations, observed in a note to MacDonald, because “the information
machinery should be used to bring home to a particular section of the Indian public the fact that
life in the United Kingdom for the unskilled immigrant is, in the present economic situation,
likely to prove hard and difficult” without undermining the message of “economic progress and
advance.” Accordingly, in the summer of 1958, the Information Department drafted nine articles
for the English, Punjabi and Urdu press in India, with titles such as “Too many chase too few
jobs” (13 May 1958), “From Rawalpindi to Birmingham but no job” (16 May 1958), and “No
work for the tailor from Ludhiana” (18 June 1958), that intended to discourage migration with a
targeted depiction of economic hardship for unskilled workers.
The net effect of the propaganda campaign itself seems to have had, at best, marginal
results. The CRO recognized that the style of feature that the Information Services had produced
was not likely to get a warm reception by Indian newspaper editors who “reject anything they
feel to be propaganda.” Therefore, entire draft articles had to be scrapped because the tone and
message were “too vague and rhetorical, and we still feel that this approach is so contrived and
artificial that Indian editors would not only reject it but might even find it offensive.” A
representative article of this sort, initially approved by the Central Office of Information before
protests came from officials in India, concludes that “these pseudo-adventurers,” as the article
refers to migrant workers, “must be saved from their own enthusiasm for the sake of themselves
and their families.”49 Moreover, information gleaned from Indian officials indicated that the
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depiction of the British ability to absorb new labour made it appear stagnant. According to the
Director of Publicity in the Ministry of External Affairs for the Government of India, the antimigration propaganda was seized on by Communists in Punjab as “a true reflection of what life
throughout the capitalist countries has become. Rising unemployment, rapacious landladies,
colour-bar, poor and unsuitable food, bad health, and all are grist to the mill of the Communist
propagandist.”50
Not only did the propaganda create a negative view of the British economy and receive
criticism from South Asian stakeholders, it also seems to have intentionally obfuscated popular
sentiment about Commonwealth migration from India, Pakistan, and the Caribbean. During
postwar reconstruction and full employment, sessile and vagile workers were readily soaked up
by British industry and city services. Thus, regardless of the attempt to discourage South Asians
from migrating purely on threat of poor employment prospects, a memo on the Commonwealth
Immigrants Act of 1962 issued by the Labour Department in 1965 performed a feat of selective
memory and remembered that
the restriction of immigration has never been argued on manpower grounds. There is still
an unsatisfied demand for labour; certain occupations have come to rely on a flow of
immigrant workers; and low unemployment figures show that immigrants are absorbed
into employment. Restriction have been based on social (housing, health, education,
public order, etc.) considerations rather than on the manpower position, and decisions on
immigration must depend on weighing these factors against our manpower needs.”51
Perhaps it is because the Office of Information sought, in 1958, to deter migrants by using
empirically problematic information rather than saying, as was routine in intra-departmental
memos, that Commonwealth migrants faced significant and unyielding racial stigma in most
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parts of the country that the Government was perceived as blaming Commonwealth migrants for
undermining British prosperity in a period of economic stagnation.
For the CRO in the mid-1960s, the reason for immigration control legislation was
because the government believed that nonwhite migrants were not welcome in Great Britain and
limiting their arrivals was the best way to maintain law and order. As A. Sivanandan has
suggested, scapegoating Commonwealth migrants, as this rationale does, facilitated the
emergence of white nationalist organizations and normalized violence against black and brown
residents.52 The propaganda campaign began in the same year as the racial violence at Notting
Hill and Nottingham, which made the uncertainties of a multi-racial society urgent questions for
policymakers. The urge to restrict nonwhite migrants was rooted in hopes of allaying the “acute
social tensions” that had emerged in the latter part of the decade.53 The presence of a nonwhite
workforce led to vociferous protests by white workers across the country. According to JC Healy
of the London and South Eastern Regional Office of the Ministry of Labour, “Many welldisposed employers who have tried to avoid a quota have suffered economically because of the
loss of trained white workers, or because output (quality and quantity) has suffered.”54
The single greatest factor in South Asian migration to the UK in the years leading up to
the Commonwealth Immigration Bill was the prospect of immigration control itself. Thus, more
Indians and Pakistanis came to Britain because the Bill was discussed then might have come had
no control been considered. Moreover, it is sufficiently clear that there was in no sense an
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overwhelming number of Commonwealth immigrants, no strain on services, and no excessive
unemployment among this group that would necessitate restriction in the first place. Yet, because
immigration control was introduced the numbers of immigrants came at a higher rate only
exacerbating the rationale for control, which fundamentally was to mitigate social tensions that
emerged because white Britons were uncomfortable with black and brown neighbors. From 1960
to 1962, South Asian migration exploded from fewer than 10,000 per year from India and
Pakistan in 1957 (the previous high mark) to more than 40,000 in 1961 and 90 thousand in 1962
prior to the Act taking effect. Immediately after the Act went into force, the numbers of Indian
migrants receded to 1950s numbers for the remainder of 1962 and, according to the Times,
immigration from Pakistan virtually stopped. Yet, beginning in 1963 those numbers again
resembled that of 1960 (roughly 40,000 South Asian migrants per year). Moreover, the ebbs and
flows of commonwealth immigration correlated with the numbers of unemployed in Britain.
Thus, when unemployment ticked up between 1957-1959, Commonwealth immigration declined
and in times of full employment.55
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Though the Government had tried to avoid legislation and hoped to minimize migration
through misinformation, by 1961 the Commonwealth Relations Office conceded to support
immigration restriction legislation “rather than incur the increasing risk of racial strife in this
country.”56 The CRO’s position confirms that immigration restriction was not about Britain’s
ability to absorb new workers but rather about Britain’s unwillingness to welcome nonwhite
people. A brief comparative accounting of migration patterns from European and non-European
sources will help to clarify the question of population growth both on quantity alone and the
geographic origin of the migrants. According to the 1951 census for Great Britain, 127,000
natives of the Indian subcontinent resided in England and Wales with an additional 9,039 South
Asians living in Scotland, which constituted fifty percent of the total Commonwealth
population.57 By 1964, a report from the Ministry of Housing and Local Government numbered
the South Asian population at 330,000, with many migrants arriving prior to the enactment of the
Commonwealth Immigrants Act in order “beat the ban.” However, the rate of migration from
Europe is remarkably understated in this report. Appendix C notes that in 1951 the total
overseas-born European residents in the United Kingdom was 745,000 compared to 218,000
non-European. By 1961, though the non-European population grew at a faster rate, the European
population numbered 901,000 and the non-European population was 517,000.58 In short, the total
migration to the United Kingdom was dominated by Europe, which was not subject to the
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Commonwealth Immigrants Act. This phenomenon further demonstrates that the British
economy was equipped to absorb migrants, regardless of their origin.
Thus, the issue that necessitated legislation was not the overall number of migrants and
the threat of an overwhelmed society, or even with presumed cultural differences that Caribbean
and South Asian migrants presented. Rather, the complaint was that black and brown people
were in Britain at all. The social strain that the government perceived in the early-1960s was
fundamentally an unwillingness on the part of white Britons to tolerate the presence of nonwhite
migrants from former colonial possessions whose presence was important in the rebuilding of
Britain after the war. The political awakening of these migrants was spurred on by government
action that lent validity to racism in Britain and combined with the decolonial movement for
peace and friendship enshrined in the Bandung Conference of 1955.
Praxis of Bandung
The Coventry branch of the Indian Workers Association provide early instances of
Bandung-inspired resistance from in the mid-1950s to early-1960. South Asian political activity
in the early post-war period actively sought the support of municipal agencies and the local
Labour Party to combat racial segregation and hiring discrimination by challenging and changing
policy. Under the leadership of Rajmal Singh, the IWA in Coventry focused on the hiring
practices of the Coventry City Transport Department. In 1955, Gurdev Singh Dhami, the
Secretary for the Coventry branch, wrote to the Coventry Trades Council to express the
association’s gratitude “for the steps [the Council has] taken in dealing with the question of
Colour Bar confronting the coloured people in the UK in general and Coventry in particular.”59
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Nevertheless, the IWA remained vigilant in defense of the right of South Asian, often
specifically Punjabi Sikh, migrants to secure employment in the face of blatantly discriminatory
hiring practices. In 1960, Rajmal Singh stated that the continued reluctance on the part of the city
to hire “coloured crews” underscored the official racism of the city. He further suggested that, in
view of contemporary events around the integration of the Arkansas schools in the United States,
“in the whole of the Midlands, Coventry City Transport is a Little Rock of Coventry.”60 In his
reference to the American Civil Rights movement, Singh anticipated that South Asian and
Caribbean migrants would begin deploying strategies of non-cooperation and non-violent direct
action against racism and colonialism throughout the decade.
The coalescence against racism and colonialism among South Asian migrants in the
1950s was the product of a history of anticolonial resistance and the experience of discrimination
in Britain. Though the Final Communique of Bandung served as a list of priorities that focused
the activism of migrants, Jawaharlal Nehru’s example and his imprint on international relations
in the 1950s was inspirational. As the first Prime Minister of India and long-time advocate for
national liberation movements, Nehru’s influence on Indian politics in postwar Britain can
hardly be overestimated. As early as 1927, as a convener of the League Against Imperialism’s
inaugural conference, Nehru’s status in the international anticolonial movement was well-known
and appreciated in Britain. Having supported myriad conferences for national self-determination
in Europe, mutual admiration for Nehru helped to draw Indian nationalists and Pan-Africanists
closer together as co-agitators in interwar Britain.61As an architect of non-alignment and the
regional cooperation embodied in Bandung, and the 1954 Colombo agreement, as well as
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nationalist hero, Nehru was central to Indian demands for just treatment in Britain. Indeed, the
gathering at Bandung was largely the result of the determination and collaboration of Nehru,
Abdul Nasser of Egypt, and Indonesian President Ahmed Sukarno. Though Bandung allowed
Nehru to “consolidate his position as a recognized world leader,” his support for the Five
Principles for World Peace was first codified in the Sino-Indian Treaty of 1954. Subsequently
Nehru enthusiastically endorsed the Five Principles when he met with the leaders of Pakistan,
Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia at the Asian Prime Ministers’ Conference in Colombo later that
year.62 Nehru’s views on international peace and non-alignment were thus often reflected in the
political alliances that Indian migrants forged in Britain.
Nehru was praised as a leader for regional cooperation and as a champion of the
oppressed. Chowdry Akbar Khan proudly declared Nehru’s rising prominence in his 1953
pamphlet on the wounds of partition titled August 14/15. Reviewing the history of national
liberation movements dating to the American Revolutionary War, Khan believed that India had
emerged as the defender of the oppressed. Indeed, “if the Africans had any spokesman interested
in their freedom it is Nehru of India.”63 For Khan, Nehru embodied the anti-racism that was
integral to the spirit of Bandung. Citing manifold examples of “the racial trends and policies
ingrained in the Westerners for generations past,” including apartheid, travel bans, and Jim
Crow, Khan proclaimed “[n]ature demands and puts forward an agent to stand up for the weak
against tyranny and injustice.”64 Not only was Nehru an anti-racist and anti-imperialist luminary,
but he was also a leader among postcolonial states who was able to secure additional support for
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national liberation movements across the region, including Pakistan and “other Muslims nations
represented in the U[nited] N[ations] O[rganization].” With such leadership, Khan added, “a
middle block must emerge...a bloc to keep the capitalist and Communist adversaries in check for
the maintenance of the sorely needed peace in the world of today.”65 Thus, while the non-aligned
movement had not yet emerged in earnest and the Bandung conference still nearly two years
away, Khan recognized Nehru as a force for peace navigating between bellicose superpowers.
Khan’s reverence for Nehru in the 1950s was expanded into the 1960s through official
statements and delegations from the Indian Workers Association. Affording the Association
status as an unofficial representative of Indians in Britain, Nehru gave an audience to the IWA
during his visits to London during which IWA officers voiced grievances to the Prime Minister
about the difficulties Indians experienced in Britain.66 “It is a matter of great pride and honour
for the Indians,” the IWA Central Executive Committee (CEC) wrote in 1962, “that ever since
India became independent it p[ursued] a policy [of] peace in the world.”67 Nehru’s perceived
abilities to negotiate between hostile parties was on full display during the Berlin Crisis of 1961,
which threatened to erupt into violence between the Allies and the USSR.68 For their part, noting
anxiety over the “present international situation,” the IWA reaffirmed its belief in peaceful
cooperation and the rule of law as it issued a press release in support of “the efforts of the Prime
Minister Mr. Nehru to promote a solution of the problem through negotiations and not through
use of force.” Moreover, in a demonstration of Nehru’s influence on their views on the situation,
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the CEC emphasized that peace treaties should be signed between East and West Germany and
was adamant in its opposition to “any militarization of West Germany.”69
Upon Nehru’s death in May 1964, IWA oragnizer Avtar Singh Jouhl gathered supporters
in the industrial Midlands town of Smethwick to mourn him. In his address he noted that “the
contribution for which he will be most remembered is in the sphere of international relations. For
his attempts to bring about a better understanding between nations he became internationally
respected.”70 In November of that year, hoping that his successors would follow Nehru’s
example, the IWA reached out to Indian Finance Minister TT Krishnamachari and Indira
Gandhi, Nehru's’ daughter and Minister of Information and Broadcasting, during their time at the
Commonwealth Prime Minister’s Conference in London. In this memo, the Central Executive
Committee reiterated its support for the “policy of non-alignment based on the five noble
principles of peace.” Although the Sino-Indian border dispute would appear to undermine
Nehru’s commitment to regional cooperation, the IWA leadership was undeterred: “Shri Nehru
had said that it is futile to think either for China to defeat India or for India to defeat China, and
he had rightly prophesied that the ultimate solution for this problem can only be found through
peaceful means acceptable to both sides.”71 Through the policies of non-alignment and peaceful
cooperation, the IWA was happy to assert its patriotism in the age of Nehruvian Idealism. 72
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Beyond addressing memos to Indian Government ministers in the wake of Nehru’s death,
the IWA also attempted to practice a politics of cooperation in the early 1960s in the face of
international conflicts involving India. Indeed, the concern that IWA expressed about India’s
relationship with Pakistan and China in the early 1960s and its belief in international solidarity
evokes Chowdry Akbar Khan’s notion of an Asian nucleus at the center of Bandung’s Third
World. Reminiscent of the demands of the Final Communique, the IWA issued a press release in
July 1964 on China’s status outside of the United Nations. It reminded readers that the IWA had
been a resolute supporter of China and lamented that “it is nothing but a mockery of such a vast
proportion of humanity” that the UN refuses to admit China. The release also called attention to
a resolution that the IWA passed at its biennial national meeting suggesting that the UN would
remain constitutionally unfit to act as arbiter of international conflict until China was made a
member state. Furthermore, directing its ire at the Indian Government, the statement noted that a
recent official Indian delegation to Taiwan only serves to “increase tensions” between the two
countries in opposition, from the IWA’s perspective, to the dictates of mutual non-interference.73
More significant than the IWA’s vocal support for China’s place at the UN, was the joint
effort between the Indian and Pakistani Workers Associations in Birmingham to mitigate against
violence during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. According to the Evening Mail, Urdu and
Gurmukhi pamphlets titled “War Means Ruin” had begun surfacing in Smethwick factories
instructing South Asian workers to be civil at work and avoid discussing the war. An English
draft of the document, co-signed by K. Ali of the Pakistani Workers Association, and Jagmohan
Joshi, began by cautioning that “the fighting between India and Pakistan is causing a great deal
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of concern to all peace-loving people.” Not only did the war between the two states not benefit
their citizens, but also if “this friction...can only weaken our fight for equal rights and justice” as
South Asians in Britain. Not twenty years since the creation of Pakistan and India, the violence
of 1947 was fresh in the minds of the authors: “Those of us who saw the terrible days of partition
will surely not want to see a repetition of such horrors.” Invoking “our cultural and historical
relationship,” Ali and Joshi were confident that “our people...will not get carried away in a wave
of ‘jingoism’.” However, fully aware of the salience of nationalism and the bitter relationship
between these two states, the pamphlet called on the “extremist sections of both communities...to
join us in our appeal to the govts [sic] to end the fighting.”74 The published version of the
pamphlet pleaded that “[i]t is the foremost duty of Indians and Pakistanis in Britain to live
together in peace and harmony;” an injunction steeped in the ideology of Bandung.75
The Indian Workers Association recognized the importance of inter-group alliances for
mutual benefit and protection. Although coordinating with progressive parties and migrant
organizations was not a new approach, it gained new momentum in the post-Bandung period.76
The Indian Workers Association, Great Britain (IWAGB), which was established in 1958 to
consolidate all branch organizations under a single Central Executive Committee, adopted a
Constitution whose aims included “cooperation with Trade Union and Labour Movement” along
with the fundamental concern of safeguarding and improving the conditions of life and work for
Indians in Britain.77 Accordingly, the IWA actively participated in International Worker Day
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celebrations in order to demonstrate solidarity with the labour movement. In 1961, the
Birmingham branch circulated a flier for that city‘s May Day march, which was emblazoned
with slogans from the labour and anti-colonial movements that epitomized Bandung-era politics,
including “For Peace and Friendship,” “For Workers Unity,” and “For Colonial Freedom.”78 A
year later, Avtar Singh Jouhl, General Secretary of the IWA in Birmingham, distributed a
Punjabi call for participation in which he states “there is only one festival which surpasses all the
boundaries of nations, nationalities, and religions. This festival of workers of the world is called
May Day.” Not only does this flier reveal a pedagogical orientation towards its audience seeking
to inform local Punjabis about the importance of May Day and the labour movement, but it also
affirms the centrality of internationalism to the Indian Workers Association political platform.
By subordinating national and religious identity to international class consciousness, this flier
appealed directly to the shared demands and common experience of the Indian and British
working-class.79 That same year, the IWA distributed a separate May Day announcement to
protest the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962. The IWA criticized “the foul cankers of
racial discrimination” and hoped to “extend out solidarity and friendship to all the peoples still
fighting Imperialist Domination.” In closing, the flier proclaimed “Long Live the Friendship of
the British and Indian Workers. Long Live Peace.”80 May Day celebrations served as an annual
demonstration of the expansive politics of friendship that South Asian activists adopted in the
years after the Bandung Conference in the era of decolonization and mass migration.
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The Indian Workers Associations mobilized its alliances with the British Labor
Movement and the Communist Party of Great Britain to protest war-time provisions that the
Indian government refused to repeal. During the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the Indian government
had enacted the Defence of India Ordinance, which included the Defense of India Rules (DIR).
The Rules dated to the colonial administration during World War I that limited civil liberties in
wartime. In an address to representatives of the Indian government in 1963, the IWA leadership
maintained a tone of goodwill when discussing the Indian stance on the Chinese crisis. Though
they noted that “grave concern was expressed by the Indian community at the armed conflict
between the two major nations of Asia,” they expressed satisfaction that “Mr. Nehru has
accepted the proposals of the Colombo plan and has expressed his willingness to [negotiate] with
the Chinese according to this plan.”81 The IWA became increasingly critical of the Indian
government’s reluctance to repeal the DIR, especially in the face of continued arrests of Indian
citizens under the aegis of the Rules. In November 1964, Rattan Singh and Jagmohan Joshi sent
a memorandum to Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri encouraging him to end Emergency Rule
including the DIR and “thus restoring democracy in its full sense” to India.82 A few months later,
in January 1965, Avtar Jouhl, on behalf of the Birmingham branch of the IWA, wrote to Shastri
to condemn the arrest of Communist and Trade Union leaders for unlawful assembly,
considering it “contrary to the concept of democracy.”83 Through this process, the IWA and its
allies came to see the Congress Party as an obstacle to Indian democracy and the suspension of
due process for political rivals necessitated an urgent response.
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The news of mass arrests India led to the IWA becoming a central organizing force in
Britain and allowed it to claim support from the British labour movement with a protest rally in
London on 28 March 1965 in defense of civil liberties in India. By the end of January, Joshi
issued a request for trade union representation and messages of support by invoking the language
of worker solidarity: “we feel sure that in the tradition of the British labour Movement which has
always extended the hand of friendship to workers in other lands you will support us in this
demonstration.” Joshi also invited specific trade unionists and politicians to speak out against the
Indian government’s “serious violation of democratic principles.” 84 In response, Reg Birch from
the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU), and Rajani Palme Dutt of the CPGB, among
others, agreed to address the assembly. Unions and political associations also sent messages in
support of the protest. For instance, GH Phillips, of the Shard End branch of the AEU, wrote
“may your efforts be crowned with victory,” and the Birmingham Branch of the National Union
of Sheet Metal Workers sent a resolution to the Indian High Commissioner in London protesting
“the mass imprisonment of Indian Communists without the opportunity of a fair trial through the
normal legal machinery.”85 The IWA mobilized members of the Association itself by chartering
coaches to London from cities with active branches. Incorporating trade unions, political parties,
and humanitarian organizations legitimized the struggles of opposition forces in India by making
them visible to a wide cross-section of British society.
On 28 March, demonstrators assembled at Waterloo Bridge beginning at 12:30 PM and
marched five miles east to the Hammersmith Town Hall. According to the socialist newspaper
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Keep Left, more than 2000 Indian workers participated in the rally.86 Before the event, Jagmohan
Joshi and Rattan Singh issued a press release titled “Why we are Protesting,” which outlined the
complaints against the Indian government. The release insisted that “the Emergency Rule and the
D.I.R. are being used by the Government to suppress the genuine and just demands of the Indian
people” and lamented the decline in India’s international prestige since Nehru’s death.87 At the
rally, one speaker alleged that the Communists had been targeted by the Government in part
because of political realities, especially considering the success of the Communist Party in
Kerala in South India, but mostly because the Communist Party had highlighted the food scarcity
in India that had contributed to near-famine conditions. The message also dismissed the pretext
of the arrests given by the Government that those arrested were supporters of the Chinese
Communist Party and were therefore a destabilizing force in the years after the border conflict
with China.88 Dave Ashby, secretary of the Young Socialists, joined Reg Birch and Rajani Palme
Dutt on the platform at the Hammersmith Town Hall and pointed out that, in the aftermath of the
Sino-Soviet doctrinal split, communism itself was not the focus of the government crackdown.
While the Indian government continued to accept Soviet weapons, only those who supported the
Chinese Communist Party were subject to arbitrary arrest. Though the national emergency was
not rescinded until 1968, the mobilizations around civil liberties provided a clear opportunity for
the IWA to embody the Bandung ideals of peaceful cooperation and friendship with British
workers. The first half of 1965 was a period of transition in the relationship between the IWA
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and the Indian government. In the years following Nehru’s death the rhetoric regarding the SinoIndian War and the Emergency Rule changed and the IWA became actively antagonistic toward
the Indian state.89
In addition to espousing peaceful co-existence, the Asian-African Conference in Bandung
was a call to arms against racism and colonialism. Indians in Britain participated in a sustained
struggle against the vestiges of colonialism in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In the Indian
subcontinent, the continued Portuguese occupation of Goa in Western India was an animating
force. As Chowdry Akbar Ali Khan reminded his readers in 1954, Indian territory remained
under the “fascist government of Dr. Salazar” and insisted that “Goa is India, and must be
returned to the motherland.”90 In celebration of the first anniversary of Goa’s independence from
Portugal, the Indian Workers Association in Birmingham hosted “Goa Day” on 7 January 1962.
Although events in the subcontinent structured the anticolonial politics of Indian activists
in Britain, the more expansive view of the Bandung event informed further statements and
demonstrations. In “The End of Empire?”, a pamphlet distributed in 1960, the Association
addresses a series of questions to the British worker:
Why should the Belgians agree to the independence of the Congo and then seek to
subjugate it again? Why should the British Government divine the direction of the wind
of change and leave Ghana while steadfastly maintaining its hold on Kenya? Why should
the United States Government champion the cause of Indian freedom but look askance at
the struggle for independence in Puerto Rico?
For the Indian Workers Association, the answers to the questions are rooted in the continued
economic subjugation that African, Asian, and Latin American states to Western Imperialism. In
these terms, the Association entreated the British labor movement to consider that “the end of
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imperialism in all its forms is necessary before Britain itself can become a socialist state.” Thus,
the labor movement and the anti-colonial movement were connected through global economic
and political currents. Specifically, the Association hoped to impress upon a British audience that
economic stagnation in Britain and neo-imperialist intervention in Asia and Africa combined to
undermine the welfare of “the down-trodden people of the world” including British workers.
Yet, embodied in immigration control legislation was the view that nonwhite migrants were to
blame for problems with wages, housing, and education.91
The spirit of Bandung that informed migrant internationalism in Britain was heavily
organized around a politics of anti-racism at home and abroad. Disdain for the South African
government and any individual or government that would attempt to have normal relations with
the apartheid state was a focal point for activist mobilization. Within the ambit of international
politics and intergovernmental organizations that disciplined the proceedings at Bandung, South
Africa clearly emerged as a pariah. It is telling that South Africa was among the very few
countries that declined to sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.92
The opprobrium directed at the apartheid government resounded among South Asians in
Britain. In 1954, Chowdry Akbar Khan, anticipating Bandung’s opposition to “Soviet
colonialism” and racial discrimination, observed the double-bind of decolonization in Africa.
“Communism would naturally appeal to an African against the civilising mission of his white
lord,” Khan opined. Yet, it would nonetheless result in foreign control and therefore “any Red
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domination would be as bad as the present white subjection of the Fascist Malanism.”93 In a
1956 pamphlet, Khan made an explicit attack on the “demonic fury of racialism” and
remembered that “the seed of hatred was nurtured under the soul-destroying care of Dr. Malan
who, during the last war, pleaded his countrymen to join the side of Hitler against the Allies.”94
In 1960, the reconstituted Indian Workers Association mobilized in support of Black South
Africans as an act of anticolonial solidarity. Announcing a protest meeting at Priory School in
Coventry for 3 April 1960, HD Dosanjh, General Secretary of the IWAGB, wrote that “the
whole civilization is shocked at the massacre of 71 human-beings at Sharpeville in South Africa,
along with the wounding of over 170 other Africans, struck down by the machine gun bullets of
the South African Police.”95 In the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre, the Indian
Workers Association in Coventry solicited Labour Party support for the inauguration of an AntiApartheid Committee.96
The events a Sharpeville constituted a turning point for Indian support for Black South
Africans and gave way to direct action against the regime and its apologists. In February 1961,
the Birmingham Branch of the IWA passed a resolution at its Biennial Meeting against the South
African government: “We demand that Dr. Verwoed should not be allowed to participate in the
Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference unless his Government repudiates its past
repressive policies.”97 Similarly, in 1964, the IWA National Organization passed a resolution in
support of the “liberation movement of South Africa,” expressing both “deep admiration for the
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courageous people of South Africa” and strong condemnation of the “obnoxious policy of
apartheid and its accompanying fascist measures.”98
The IWA further demanded that the British government pursue a program of boycott,
divestment, and sanctions on the Apartheid state. The boycott campaign was realized, in part, in
Birmingham as the Association demanded the resignation of Oscar Hahn, the President of the
Birmingham Chamber of Commerce and recently appointed Chair of the West Midlands
Conciliation Committee of the Race Relations Board. The complaint against Hahn was that he
had led a trade delegation to South Africa immediately after his appointment to the Committee.
Considering that the Committee was explicitly designed to facilitate migrant transitions to the
West Midlands and mitigate racial discrimination, Jagmohan Joshi, the General Secretary of the
IWAGB, demanded his resignation because “he does not have the confidence of the immigrant
workers.”99 Indeed, the appointment of Hahn had immediate ramifications for Indian perceptions
of government accountability and commitment to combating racial injustice in the Midlands. In a
letter to Joshi, CE Karunakaran reported that he had been refused service at The Star and Garter,
a West Bromwich pub, which he admitted “are...no match to the more lasting effect on our
people due to deprivation in the vital fields of jobs and houses.” Nonetheless, Karunakaran
sought counsel from the IWA rather than the Conciliation Committee because, “As you know, its
Chairman is now in South Africa, fraternising with an openly racist state.”100 When
Karunakaran’s complaint came to the attention of Maurice Foley, West Bromwich MP and
Chairman of the Committee of Ministers on Immigrant Integration, his response was to
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unhelpfully reassert the authority of the Race Relations Board and the West Midlands
Conciliation Committee.101
On 1 December 1966, seventeen migrant and anti-racist organizations, including the
Indian Workers Association, the Coordinating Committee Against Racial Discrimination
(CCARD), the Pan-Africanist Congress, and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, met with John
Lyttle, the Chair of the Race Relations Board and, to their surprise, Oscar Hahn, who presided
over the meeting. Rather than discussing the migrant community’s request that Hahn’s
appointment be reconsidered, the meeting became an opportunity for Hahn to repudiate
allegations against him. According to the minutes of the meeting, Maurice Ludmer “pointed out
that when the whole world, through the United Nations and the nonwhite people of S. Africa
through their representatives, had called for sanctions, Mr. Hahn’s action cannot but be regarded
as strengthening the racialist gov’t there.” In response, Hahn outlined his myriad justifications
for trading with South Africa. First, he dismissed the idea of boycotting South Africa and argued
that it would necessitate a boycott of all countries with whom Britain “politically disagreed.”
Second, he claimed that economic engagement benefitted all South Africans and he cited that he
had seen black people in cars during his most recent visit. Third, he posited that international
trade was the most reliable way to dismantle apartheid because it would expand the South
African market and lead to greater economic opportunities for Black South Africans. Finally, and
most gravely, he predicted that that sanctions would lead to economic stagnation in South Africa
and that “the whites will hit back and there will be bloodshed,” as if to suggest, in the aftermath
of Sharpeville, that apartheid was not already a bloody regime.
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In a follow-up letter to Joshi, after the meeting in December, John Lyttle wrote that “I do
hope that the outcome will be that you and Oscar Hahn can agree to differ on South Africa...I am
sure you agree that his views on discrimination in this country are beyond reproach and indeed
his views on apartheid too!”102 To be sure, this was not the consensus of the meeting. The
representatives of the activist organizations remained “critical of many remarks made my Mr.
Hahn” and sought an additional audience with Mark Bonham Carter, Chairman of the Race
Relations Board, to protest Hahn’s appointment and the dissonance between racial conciliation
and dismissal of apartheid.
For his part, Hahn, speaking at the Conference on Racial Equality in Employment in
February 1967, noted that he “manage[d] a factory on the South side of Birmingham, employing
just over 1,000 people of whom something like 120 are coloured and a further 20 are people like
myself, who have found refuge in Britain from Nazi or Communist persecution in Europe.” By
deploying his personal experience with totalitarianism and fascism in Europe, the effect was to
contrast what Hahn considered were the legitimate experiences of oppression among European
refugees and the experiences of “coloured” migrant workers. Although he insisted that a lack of
nonwhite shop stewards and foremen in factories is the equivalent to a whites-only military
command, he reminded his audience that the lack of promotion was, ultimately, due to a “lack of
education and a lack of understanding of the mentality of their white workmates and, in many
cases, a lack of belonging.” Hahn insisted that there was no “reluctance of the white man to work
for a coloured foreman.”
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From the perspective of Indian workers in the Midlands, Hahn’s economic ties to South
Africa undermined his view that “the purpose of [anti-discrimination] legislation in this field is
to harness the support of the people of goodwill and not, in the first instance, to convert the
segregationists.”103 However, by targeting migrants for the pace of integration yet
acknowledging that he managed a firm that refused to promote nonwhite workers combined with
his reluctance to disavow the trade delegation to South Africa did not assuage concerns about his
appointment. As the 1960s ended and British nationalism began to dictate the terms of the
immigration debate, the priorities of the Bandung era also began to erode. For Indians and other
nonwhite migrants in Britain, Oscar Hahn’s rhetoric about fleeing Nazi persecution began to
look darkly prescient. From the early 1960s racism had begun to play a visceral role in British
elections and by the 1970s the National Front and other anti-immigrant organizations had begun
to terrorize communities of color. Thus, the peaceful coexistence of Bandung gave way to
militant opposition to fascism and imperialism, abandonment of unresponsive democratic
institutions, and a rejection of authoritarianism in Britain and India.
Conclusion
Oscar Hahn’s appointment in the West Midlands Conciliation Committee was a local
instance of migrant abhorrence for the apartheid regime and the continued imperialist mentality
that it represented. Many considered Hahn's position transparent. “You cannot trade with
someone on the one hand,” The Times quoted one anti-Apartheid activist saying, “and condemn
his way of life on the other.”104 The oppression of Black South Africans elicited the compassion
of nonwhite migrants in Britain in the early 1960s for manifold reasons. Anticolonialism was
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foundational to the worldview of many South Asian migrants in the 1950s and 1960s who had
both lived through the last years of British colonial rule and experienced the tumult of partition.
The well-publicized violence in Sharpeville triggered international outrage and contributed to the
maturation of the anti-apartheid movement in Europe. The racially motivated violence in South
Africa resonated with nonwhite migrants in Britain who had been subject to racial
discrimination, segregation, and violence -- the vestiges of imperialism. Apartheid became a
mobilizing force for the anti-racism struggle in Britain because its rationale and the atrocities
committed in its name were anathema to the peace and friendship priorities of the Bandung
Conference.
The theory of a third bloc that Chowdry Akbar Khan presented in the early 1950s was
made manifest by Indians and other Commonwealth citizens who came to Britain in the era of
mass migration. The Bandung moment in Britain was characterized by anti-colonialism, antiracism, and broad-front strategies for peaceful conflict resolutions that carried sway among
migrants and leftwing activists from roughly the end of the war until the mid-1960s. Yet, the
resistance to Hahn and the IWA’s subsequent disengagement from the Race Relations Board
represents a shift in tactics of migrant politics and activism in the 1960s that reflects a more
general repudiation of the dictates of peace and cooperation at the core of Bandung’s
internationalism. Over the course of the decade, Bandung’s focus on peaceful cooperation was
eroded and replaced by more radical mobilizations against global power structures and
inequality. In part, the limitations of Bandung’s message were exposed due to changing
geopolitical conditions, especially the escalating violence in Vietnam.105 However, others have
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argued that Bandung’s determination to function within existing international norms necessarily
undermined the more revolutionary demands of liberationist discourses. Itty Abraham has
focused on “civilizational thinking” at Bandung and the earlier Asian Relations Conference,
which echoed European hierarchies. Such thinking justified the European colonization of more
“primitive” societies in Africa and Asia. For the postcolonial elites at Bandung, Abraham argues,
this thinking anchored discussions on “backward tribal communities” which were “untouched by
civilization.”106 To that end, the pedagogical mode that Bandung adopted functioned to disavow
non-western epistemologies and to consolidate power in pursuit of developmentalist aims and
Afro-Asian solidarity.107
This chapter has argued that the demands of the Final Communique represented a
worldview that animated migrant activism in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, that
worldview, according to Robbie Shilliam, was built on faulty foundations. The declarations,
particularly the postcolonial elite’s investment in the international relations and
intergovernmental collaboration of the United Nations, resulted in a fleeting peace because they
relied on an already existing “colonial architecture.”108 Yet, Shilliam agrees with Abraham, the
priorities of international relations that subjugated untamed peripheries to settled centers of
colonial rule did not obliterate the epistemologies of so-called backward tribes. Thus, an
alternative spirit of Bandung emerged out of the irruption of power centers and the unmooring of
the tribal, untouchable, indentured, and slave “hinterlands” that colonialism created. In a
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rejection of colonial power, the stated goals of peaceful coexistence had to be jettisoned in order
to fashion “global designs otherwise to the architecture of colonial rule.”109 Whereas the
organizers of Bandung structured their demands around human rights and sought admission to
the United Nations, an alternate possibility emerged that sought to invert global power structures
and dismantle the colonial architecture that framed intergovernmental organizations. The next
chapter will excavate the militant strategies of acting “other-wise” to the architecture of colonial
rule that rejected cooperation with governments that sponsored or sheltered racism and fascism.
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Chapter 7
Migrant Militancy and Revolutionary Violence in Britain and India, 1962-1979
The Indian Workers Association first acknowledged the deteriorating conditions for
nonwhite migrants in the Midlands in July 1961. “The situation” in Smethwick, AS Rai wrote to
Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, Indian High Commissioner in London, “demands constant vigilance on
the part of the authorities.”1 In April 1963, Avtar Singh Jouhl, newly elected General Secretary
and Smethwick resident, wrote a letter to Peter Griffiths, Conservative Parliamentary candidate,
stating that the Conservative Party’s plan to deport unemployed migrants was an “unprincipled
election stunt” and a “clear exploitation of the situation.” Furthermore, by noting that “we are
aware when your Party tried to make the Immigrants a scape-Goat [sic] and passed the
Immigration Act,” Jouhl drew parallels between the Smethwick Conservative Association and
“Colin Jordan’s and Sir Oswald Mosley’s parties,” who led, respectively, the Neo-Nazi National
Socialist Movement in the United Kingdom in the 1960s and the Fascist movement in interwar
Britain.2
The campaign for the Smethwick parliamentary constituency was a turning point in
South Asian migrant activism in Britain. In this election, Griffiths and the Conservative
Association advocated segregated housing and schools as well as deportation of migrants who
had been unemployed for six months or more. The IWA formally rejected the Conservative’s
platform during a national assembly in 1964. “This Biennial General Council Meeting of the
IWAGB,” stated a resolution adopted at the meeting, “strongly condemns the racial activities of
the Smethwick Conservative Association” and promised to wage an “unremitting fight” in
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response to segregationist policies. Moreover, the IWA endorsed the Brockway Bill, named for
long-time ally of Indian Independence and anticolonialism Fenner Brockway, that banned
“incitement to racial hatred.” This bill eventually gained the support of Rajani Palme Dutt's
Communist Party and the Movement for Colonial Freedom and formed the foundation of the
Race Relations Act of 1965.3
As the election campaign entered its final months, the Indian Workers Association
continued to dispel the myths of crisis that the Conservative Party sought to promulgate to
voters. Having just been elected as General Secretary of the IWA at the April Biennial Meeting,
Jagmohan Joshi penned a rebuttal for a series in the Smethwick Telephone that had previously
detailed the platforms of the Labour, Liberal, and Conservative Parties. In an article titled
“Immigrants Look at Immigration in Smethwick,” Joshi reminded the reader that “immigrants in
Smethwick are not here from their own choice” but rather have been forced, due to British
colonial agricultural policy, to migrate. He emphasized, moreover, that South Asians, at least
before 1962, had the right as Commonwealth citizens to come and work in Britain. He
acknowledged the manifold challenges to migrants in Britain. But he insisted, in contrast to
Griffiths, that unemployment, overcrowding, and criminality were not brought to Britain by
migrants. Rather, these issues were all prevalent in British society in the inter-war period, during
which there were few South Asian residents.
Furthermore, considering that residents of Smethwick were faced with many of the same
challenges, Joshi hoped that the Communist appeal to the British working-class to incorporate
migrant workers into the labor movement would address problems of wages, housing, and
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segregation. “Mr. Griffiths’ final racialist sentiment was ‘Let’s clean up Smethwick,’” Joshi
reminded his readers. “We want to clean up Smethwick too. We want to put an end to racialism
and we can only do this together with the people of Smethwick.” In rejecting the anti-immigrant
position of the Smethwick Conservatives, Joshi framed his argument as a claiming of rights:
“The immigrants in this town are not begging anything. They are simply demanding their rights.”
The Smethwick campaign provided an urgent opportunity for South Asian activists to deploy the
politics of Bandung which were rooted in a rhetoric of human rights and international norms that
protected them in the face of color-coded nationalism in late-industrial Britain but increasing
violence with the tacit support of the government necessitated a different approach.4
The rhetoric and politics of anti-fascism emerged among Indians in Britain during and
after Griffiths’ election. By the 1970s, the mob violence of so-called “Paki bashers” like the
National Front had been validated by a state-sanctioned white supremacy that questioned the
presence of nonwhite residents. Anti-immigrant forces deployed a machinery that was codified
and reaffirmed throughout the 1960s and 1970s to de-legitimize black and brown claims to
citizenship. Simultaneously, Indians in Britain shifted away from Indian nationalism and the
Congress party of Jawaharlal Nehru. The 1962 Sino-Indian border conflict revealed a deep
skepticism of the Indian government for its treatment of political opponents during periods of
conflict. Activists in Britain mobilized against the use of repressive laws that had originated in
the colonial period to detain dissidents and quash dissent. The fight against nascent Indian
totalitarianism was informed by anti-immigrant legislation and white nationalist abuse in Britain
and fully articulated during Indira Gandhi’s government from 1966-1977. Her tenure as Prime
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Minister was adumbrated by Emergency Rule that suspended the democratic process and enabled
the near arbitrary use of anti-communist and anti-terrorist legislation to eliminate challenges to
the authority of the Congress Party.
This chapter argues that the dual mobilizations against white supremacy in Britain and
totalitarianism in India were mutually reinforcing. In the years following the Bandung
conference, the rise in violence against black and brown people in Britain and against adivasis,
communists, and trade unionists in India were met with a growing belief in armed self-defense.
Indian activists in Britain were inspired by Mao’s permanent revolution and informed by Frantz
Fanon’s views on the inevitability of violence for decolonization. These activists believed, with
Malcolm X, in the necessity of protecting one’s rights and community by any means necessary.
Focused on the linkages between marginalized and disenfranchised communities, the Indian
Workers Association maintained a cohesive working-class movement that turned to MarxistLeninist and Maoist organizations to support the fight against racism and imperialism. The
interplay of workers’ politics, the international realignment of communism between the Soviet
Union and China, and the imposition of anti-democratic policies in India, must be considered
together when attempting to understand the salience of Maoist revolutionary thought among
Indian migrants in the era of British deindustrialization.
Genealogy of Self-defense, 1964-1968
The election of Peter Griffiths was tacit sanction of racial violence and incitement by the
Smethwick electorate and the Conservative Party. In June 1965, the trend toward violence was
punctuated by the appearance of a burning cross leaning against Dharam Singh’s front door in
Leamington, Warwickshire. According to the Express News Service account, though this was not
the first instance of violence, “the intervention by the [Ku Klux] Klan lends distinction to the
latest incident. Apparently, the Klan is spearheading the racist attacks on Midlands coloureds.”
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The Evening Mail added that a former member of the National Socialist Movement, a British
Nazi organization, confirmed that the Klan had discussed Dharam Singh’s activism in
Birmingham the night prior to the attack.5 In the aftermath of Smethwick, the belief in collective
self-defense, which necessarily abandoned the blanket concept of peaceful coexistence in the
face of a violent aggressor, was ascendant. Appeals to white Britons in the early-1960s were
couched in the language of friendship that was a cornerstone of the spirit of Bandung. In that
spirit, opportunities to work with elected officials to address racial discrimination were taken in
the 1950s by some IWA leaders. But the events at Smethwick and the Labour Party White Paper
on Immigration of 1965 signified to Indians in the Midlands that the government had abdicated
responsibility for Commonwealth migrants.
In response to the intimidation of Dharam Singh, Joshi declared that “we are not afraid
even of physical violence. If it is used against us, we will hit back and defend our rights.”6 In
turn, the editorial board at the Birmingham Post condemned Joshi’s intemperance as the “wrong
approach,” fearing that “such statements are likely to alienate the sympathy of law abiding [sic]
people” and reminding the reader that “the Indian community in this country, like any other
minority, can claim the full protection of the law.”7 Yet, implicit in Joshi’s statement was the
belief that the British authorities were not willing or able to defend the rights of South Asian
migrants and that, until change was achieved, migrants were to defend themselves. Soon after
Joshi’s statements about self-defense were published, he corresponded with the Birmingham Post
regarding their condemnatory stance. In a letter dated 11 June 1965, Joshi wrote to DH

“We Shall Hit Back, Says Indians’ Leader,” Evening Mail, 9 June 1965.
Sitanshu Das, “KKK Strikes at Indian in Britain,” The Indian Express, 10 June 1965.
7
“Wrong Approach,” Birmingham Post, 9 June 1965.
5
6

256
Hopkinson, the editor of the Post, to protest its editorial. Joshi felt it suggested that he was
inciting violence rather than stating that violence will be met with violence. He then rebuked
Hopkinson and stated that, without a “satisfactory reply,” he would be forced to take the matter
of misrepresentation to the Press Council.8
In reply, Hopkinson defended his paper’s reportage and suggested, naively if not
disingenuously in light of recent Ku Klux Klan activity, that “you would agree with me, I am
sure, that neither Indian nor English people would want to see a situation arising in this country
where it was necessary for even non-violent demonstrations to take place.”9 Of course, the
position of the Indian Workers Association was to advocate for the rights of Commonwealth
migrants during a particularly fraught period of anti-immigrant sentiment throughout the country.
Though Joshi pointed to African-Americans in the Civil Rights Movement as an example of
“‘hitting back’ in their fight for their rights as human beings and yet they are not using violence,”
he acknowledged the limitations of non-violent direct action. He evoked Malcolm X and the
principle of liberation “by any means necessary,” when he insisted that “members of the Indian
community will never initiate violence, but this does not mean that they will remain passive and
inactive in the face of racialist violence and intimidation. They will hit back.”10 Thus, to suggest,
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as Hopkinson did, that a time for “even non-violent demonstrations” was yet to arrive belies a
lack of exposure in the press of the experiences of South Asian and other nonwhite migrants.
Joshi’s evocation of Malcolm X’s philosophy in the aftermath of KKK activity at
Leamington Spa was not a coincidence; it was an acolyte’s conviction. In February 1965,
Malcolm X came to the Midlands to see first-hand the conditions that nonwhite residents
endured and to comment on the need for action. He came to Britain at the invitation of the Africa
Society at the London School of Economics after being refused entry to Paris as an undesirable
person.11 Malcolm X might have heard about Peter Griffiths campaign tactics in 1964 but he was
not originally scheduled to visit the town. After his event at the LSE, Shirley Fossick met him
outside and invited him to Smethwick to meet with civil rights activists there, including Avtar
Jouhl and Joshi, her future husband.12
The invitation did not happen by chance nor was Fossick merely an intermediary for the
Indian Workers Association. She had been active in the mobilization against Griffiths and had
co-written “Smethwick -- Integration or Racialism” for the Coordinating Committee Against
Racial Discrimination in 1965.13 In an announcement for “Mazdoor,” an IWA newsletter, she
emphasized that “ultimately racial discrimination can only be eliminated when the social
structure of Britain is changed so that it is no longer based upon the exploitation of one class by
another.”14 Fossick (who later married Jagmohan Joshi and took his name) remained an active
figure in the movement against racism for the remainder of her life an organizer, writer, and
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speaker. She eventually joined the faculty of Birmingham Polytechnic as a lecturer and published
articles on race and racism in Britain in the twentieth century.15
By the time of Malcolm X’s visit, Smethwick had become a symbol of “racialism and
colour prejudice” in Britain and the Marshall Street plan was emblematic of that reputation.16
Despite the Indian Workers Association’s efforts, Griffiths had triumphed on a platform of racial
anxiety and segregation. Soon after he took office in October 1964, the Conservatives began
drawing up a proposal to buy houses in the Marshall Street neighborhood so that immigrants
would be unable to move there. The stated rationale was to prevent the creation of migrant
ghettos and facilitate greater integration into society. However, the Labour Party leader, E.
Lowry, rejected this claim and he considered that the plan “is definitely a colour bar, whatever
the Conservatives might say.”17 The Indian Workers Association circulated an “open letter” to
residents of Marshall Street, asking them to “come together and, in a spirit of goodwill, achieve
harmony.” Joshi attacked the plan by referring to American Presidential candidate Barry
Goldwater who had recently voted against the Civil Rights Act: “we are fully aware that this
Goldwater section of the Smethwick Conservative Party is bent upon fanning racial antagonism
in the area” to the point of “lead[ing] to race-riots.” Yet, the racial tensions were not limited to
the Conservative Party platform. The Guardian quoted W. Jolley, a Marshall Street shopkeeper,
as saying “Immigrants have been shown goodwill, but they should all learn to live decently,” to
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demonstrate that the electorate sympathized with the Conservative line on race relations. 18 Later,
Avtar Jouhl reminisced that other than touring Marshall Street, Malcolm X met with him and
Jagmohan Joshi for a drink at the Blue Gate Hotel, where they were only served at the bar -- a
practice of everyday racism in Smethwick.19 The rhetoric of vice, overcrowding, and unhygienic
behavior among migrants had clearly permeated Smethwick resulting in a hostile environment
for South Asians in the Midlands.20
Malcolm X arrived in Smethwick on 12 February 1965 along with the crew from the
BBC program Tonight.21 Brief though it was, X's visit was well documented by the press who, as
Shirley Joshi (née Fossick) put it much later, “were always traipsing around after him,” in the
United States and in Britain.22 He had hoped to have an audience with Griffiths, but the MP was
out of town addressing an event at the University of Hull at the time. Without any organized
event, Malcolm X only spent a few hours in town before taking the stage at the Birmingham
University Students’ Union that evening. The LA Times, in its coverage of Malcolm X’s visit,
referred to Smethwick as “the midlands hotbed of racial problems” in Britain.23 When speaking
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to reporters, Malcolm X remarked that “I have heard that the blacks in Smethwick are being
treated in the same way as the Negroes were treated in Alabama -- like Hitler treated the Jews.”
The Washington Post quoted him as adding “I would not wait for the Fascist element in
Smethwick to erect gas ovens.” The apparent intemperance of this statement provoked the ire of
the Mayor, Alderman CV Williams, and Cedric Taylor, chair of the Standing Conference of
West Indian Organizations alike. But by insisting that he would “not wait” he left open strategies
for resistance that would prevent escalated racist victimization in the town. His comments
buttressed Jagmohan Joshi’s insistence that black and brown communities must hit back and
demonstrate to the “fascist element” that they would protect their rights, themselves, and their
communities.24
In 1965, the Labour Party doubled down on immigration restriction first introduced by
the Conservatives and providing new evidence to nonwhite migrants that they were second-class
citizens. In March, the newly elected Labour Government issued a White Paper on Immigration
that proposed stricter controls on immigration than those established by the Immigration Act of
1962. Since the Labour Party had previously pledged to repeal the 1962 legislation, the increased
limitations on immigration signified a bait and switch to many migrant and leftwing activists. In
response to the White Paper, Britain-born Communist Party theorist Rajani Palme Dutt
acknowledged that the initial immigration restriction was passed by a Conservative ministry and
remembered that the Labour party in 1962 protested its enactment. Referring to the 1962 Act as
the “Color Bar Act,” Dutt lamented the consequences of racism in Western societies and
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suggested that “the trade unions and whole labour movement should campaign amongst all their
members to strengthen class solidarity and understanding and bring the coloured workers fully
into the movement.”25 Subsequently, Dutt issued a “Memorandum for the Political Committee on
Racialism” clarifying that economic underdevelopment in Commonwealth and postcolonial
countries was the fault of British imperialism and, therefore, Britain was obliged to allow
migrants from intentionally underdeveloped countries to live and work there.26 Unmoved by the
protestations of leftwing and migrant activists, the White Paper became the Commonwealth
Immigrants Act of 1968 which limited immigration to those who could prove that a parent or
grandparent had been born in the United Kingdom.
Faced with the electoral success of the Smethwick Conservatives and ensuing KKK
terrorism, migrants in Britain were forced to consider new strategies for navigating antiimmigration legislation, local policies that promoted racial discrimination, and violence. Joshi
had never believed that, in the face of racist persecution, the only option for migrants was to
respond with violence -- even if he refused to abjure it altogether -- and he fully intended to
“bring about pressure on the Government here to strengthen legislation against racialism.”27
Therefore, in July 1965 the IWA organized a march and rally to 10 Downing Street in London.
In a press statement about the march, Joshi reiterated that the IWA intended to mobilize in a way
that went beyond “demanding immediate action” from the government. Rather, the IWA sought
the formation of “street defense committees” and was determined to coordinate with black and
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progressive organizations “to discuss joint action against the ever-increasing racial violence.”28
In short, the capacity of the state to protect the rights and lives of black and brown migrants was
questioned and the Indian Workers Association began to disengage from state-led initiatives.
In the wake of the Race Relations Bill of 1965, which created limited restrictions on overt
racial discrimination that, importantly, did not extend to housing protections for racial and ethnic
minorities, and the Government White Paper of the same year, the Indian Workers Association
publicly disavowed government interventions on behalf of Commonwealth migrants. Having
pursued a strategy of mobilizing its supporters to pressure the government and demand the repeal
of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, while also encouraging them to band together
for mutual protection, the Indian Workers Association decided on a new strategy. Livid with the
Labour Government’s reversal on the need to repeal immigration control legislation, Joshi and
Rattan Singh, the President of the IWA, published “The Victims Speak” which asked “[h]as an
Act which was at one time racialist ceased to be so?”29 Believing that the White Paper reaffirmed
and strengthened anti-immigrant sentiment, Joshi and Singh declared that “[t]he contrast in the
statements made by the Labour Party in 1961 during the immigration control debates and their
present statements on the Act indicate vividly the deterioration which has taken place in official
attitudes on this question”30 To convey the conditions in which migrants lived in mid-1960s
Britain, Joshi and Singh quoted a Guardian article by Jean Stead from 22 October 1965, which
noted that immigrant houses are “knocked up” in the middle of the night in order to determine its
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occupants. With a comparison to fascist regimes in Europe, the pamphlet cautioned that “official
midnight visits to people’s houses are associated with police states. The fact that it is only the
immigrants who are being treated in this way will surely bring to mind the treatment of racial
minorities in Europe in the 1930’s [sic].”31 Joshi and Singh suggest that eliminating “scarcity and
competition in employment, housing, social services, and educational facilities” is the only way
to achieve an equitable and multi-racial society.
Heretofore, the IWA encouraged its members to use the democratic process to seek
solutions to the problems of racial discrimination and anti-immigration legislation. To do this,
the IWA officially endorsed several Labour politicians for parliamentary seats, including Denis
Howell and Maurice Foley. However, by the 1966 General Election, the IWA only endorsed
politicians “whose stand was against racialism in the true sense.” From this point, the IWA
called for abstention from votes in the Sparkbrook and All Saints constituencies of Birmingham,
where the candidates espoused views that the Association viewed as unfairly blaming immigrant
communities for social problems.32 To indicate the unanimity of the Labour and Conservative
Parties on immigration, Joshi and Singh quoted Roy Hattersley, the Labour candidate for the
Sparkbrook seat, as saying “we must impose a test which tries to analyze which immigrants, as
well as having jobs or special skills, are likely to be assimilated into the national life.” Believing
that such a policy would require immigrants to jettison their cultural lives, the “Victims Speak”
took it as a sign that any cultural difference was deemed anathema to British society.33 Instances
of abstention like these indicate that a gradual disengagement from the democratic process was
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occurring. The IWA had lost faith that politicians were willing to modulate immigration policy
or sympathetic to the social and economic conditions of black and brown people in Britain.
In addition to shifting away from the democratic process, the immigrant organizations
grew increasingly impatient with government entities on the view that they were founded and
funded on the government’s general policy of reducing the number of Commonwealth
immigrants in Britain. That the IWA was losing patience with such bodies was evident in the
row around Oscar Hahn’s appointment to lead the West Midlands Conciliation Committee in
1966. Nevertheless, the IWA was actively pursuing redress by the Race Relations Board in the
interest of continuing a working relationship with the organization. However, the disgust caused
by the White Paper on Immigration led the IWA and similar organizations, like the West Indian
Standing Conference and the Pakistani Welfare Association, to reject bodies established under its
aegis. Speaking about one of the most prominent new agencies in “The Victims Speak,” Joshi
and Singh argued specifically against the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants
(NCCI): “Because it is the produce of a racialist document it has not the trust of the immigrant
communities in Britain. The tragedy is that it is misleading many people into believing that
through it a solution can be found to racial intolerance and conflict.” Not only was the
Committee established on faulty premises, the IWA also believed that the top-down approach of
the government undermined the initiatives of grassroots migrant organizations by refusing to
consult them.34 The practice of disengaging from government bodies and democratic process
because of anti-immigrant racism is reminiscent of the Indian leftwing during World War II who
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aligned against Nazism and Stalinism because both were manifestations of fascism and
imperialism.35
Though the Birmingham Post doubted it, by 1966 the Black American press fully
appreciated the crisis that faced immigrants in Britain. According to the Chicago Defender, Sikh
shop-owners in Royal Leamington Spa had heeded Joshi’s words and armed themselves with
“double-barreled shotguns and announced they would shoot raiders.”36 A few weeks later, the
same paper cautioned that “Britain, where racial discord wasn’t supposed to happen, has turned
into a cauldron of both subtle and violent hate.”37 The IWA National Conference in November
1967 gave Joshi an opportunity to outline the Association’s policy of “non-cooperation with
various Government committees.”38 Yet, he acknowledged that the IWA had historically been a
social and cultural organization for migrants and was established, in part, to help Indians
navigate a hostile environment. Feelings of abandonment among Commonwealth migrants, he
believed, had been revived in the late-1960s after having “realized that the Labour Party was to
join the Conservatives in their use of racialism as a political weapon” by expanding immigration
control to neutralize one Tory campaign strategy.39 Immigration control in Parliament occurred
simultaneously with an uptick in threats of physical attack at the street level: “Faced with
increasing violence against members of the Indian community the IWA has had several meetings
with the police and Mayors of various cities in order to demand greater protection.”40 Finally,
Joshi declared that, in line with decades of Indian activism in Britain, united action with migrant
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and progressive organizations was the only option. “Unity and militancy are our greatest
protection.”41
As Joshi sought to bring progressive forces together, votaries of British anti-immigrant
nativism embraced a spokesman. In April 1968, speaking in Birmingham, Enoch Powell, MP for
Wolverhampton South West, delivered a speech steeped in in anti-immigrant rhetoric and
economic torpor, that was a distillation of a decade of racial anxiety that had previously reached
its high mark in Smethwick. Unsatisfied with the state of immigration control and repeating the
disdain for Commonwealth immigrants that marked the Smethwick campaign, Powell insisted on
a policy of “re-immigration” so that the population of nonwhite people in Britain was not just
stabilized but obliterated as far as possible. In conclusion, Powell remarked enigmatically, “As I
look ahead, I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see “the River Tiber foaming
with much blood’.” This quotation from Vergil’s Aeneid led to Powell’s address being
remembered as the “Rivers of Blood Speech” anticipating violence that would accompany
continued migration. For his migrant audience, this line appeared to excuse, if not endorse,
bloodshed. Subsequently, dock workers marched in London against immigration as an example
of “resolute and urgent action” and demonstrating the deep resonance of Powell’s words for
some in the white working-class.42
In response to Powell’s speech and the support it had received, Joshi convened a meeting
in a Leamington Spa home that was among those to be vandalized by the KKK three years
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earlier. The militant Black People’s Alliance (BPA), guided by the Black Power movement and
fueled by an effort to focus migrant “anger and resentment” against discrimination and
Powellism, emerged out of the meeting.43 According to organizers, who hosted fifty-one
immigrant leaders from twenty organizations, the BPA was necessary because “the political
parties have now given the green light to the overtly fascist organizations and they are not very
active in organising themselves, particularly among the working class.”44 During the meeting
Joshi reflected on the possibility of violent confrontations because of the conditions in which
African, Caribbean, and South Asian migrants were forced to live. In a reference to events in the
United States during the summer of 1967, he remarked that immigrants “are not the people who
create Detroits. Detroits are forced on us.“45 A year later, the Black People’s Alliance organized
the “March for Dignity” in London during the 1969 Commonwealth Prime Minister’s
Conference, to demonstrate that “the unity of all oppressed people is the guarantee that
Imperialism and Racialism will meet their dam.”46 Moreover, the March for Dignity marked the
distance that Indian radicals had moved from the Bandung-inspired nationalism of earlier in the
decade. In a circular for the March, Joshi commented, as if a statement of general knowledge and
belief, that
the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries are no more than the lackies of
Anglo-American imperialism. They do not care about their nationals whether at home or
abroad. At home they shoot us, murder us, imprison us and abroad they ignore our
sufferings in the face of racialist oppression.47
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Sivanandan records that approximately 7,000 people marched on the Commonwealth Prime
Ministers’ Conference in support of the BPA.48 In reference to the magnitude of the event and as
an indication of its success the New York Times described the March as the “largest civil rights
demonstration in recent British history.”49
A foremost concern of the newly formed Alliance was the creation of “cells of militant
coloured workers in trade union to fight colour prejudice in industry,” a need which was
highlighted “when,” as Joshi put it, “dockers start marching in favour of fascism and strikes take
place to defend racialism.”50 Representatives of the United Coloured People and Arab
Association (UCPAA), the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination, and the National
Federation of Pakistani Associations addressed a meeting in early May. Roy Sawh, of the
UCPAA and Black Power movement in Britain, called for militant action to protect black people
in London.51 Because “you are living in a hostile society,” Sawh advised, following Joshi’s
suggestions from 1965, that people should form patrols armed with three-inch knives.52 With the
support of the Black Peoples’ Alliance, the Pakistani Workers’ Union was among the first to
establish “vigilante groups.” In March and early April of 1970, Pakistanis in the Stepney area of
London had experienced increased attacks by “white gangs.” Following the murder of Tosir Ali
on 7 April, the Union held a meeting at the Grand Palais Hall in Commercial Road, Stepney, that
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attracted an audience of over 1000. Abul Ishaque, the Union’s secretary, announced that “we are
asking our people to move about together and look after themselves.” Chairman of the Union’s
Legal Committee, Sibghat Kadri, clarified that “Pakistanis will not take the law into their own
hands, but will adopt self-defense. If you hit back in self-defense, that is all right. Even if you kill
in self-defense, it will not be murder.”53 On 3 May, the Union sponsored a rally at Speaker’s
Corner in Hyde Park leading to a march to 10 Downing Street whereupon 800 demonstrators
issued the warning that “the only answer [to relieve their suffering] lies in self-reliance for their
safety and welfare.”54 Through “anti-Paki basher” troops, the Black Peoples’ Alliance and
affiliated organizations created a parallel police force that was determined to protect their
membership and community in the void left by police inaction.
As the Alliance functioned as centralizing force for migrant anti-racist and antiimperialist resistance in the late-1960s and early-1970s, it gave expression to two streams of
political thought in deindustrializing Britain. First was the belief in the state’s abdication of
responsibility for the protection of all British residents. Second was the view that postcolonial
states who cooperated with western neo-imperialism could not be trusted. The latter view was
adamantly held in view of the Indian Government during Indira Gandhi’s terms as Prime
Minister. Though the Indian Workers Association had been voicing concern about the leadership
provided by the Indian Government in the years after Nehru’s death, the arrival in power of
Indira Gandhi, his daughter, represented the abandonment of Indian migrant laborers in Britain
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and introduced a new period of repression of leftwing oppositional forces in India. Over the
course of the late-1960s and especially during Gandhi’s imposition of Emergency Rule from
1975-77, the Indian government mounted a sustained campaign of repression against
communists and trade unionists. But, as early as 1959, Gandhi had stated her distrust of leftists
clearly. At the All-India Congress Committee meeting at Chandigarh in September of that year,
Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, who was then the Congress Party President, both
condemned the behavior of Communists in the West Bengal Assembly. In protest of the
assassination of the Sri Lankan Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike, Communist members of
the Legislative Assembly were alleged to have thrown shoes at the colleagues. While both
leaders voiced their disapproval of the “anti-national” behavior of the Bengali Communists,
Gandhi, per a newspaper report, accused the Communist Party of India membership of working
against India because they “always supported Communist countries even against their own.”55
The Rise of Maoism in 1960s Britain
Even though the Bandung spirit defined much of Indian Workers Association activism in
the late-1950s and early-1960s, there was another thread of South Asian activism in Britain,
embodied by Abhimanyu Manchanda and Roy Sawh, that diverged from this consensus and
gradually brought the leftwing of the Indian Workers Association and Association of Indian
Communists along. By 1968, armed self-defense among black and migrant organizations was
disciplined by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought (MLM).56 The rise in militant antifascism in Britain that accompanied the rise in anti-immigrant violence was infused with support
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for the People’s Republic of China and Maoism as the ideology of revolution. The consolidation
of Maoism, especially among Indian migrants, marked a new phase in the struggle against white
supremacy in Britain and the erosion of civil liberties in postcolonial India.
In 1955, the Trinidad-born Communist revolutionary Claudia Jones arrived in Britain,
after having been deported from the United States. In 1958, she organized the publication of the
journal West Indian Gazette. With her colleagues at the journal, and the support of the
Movement for Colonial Freedom and the Indian Workers Association, Jones established the
Conference of Afro-Asian-Caribbean Organizations in London. According to Sivanandan, the
CAACO did for the Greater London area what the Coordinating Committee Against Racial
Discrimination under Jagmohan Joshi did for the Midlands.57 Jones' partner, Ceylon-born
Abhimanyu Manchanda, took up the editorship of the Gazette while Jones was in the Soviet
Union undergoing treatment for an illness that proved terminal.58 Carol Boyce Davies writes that
Manchanda and Jones had a “bond of consistent struggle at the person level” and that through
their relationship Jones came to recognize the importance of Afro-Asian solidarity in the struggle
against racism, imperialism, and capitalism. Moreover, through this relationship, Manchanda
came into the orbit of Black Communism in the late-1950s and learned from Jones about the
ideological distinctions between Soviet and Chinese Communism.59
The Sino-Soviet split and the Sino-Indian border conflict brought the ideological disputes
among British Communists and colonial revolutionaries into sharp relief, especially on the
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grounds that the Chinese Communist Party had rejected the Soviet policy of “peaceful
coexistence” with capitalism.60 Pushing a hard line against capitalism, which for many
anticolonial migrant activists in Britain was necessary in the struggle against imperialism and
racism, created space for a wave of Commonwealth defection from the Communist Party of
Great Britain. In its wake emerged a more militant political affiliation that aligned with the
policy of armed self-defense. In October 1963, Manchanda and his associates began
corresponding with the Political Committee of the Communist Party of Great Britain,
specifically with Rajani Palme Dutt, seeking to modify the Communist Party of Great Britain’s
stance on the Sino-Indian border dispute. On 25 September 1963, Ranjana Ash, a mutual friend
of Manchanda and Jones, wrote to Dutt hoping to secure his support for the newly established
Indian Forum and notifying him of a campaign, like that of the Indian Workers Association, to
free political prisoners in India who had been detained under the Defense of India Rules.61 In
response, Dutt asked Ash to wait until after she had met with CPGB leadership to “make sure of
agreement on the best lines to follow.”62 However, that same month, Ash’s group provocatively
published the first issue of the Anti-Imperialist Indian Forum with the headline “Non-alignment New Style” and a caricature of Jawaharlal Nehru holding two rifles aloft, the one in his left hand
labelled “Made in the USA” and the one in his right labelled “Made in USSR,” while riding in a
convertible labeled “Voice of America.” Predictably, the CPGB regarded the publication as
evidence of “factional activity” and reprimanded Manchanda, Ash, and their co-conspirators.63
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The imagery and rhetoric of the new publication not only went against Communist Party line, but
also pilloried Nehru for hypocrisy in dealing with China, a radical departure from the
nationalistic overtures that the IWA issued in the same period.
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The Political Committee’s response to Indian Forum’s “factionalist” activities elicited the
ire of Abhimanyu Manchanda. In a detailed refutation of each of the Political Committee’s
points about Indian Forum, Manchanda argues that the CPGB refused to modify its stance,
structure, and platform even though its new members who had arrived from postcolonial
societies insisted on new political forms that would cut at the heart of neo-imperialism abroad
and racial discrimination in Britain. “Some comrades,” Manchanda asserts, “are the unpaid
apologists for the racialists in defending the discriminatory attitude of reactionary trade unionists
pointing to the ‘lack of skill of these colonials’.”64 The behavior of the CPGB, in Manchanda’s
view, was no different from that of the Labour Party after the 1964 General Election when it
reversed its pledge to rescind immigration control. Thus, the parliamentary landscape for
migrants in Britain provided no defenders. Furthermore, Manchanda, much earlier than his IWA
associates, recognized the emptiness of Congress Party platitudes in India, noting that “while
serving the imperialists and monopolists, Nehru masquerades behind his ‘socialism’, his
‘progressive Government’ has unleashed a reign of brutal exploitation of the masses of poor
people of India, by heavy burdens of taxation, compulsory deposit schemes and the uncontrolled
racketeering of high prices of consumer goods.”65 In concluding his letter, he urged the Political
Committee to modify its position on factionalism and to support Indian Party members in Britain
to pursue an anti-imperialist and anti-racist program that coheres with Communist Party doctrine
but emerges out of lived experience.66
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Initially, Dutt suggested that the question of forming an Indian Communist Party branch
in Britain was one that could be discussed more fully in the appropriate setting but otherwise
dismissed much of Manchanda’s criticism of the CPGB as an articulation of Communist Party
of China talking points.67 Subsequently, in a letter from John Gollan, the Political Committee
concluded that Manchanda’s group sought to do nothing but “establish a factional grouping and
platform hostile equally to the Communist Party of India and to the Communist Party of Great
Britain.”68 Incredulously, he also demanded substantiation for the myriad charges that
Manchanda made against the Party and its leadership. Gollan’s attempt to bring Manchanda in
line was in vain. Manchanda had become a believer in the communism of Mao Zedong in part
because of Claudia Jones’ insistence that it represented a “national revolution rooted in the
people.” At the same time depictions of the Soviet Union were of a decaying and “revisionist”
party and the ideological split between China and the USSR had become palpable.69 Indeed,
though the CPGB may not have recognized it at the time, Manchanda had already broken with
the Soviet-backed CPGB. He had begun garnering support for the Communist Party of China
and popularizing Maoist thought among the leftwing of the Communist Party and like-minded
organizations. In 1962, Manchanda emerged as a leader of nascent British Maoism through the
Committee to Defeat Revisionism for Communist Unity (CDRCU), which was the first Maoist
organization in Britain, and later founding the Revolutionary Marxist-Leninist League.70 Thus,
the defense of the CPGB and the attempt to call Manchanda to account was an exercise in

67

Dutt to Manchanda, 29 November 1963. Dutt Papers. LHA.
Political Committee to Manchanda, 12 December 1963. Dutt Papers. LHA.
69
Davies, Left of Karl Marx, 227.
70
Redfern, “No Friends to the Left,” 353.
68

277
futility. Manchanda had lost hope for the reform of the Party and Anti-Imperialist Indian Forum
was a declaration of independence.
The combination of the Sino-Soviet split of the early-1960s and Sino-Indian border
dispute of 1962 had a considerable impact on the politics and international perspective of Indians
in Britain. Abhimanyu Manchanda, in a 1963 letter to the Political Committee of the Communist
Party of Great Britain, stated that “it is imperative to fight for a policy of defeating the
imperialist conspiracy of making the Asians fights Asians.” Moreover, Manchanda, through the
newsletter Anti-Imperialist Indian Forum, which he co-edited with Ranjana Ash, among others,
contended that “[thousands] of people are participating in demonstrations, strikes and
processions, all over India, against the ‘emergency’ measures” enacted during the war with
China, which had resulted in the “unconstitutional” imprisonment of innocent Indians. As these
appeals were rejected by the CPGB, Manchanda represented a far-left alternative to South Asians
in Britain grasping for greater theoretical engagement with the roots of Indian autocracy, British
racism, and Black Power.
Chinese nuclear tests not only allowed for clear statements of support for Mao but also
demonstrated close attention to the rhetoric of the CCP among Indian radicals in India. For
instance, Zhou Enlai, during a 1963 meeting with a Kenyan African National Federation
delegation, asked “Why is there no complete prohibition on nuclear testing…what is the
purpose? The purpose is to use this [situation] to carry out nuclear blackmail. Towards whom?
Towards countries that do not have nuclear weapons, especially small, weak countries, Asian,
African and Latin American countries.”71 Within a few years, Indians in Britain began to deploy
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this language triumphantly. “Chinese atomic weapons are our weapons of [defense] against the
imperialists’ nuclear blackmail and aggression,” Manchanda proclaimed in 1966.72 The
following year, in a statement lamenting “Hooliganism at the Chinese Embassy in Delhi,” Joshi
declared that “the friendship of the two peoples is the greatest need of the hour and anything
which impedes that must be combated.” Focusing on China’s military prowess, he continued that
“the Indian Workers Association…wishes to congratulate the Chinese people on their successful
explosion of the H bomb. This can only strengthen the peoples of the world and the forces of
anti-imperialism. It will help to combat the nuclear blackmail of the American imperialists and at
the same time be a security for the poor nations against big power chauvinism.”73 Thus, over the
course of the 1960s, China came to be regarded as an anti-imperialist beacon, whose militant
opposition to western power was positioned in contrast to the Indian government’s submission to
American imperialism. Indian radicals in Britain embraced China, in part, because it embodied
militant resistance that would buttress national and class liberation for “semi-colonial and semifeudal” states, such as India, and workers and national minorities subject to industrial capitalism.
The respect for Chinese military prowess reflected the urge among leftists in Britain to
adopt a more militant stance in opposition to American and Soviet imperialism. Yet, the rise in
China’s global status also fed into a Third Worldism that sought South-South cooperation that
was first solidified at the Bandung Conference. G. Thomas Burgess has written about China’s
relationship with postcolonial Zanzibar in the 1950s and 1960s to suggest that the African nation
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regarded China as the “model for the island’s future.”74 Indeed, for Zanzibar and many other
newly independent states, the search for a usable future was often more urgent and practicable
than looking back at a glorious past. Colonial ruptures had undermined narratives of continuous
and ancient nationality. Burgess notes, however, that the collaboration between China and
Zanzibar was “a simultaneous embrace and repudiation of Afro-Asian solidarities” because the
futurity of Zanzibari freedom, which involved a multi-ethnic state comprised of Africans, Arabs,
and South Asians, was frustrated by nascent ethno-nationalist sentiment that sought an ethnically
homogeneous African state.75
Nevertheless, the history of Chinese patronage in Africa opened space for the “Maoist
gospel” to co-mingle with Pan-Africanism in support of the revolutionary struggle against
capitalism and imperialism. The interaction between the two had profound influence on Black
Power militancy in the United States and Britain. “Black Man in Search of Power,” a multi-part
series that the Times published in 1968, explored the links between African liberation, Chinese
patronage, and Black Power. Presented as a study of racial violence and guerilla warfare in
southern Africa, the Times series centered on the relationships that China had with African
liberation movements. “China wants revolution – everywhere,” the series observed, “and China,
unlike the goulash communists of the west, can pass herself off as a coloured, have-not nation
sent by history to help the black world.” In pursuit of this revolution, the Times pointed out that
“China’s main contribution to the black revolution is in the supply of arms,” especially the
Kalashnikov AK 47 automatic rifle, and that African revolutionaries had received training in
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Beijing.76 It bears mentioning that China’s relationship to African guerilla fighters is thus
reminiscent of the connections between the Soviet Union and Communist International,
especially the University of the Toilers of the East, and militant nationalists in India that the
Ghadar Party helped to forge in the 1920s and 1930s.
As for the influence that China and Black Power had amassed in the United Kingdom, the
Times indicated that it emerged in the early 1960s with a politics of belonging that alienated
nonwhite people and left them to look for alternate sources of pride and community identity.77 In
the penultimate part of its series, the Times profiled Ahmed Gora Ebrahim, who had established
the Pan-Africanist Congress in South Africa that had been banned by 1968. Ebrahim made “a
significant impact on militant leaders of British immigrants” by “woo[ing] the Black Power
movement to the Maoist cause.” Ebrahim effectively converted representatives of Black Power
and race relations organizations to Maoism during his brief tenure in Britain and stage-managed
a mutiny in the ranks of the Committee Against Racial Discrimination via Johnny James, the
head of the Caribbean Workers’ Movement. Moreover, his influence extended to Ajoy Ghose of
the Universal Coloured People’s Association and Roy Sawh, who later became instrumental in
the Black People’s Association.78 Furthermore, Ebrahim established links with Manchanda and,
by way of the Association of Indian Communists, the Indian Workers Association. In July 1967,
the Chief Representative in Britain of Ebrahim’s Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania (South
Africa) wrote to Joshi at the behest of Manchanda to request the use of an IWA cinema to screen
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a film on South Africa as a fundraiser to support “the work of liberating our country from the
pangs of imperialism and racism.”79 The militancy that Ebrahim brought to the anti-Apartheid
movement constituted a new phase in the struggle for which the Indian Workers Association had
been issuing resolutions. Manchanda had also been demonstrating against the Apartheid regime.
In 1964, along with three South Africans and two Englishmen, Manchanda had begun a sevenday hunger strike to demand the release of political prisoners in South Africa.
The sense that the Apartheid regime was a common enemy of anti-imperialists
undergirded the growing allure of Maoist mobilization for Indians in Britain but there were also
material connections. The Times News Team revealed that Ebrahim and Manchanda linked the
Indian Workers Association to a Maoist network in Western Europe. Most directly, this
relationship manifested with the printing of the “Peking-line” Punjabi periodical Lalkar. Edited
by Avtar Jouhl, with Manchanda on the editorial board, Lalkar was “part of an effort to convert
[Indian immigrants in Britain] to Maoist revolution.” The article goes on to detail how Jacques
Grippa of the Belgian Communist Party facilitated the circuitous production of the paper:
Someone, somewhere, loves Lal Kar [sic]. It is quite a business to take the raw copy to
Heathrow airport on a Tuesday, have it picked up at the Sabena freight office in Brussels
next day, spin of 1500 copies at the Rue van der Weyer, send a member of Jacques
Grippa’s party from Le Livre International [bookstore] to take it back to Brussels airport
on Friday and then have it picked up from the UEA freight terminal at Heathrow. Why go
through all this trouble for an eight-page irregular shilling publication?80
While Ebrahim had worked with African and Asian organizations and community leaders to
consolidate support for Maoist doctrine and the inevitability of the violent revolution, British
Maoism ultimately emerged at the intersection of anti-imperialism, trade unionism, and Black
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Power. The Black Peoples’ Alliance was a first iteration of this broad-front approach but the
Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) was the first nationwide Party organized
explicitly around the “Peking-line”.
Militant worker solidarities than transcended racial divisions were resolutely pronounced
at the inaugural meeting of the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) in 1968. The CPB
(M-L) emerged as an alternative to the Communist Party of Great Britain, which was a
subsidiary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union whose power and influence on the British
left was deemed untenable by some after the Sino-Soviet split. Reg Birch and William Ash,
among others, helped to establish the new party. Birch had been a leading figure in the CPGB
and in the Amalgamated Engineering Union through the 1960s. Being a close associate of
Jagmohan Joshi, he had addressed the rally in defense of civil liberties in India that the IWA had
organized in March 1965. According to Smith and Worley, Birch had drifted from the CPGB
because it had failed to support him during a Union election.81 Others have suggested that
Birch’s service on the editorial board of The Marxist, a journal that served as a lightning rod for
nascent pro-Chinese groups, indicates that his sympathies for the CPC were based in ideological,
and not electoral, shifts.82 William Ash, for his part, became associated with “anti-revisionists”
through his wife, Ranjana, who was a close friend of Claudia Jones and Manchanda, and had
been active among the Friends of China and the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding.83
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Although the Party was unable to consolidate the various Pro-Chinese groups, it’s resonance for
Indian revolutionaries was significant.
Though the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) was only the most prominent
Maoist organization in Britain, it did not achieve mass-appeal among British workers. However,
as Smith and Worley note, it was able to make inroads with students and South Asian activists.84
Among the reasons for the appeal of Maoism for migrants was the salience of anti-Vietnam war
campaigning, which had transformed into outright support for the South Vietnamese National
Liberation Front, commonly known as the Viet Cong. Clearly, Abhimanyu Manchanda was an
early votary of the “Peking-line” from his work with the Anti-Imperialist Indian Forum, but by
the mid-1960s, the Indian Workers Association was actively coordinating with Pat Jordan, both a
secretary for Bertrand Russell’s Peace Foundation and member of the Trotskyist International
Marxist Group (IMG). Jordan was able to recruit the Indian Workers Association as a co-sponsor
for the Vietnam Solidarity Committee, which, according to a report in The Observer, was “the
only movement since the war which has succeeded in welding together the fissiparous elements
of the extreme Left.”85 When Jordan reached out to the IWA in 1966 with the intention of
“promoting solidarity between the people of Britain and Vietnam,” Joshi responded
enthusiastically that “the Indian workers in Britain pledge their solidarity with the workers and
peasants of Vietnam...The Indian workers know that this is a war against [the Indian Workers
Association’s] fellow Asians as well as a war against the whole of humanity.”86
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That same year, 1966, in a joint message to the South Vietnam National Front for
Liberation, the Indian Workers Association and the Pakistani Workers Association declared
solidarity with the movement. The message commemorated the sixth anniversary of the Front
and praised the Vietnamese people for “their glorious victories over the most vicious and
barbarous aggressor, US Imperialism,” it decried Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s “reign
of terror” and her complicity in the war in Vietnam, and it condemned British Prime Minister
Harold Wilson’s Labour Government for “impos[ing] hardships on the working people of
Britain” and for “support[ing] the criminal war of US imperialism in Vietnam.”87 By the same
token, at the IWA National Conference in November 1967, Joshi made explicit the diverging
paths that India and China had taken in the years after Bandung:
While another Asian power, China, resolutely supports the heroic Vietnamese people,
and is ready for any sacrifice to oppose US aggression as it did in support of the great
Korean people, the servile Indian Government stabs our Asian brother, Vietnam, in the
back. The tattered rag of ‘non-alignment’ cannot hide the naked subservience of the
Indian Government to U.S. imperialism.88
In response to the IWA’s support, the Vietnamese Union in France sent a message to the
National Conference, stating “we are encouraged by the continuous successes you are
achieving...against British imperialism, for independence, democracy, peace and social progress
in India, and against racialism and in defense of the rights of Indian workers in Britain.”89
Buried in the Papers of the IWA at the Birmingham Library is an unsigned speech
fragment delivered by a colleague of Joshi’s, possibly Avtar Jouhl or Teja Singh Sahota, at the
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Communist Party of Britain (M-L) inaugural meeting. This speech, or what remains of it, noted
that Mao’s writings were “the most important development of Marxism for our times.” Further, it
elaborated on the importance of engaging the British working-class in the struggle against the
vestiges of British imperialism and Anglo-American hegemony. In particular, the speaker
mentioned that educating white workers on the function of imperialism and the emergence of “a
corporate state in which the workers will be subjected to greater oppression, tyranny and
exploitation” would work to rectify the divisions and infighting of the working-class. The
speaker diagnosed the persistence of divisions within the working-class movement by noting that
“the bogey of immigration is continuously kept before the British people by both Tory and
Labour” to facilitate scapegoating black workers as the cause of the social and economic woes of
late-industrial Britain. Thus, the role of the CPB (M-L) was not just to align with the national
liberation struggles of Asia, Africa, and Latin America or to look toward the Chinese Communist
Party as the harbingers of revolution, but also to recognize that British working-class racism was
a vestige of imperialism, and the CPB (M-L) vowed to “combat it through and through.”90
Opposing the State: Anti-Fascism and Indira Gandhi, 1966-1977
When addressing the inaugural meeting of the Communist Party of Britain (MarxistLeninist) the Indian representative took the opportunity to discuss the repression of the
insurgency in the village of Naxalbari in West Bengal as a way of highlighting the transnational
movement against neo-imperialism. “In every country today the people are on the march,” the
speaker began, “in our own land the peasants of Naxalbari, by taking up arms against the
reactionary landlord-capitalist government and breaking with the peaceful road of elections, have

90

Anonymous Speech. No Date [1968]. MS2141/C/8/13.

286
helped the Indian people to begin their freedom struggle.”91 In May 1967, peasants and cadres of
the Communist Party of India (Marxist), commenced a violent uprising against local landlords
through a campaign of assassination and dispossession. By July, the insurgents had taken control
of up to 300 square miles of territory in northern West Bengal state, tucked between Nepal and
what was then East Pakistan. At that point, according to Rabindra Ray, the Centre government
coordinated with the Chief Minister of West Bengal, whose state was led by the Communist
Party of India (Marxist) in a coalition government, to quash the uprising. On 12 July, police
made seventy-five arrests in a coordinated early-morning raid.92 At the end of the police action,
nearly two weeks later, more than one thousand communists and peasants had been arrested,
which led to “mass surrenders” on 25 July at Kharibari.93 As with Vietnam, the Chinese
Communist Party helped to legitimate the insurrection at Naxalbari when a June 1967 broadcast
on Peking Radio announced that the peasant uprising was the “front paw of the revolutionary
armed struggle launched by the Indian people under the guidance of Mao Tse Tung.”94
The suppression of the uprising in Naxalbari was a cooperative effort between the West
Bengal government at Calcutta and the Centre government in New Delhi. However, as the
insurgency went underground and became an urban campaign, strategies of containment and
resistance also changed. Due to instability, Indira Gandhi’s government declared President’s
Rule through which the Centre took control of the state in 1968 and 1971. Furthermore, in 1970
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the state and Centre mobilized forces to isolate revolutionaries.95 After the deployment of police
and military troops in Calcutta to enforce a counter-insurgency campaign that involved detaining
suspected insurgents through the Defense of India Rules (DIR), Indian observers in Britain
shifted from skepticism of Gandhi’s government, which was rooted in growing alienation from
the Congress Party that had begun in 1962, to fears of nascent totalitarianism. “While posing as
the world’s largest democracy,” Joshi and Teja Sahota wrote in a letter to Indira Gandhi in
January 1969, “the government of India has ruled with an iron hand” and “whittled away civil
liberties” through the constant threat of state violence. “The Indian government,” they continued,
“has moved far to the right since the days of Bandung.”96
Thus, the uprising in West Bengal drove Maoist organizations in Britain and India closer
together. The opportunity that Naxalbari gave to Indian activists to consolidate their movement
with those on the far left of British politics and trade unionism buttressed the struggle against an
Indian state that was considered irretrievably corrupt and despotic. Specifically, the
establishment of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969 appeared to represent
an identity of purpose between Indian and British Maoists, which was rooted in the belief that
the People’s Republic of China represented a decolonial and democratic future. In a “Resolution
on India,” passed at the National Conference of the IWA in 1967, the IWA decried the brutal
suppression of the Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal and plans for a program of coerced
sterilization of peasants, which ultimately affected roughly 12 million people.97 In December
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1970, the IWA, under Joshi and Sahota, mobilized against the “unprecedented wave of terror”
that had descended on Punjab in the aftermath of Naxalbari. According to the IWA, “hundreds of
innocent students have been massacred” at the hands of “Indira’s fascist Govt. [sic].”98 Though,
the characterization of Gandhi’s government as “fascist” began in response to the use of deadly
force to repress Naxalite insurgency across India, it was quickly generalized to describe any
repressive action by the government. For instance, in 1974 the IWA asserted that the
government’s response to the Indian Railway Strike was an expression of the “true fascist nature
of the [so-called] Indian democracy.”99 This anti-fascist rhetoric had been introduced to Indian
worker politics in Britain through battles with the anti-immigrant governments in Britain and the
violent organizations they emboldened. Naxalbari focused the Indian diaspora in Britain on the
“anti-democratic” practices of Indira Gandhi’s government.
Hostility toward Indira Gandhi’s government culminated in the response to Emergency
Rule of 1975-77, which was perceived as a defense of American hegemony. The anti-fascist
campaigns that emerged in the fight against racism and racial violence in Britain had been
mobilized after the Indian state used violence against armed revolutionaries in West Bengal,
Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, and elsewhere. The Indian Workers Association explained their stance
in a flier for a protest planned for October 1972, which was titled “Why We Demonstrate.” Here,
they declared solidarity with the CPI (M-L) and proclaimed “down with fascist Indian
government.”100 Though Indians in Britain had begun to view Gandhi’s ministry as dictatorial,
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demonstrations against her government became ever fiercer as the struggle against the
“reactionary Indian government” in the early-1970s reached its apogee with the proclamation of
a National Emergency in 1975.101 The suppression of Naxalbari and the execution of Emergency
resulted in the large-scale imprisonment of political opponents, which was anathema to the
democratic principles cherished by the IWA. These incarcerations were justified through a
colonial legal apparatus, the DIR, first used after World War I to detain communists and
revolutionary terrorists. Thus, the IWA detected the emergence of fascist tendencies within the
Indian government, perhaps the Congress party specifically, through the lens of anticolonialism
and the politics of anti-racism in Britain.
After Emergency Rule was imposed, the Left throughout Western Europe coalesced
around Indian activists and others who had been affected by the revelation of the carceral
tendencies of the Indian government. In July 1975, Werner Riebe, a representative of the
German Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist) and League Against Imperialism, contacted the
Indian Workers Association for information and material they could use to “publish a pamphlet
on the actual situation in India today,” with reference to the Emergency.102 In February 1976,
Peter Wengen, also of the League Against Imperialism, wrote to invite a member of the IWA to
participate in a series of meetings in Germany to “win collaboration of other progressive and
revolutionary forces” in opposition to Indira Gandhi. Among those who were instrumental in the
growing resistance to Congress and Indira Gandhi in Britain, Mary Tyler, who had been detained
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as a Naxalite revolutionary for five years with her husband in eastern India, emerged as an
effective and motivated organizer.103 Tyler was a well-known activist who had contributed a
report on Emergency to the IWA’s “Emergency Special” newsletter in October 1975. Soon after
her release, she returned to Britain and coordinated with Jagmohan Joshi and others to establish
the Alliance Against Fascist Dictatorship in India, which formalized their partnership against the
Indian government.
The focus of the Alliance was to highlight the authoritarian nature of the Indian
government through direct correspondence with Indian and British officials as well as holding
protest demonstrations in London. In January 1976, the Alliance appealed to Prime Minister
Harold Wilson to issue “an open statement of condemnation” and suspend normal diplomatic
relations with India. Even when Indian elections were announced after nearly two years, the
AAFDI and sympathetic organizations believed that Emergency had “destroyed the last remnants
of Indian democracy.”104 A pamphlet titled “India’s General Elections are a Fraud,” observed
that India had been under a near constant state of Emergency and President’s Rule since 1962.
However, that Congress was accused of wielding autocratic power for more than a decade was
only a symptom of a larger problem. Congress’ political opponents “do not oppose Indira Gandhi
because they want to get rid of the present system,” the pamphlet asserts, “but because they want
to run it themselves.”105 For the IWA, the 1977 election fraudulently represented that there was
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political accountability to the electorate. From the revolutionary perspective of anti-Emergency
activists in Britain, the political system was broken, and the government was illegitimate.
Much in the same way that the Indian Workers Association cooperated with the antiApartheid movement, demonstrations against Indira Gandhi were intended to expose the Indian
government’s disregard for human rights and due process. By 1976, a conservative estimate of
political prisoners held in India was put at 100,000 whereas Amnesty International believed there
were 200,000 political prisoners and untold numbers of executions and extra-judicial killings.106
Just before Emergency was declared, in March 1975, “peasant rebels” G. Krishta Goud and J.
Bhoomaiah had been convicted of murder in Andhra Pradesh and sentenced to death.107 In
protest of their death sentence, Joshi wrote to Braj Kumar Nehru, Indian High Commissioner in
London, that “their ‘crime’ is, that like great martyrs Bhagat Singh and Udham Singh,” against
oppression and for the liberation of “backward classes.”108 After their execution, Goud and
Bhoomaiah became causes célèbres of the Naxalite and anti-Emergency movements and gave
momentum to mass mobilizations for the liberation of political prisoners. Just as Bhoomaiah and
Goud represented injustices against peasants, the IWA reached out to British trade union
representative to gain their support against Emergency’s preventive detentions of workers. Joshi
wrote directly to trade unionists to invite them to participate in a January 1976 demonstration to
demand the restoration of the right to strike in India.109 In June 1976, the AAFDI collaborated
with the Committee for Civil Liberties in India for a demonstration in Trafalgar Square to protest
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the erosion of democratic and civic institutions in the country.110 Just as the question of political
prisoners had been raised throughout the history of Indian political mobilization in Britain, those
detained during Emergency were not readily released even after the restoration of due process
under the Janata Party government of Morarji Desai.
Indira Gandhi continued to receive the ire of Indians in Britain even after she left office.
Because the IWA believed that the political system in India was corrupt, a new government
could neither heal the wounds of Emergency, nor could Gandhi’s departure, albeit short-lived,
from power rescue her public image. Just as the Indian Workers Association continued to push
for the release of all political prisoners well after Emergency was over, it pursued Gandhi as an
enemy of the Indian people. In November 1978, having just been elected to Parliament from a
constituency in south India, Gandhi visited Britain and was met with chants of “Indira Gandhi
fascist. Go home Nazi. Go back, Go Back!”111 In preparation for her visit, the Alliance for
People’s Democratic India, published a four-page issue of India Today with the headline
“Criminal Indira Gandhi Not Welcome Here.”112 An organization called the Indian Workers
Movement (Britain), which was ostensibly associated with the Communist Party of India
(Marxist-Leninist), issued a broadside exclaiming “Death to Fascist Indira Gandhi,” deeming her
the “archenemy of the Indian People.”113 At one of her only public addresses to a primarily
Indian audience while in Britain, speaking at the Dominion Theatre of the Indian Workers
Association (Southall), protesters threw eggs at her, at least one of which “smashed against the
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marquee and splashed on her pink and black sari.”114 Regardless of her reception at the
Dominion Theatre, her British tour marked a return to public office that saw her once again rise
to Prime Minister in 1980. Through the early-1980s, her military action against Sikh separatists
in Punjab earned her a new kind of political opponent and led to her assassination in 1984.
Conclusion
Foregrounded by the combination of progressively anti-immigrant legislation, dating to
the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, and the increasingly violent racism of British
nationalists, this chapter has examined the emergence of militant anti-imperialism among Indians
in Britain in the period of deindustrialization. In the tenth instalment of the 1965 Times series
“The Dark Million,” devoted to understanding the racial politics of Smethwick, the writer
attempted to look toward the future and remained concerned about political extremism in the
country. The lesson, for the author, was that “[a]lthough Smethwick has made people aware of
the deep feelings on the subject of coloured immigration, it has also led to a hardening of
attitudes,” which could lead to a loss of middle ground a policy paralysis.115 But the damage, it
would seem, had been done. The experience of racial demagoguery during the parliamentary
election in Smethwick in 1964 led Indian migrants to disavow state institutions as unable to
protect their rights or lives.
In the wake of Smethwick, Indian activists in the Midlands began to coordinate with
migrant and revolutionary organizations in Britain that sought to transform British political and
economic institutions, support efforts at decolonialization in Africa, Latin America, and South
Asia, and commit to mutual self-defense. In this period, Punjabi advocacy for politicians who
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would repeal the Commonwealth Immigrants Act was transformed into the belief that
mainstream political parties were unable to represent or protect the social, economic, and
political interests of the black working-class. Jagmohan Joshi made the point that “we try to
make sure that by playing their role in [Trade Union] affairs [migrants] will be contributing
something towards white workers’ understanding that black workers are not their enemy but that
both have a common enemy.”116 This was a continuation of a long-standing commitment on the
part of working-class and radical Punjabis in Britain to work with sympathetic and like-minded
organizations for the transformation of British society.
In 1976 the Indian Workers Association circulated a pamphlet titled “Smash Radicalism
and Fascism” to explain the dual threats to the black and brown populations in the United
Kingdom and to connect their experience to the anti-democratic tendencies in the Indian
government. The economic stagnation in Britain in the mid-1970s triggered deep anxieties
among the working-class and the turn toward racialism during this period was, the pamphlet
explained, fomented by “the servile lackeys of capitalism in crisis” who distributed “anti-black
propaganda” to eviscerate the British Labour Movement. As Indira Gandhi was characterized as
the arch-enemy of the Indian people, the National Front in Britain was “putting out to the
working-class that it is the black people who are responsible” for industrial stagnation. Indian
revolutionary organizations in Britain brought racism and totalitarianism into the same political
prism. Manifesting as effective single-party rule, repressive policing, scapegoating immigrants
and political rivals, and street-level violence, migrant internationalists denounced the rise of
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fascism in Britain and India and pursued strategies in the interest of defending a radical
democratic politics of socialism, anti-imperialism, and racial solidarity.

Conclusion
On 3 June 1979, in the streets of London, Jagmohan Joshi, long-time General Secretary
of the Indian Workers Association, suffered a heart attack and died. “Black people against state
brutality” was emblazoned across the top of a flier for the demonstration that was jointly
sponsored by the Indian Workers Association, Awaz and the Brixton Black Women’s Group.
The flier advised all interested in attending to assemble at Speakers Corner, Hyde Park, at 1:00
pm on Sunday afternoon. The event was to mark a turning point in South Asian radicalism as it
was among the first to simultaneously articulate the uniformity of purpose between the black
working class and organizations for the empowerment of black women.1 At the forefront of this
demonstration, like so many before in his thirty-year career as one of the intellectual leaders of
migrant internationalism, Jagmohan Joshi was intent on continuing the fight against unjust
immigration laws. In an August circular, the IWA reported that Teja Singh Sahota, Joshi’s
comrade in the Association of Indian Communists and the Alliance Against Fascist Dictatorship
in India, had replaced Joshi as General Secretary.2A year later, Delawar Hosain, General
Secretary of the Bangladesh Workers Association remembered, on the anniversary of his death,
how Joshi “inspired us with his ideals of proletarian internationalism.”3 At the close of the
1970s, South Asian political articulation in Britain was preparing to undergo a transformation
due to circumstances there and in India. Joshi’s death serves as a symbolic close to the era of
migrant internationalism.
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This dissertation is a study in colonial capitalism that facilitated South Asian mobility
and underpinned the emergence of South Asian communities across the United Kingdom. The
period under review was concomitant with growing political will to monitor and restrict the
freedom of movement for non-British people. This project has traced the legal history of
legislation that was intended to limit the arrival and settlement of destabilizing and undesirable
migrants, especially the nationals of aggressor states during wartime. However, as this history
demonstrates, questions of belonging in Britain were considered in terms of English-language
fluency and, increasingly, skin color and names. Thus, colonial subjects were casually turned
into “colored aliens.” Finally, as this dissertation has detailed, the perceptions of difference and
economic competition authorized by government ministers and legislative actions, fueled
intolerance and anti-immigrant violence throughout Britain.
But, at its core, this dissertation has been a study of resistance and progressive coalitions.
Punjabi migrants are at the center of this story as the agents of their own history; rather than the
hapless victims of racism, colonialism, and despotism. Although this narrative does not chronicle
progressive change over time, it has shown the myriad strategies for survival that migrants have
pursued. Initially, noninstitutional networks and informal relationships were vital to navigating
social and political complexities. During the 1940s and in the early-postwar period, migrants
engaged with political parties and government officials for redress. Yet, by the 1960s and 1970s,
a revolutionary ethos emerged that led to the disengagement from the political process and the
emergence of militant self-defense. The formalization of migrant politics throughout this period
maps onto increasing nativist zeal among white Britons. After the Smethwick elections, antiimmigrant violence became quotidian while the purveyors of violence faced lessened sentences.
The murderer of Noor Mohamed in 1925 Glasgow was executed after a short trial. In contrast,
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Jody Hill and Robert Hackman, who killed Gurdip Singh Chaggar in a 1976 Southall street-fight,
were given four-year jail sentences because the judge in the case maintained that there was no
racial animus.
Punjabi emigration from the Jullundur Doab, Hoshiarpur, and Ludhiana, to Britain in the
twentieth century, was partly a response to economic opportunity but was fundamentally tied to
the mobility of Punjabis as they were incorporated into commercial and martial “webs of
empire.”4 The effect of that travel was, in many cases, destabilizing to the Raj. Mridula
Mukherjee has observed that the “high rate of emigration” from Central Punjab “contributed to
the widening of political horizons” for the emigrants as well as for their non-traveling family,
friends, and collaborators.5 This relationship was the backdrop for the Indian Political
Intelligence's position, in 1942, that Hoshiarpur and Jullundur “have for many years past been
hotbeds of violent political agitation, and in fact represent the birthplace of the Ghadr [sic]
Party.”6 The history of migrant internationalism in Britain must be understood both in terms of
the mechanisms of travel in the late-nineteenth century and through the twentieth, as well as in
the emergence of Punjabi radicalism and anticolonialism, which was evident as early as the 1907
agrarian uprisings but was more fully articulated during World War I and in the interwar period.
The history of South Asian working-class settlers in Britain is rooted in sailors who had
deserted ship and sought work on British shores. The Board of Trade, Home Office, and shipping
companies intended that South Asian seamen would return to Bombay or elsewhere in India after
they were released. The incentives to escape contracts and either sign onto European crews for
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better treatment and pay or to ply a trade in British towns led to the emergence of Punjabi
Muslim population centers throughout the country in the 1920s and 1930s. Contrary to common
perception, these communities were not ethnic enclaves and they were not created or maintained
in isolation from other Britons. Of special importance were the relationships that Punjabi Muslim
men formed with English, Welsh, and Scottish women. From the police perspective,
relationships between lascars and white women, whether sexual or not, represented a matrix of
socials ills, predation, and naivete. Considering that the Indian diaspora of the early twentieth
century was largely male, sex and intimacy emerged out of the social entanglements that
presented themselves within the diverse neighborhoods they occupied.
The “typical Ghadar outlook” was a trait that the intelligence community in Britain
attributed to many early Indian Workers Association activists and underscores the phenomenon
of migrant internationalism. In the 1930s, it was assigned as a kind of fait accompli in
discussions of radical Punjabis from Hoshiarpur or Jullundur -- sites of regular anticolonial
agitation throughout the interwar period. However, the category can be applied more generally to
Punjabi radicals throughout the twentieth century. Punjabis who were sympathetic to the aims
and methods of interwar iteration of the Ghadar Party and sustained them into the postwar era of
mass migration, decolonization, and anti-authoritarianism. It was a shorthand for those who
trafficked in Ghadar Party publications and those of sibling organizations, such as the KirtiKisan Party or the Communist Party of India. As Maia Ramnath has shown, Ghadar was
sustained by a confluence of political and social movements in the years after its 1914 Ailan-iJang – its declaration of war. Yet, it was neither exclusively a Punjabi movement nor only a
movement for national independence. The “typical Ghadar outlook” was an evocative, and
perhaps intentionally limited, method of naming a form of radical anticolonialism that co-
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mingled with Pan-Africanism and international communism that had travelled back and forth
between North America, Europe, and India for decades before finally taking root at the center of
empire.
In the late-1960s and early-1970s, the self-defense groups that the Black Peoples’
Alliance encouraged and sponsored explicitly refused to be the aggressor. However, during
increased nationalist, nativist, and fascist activity throughout the country, the 1970s saw
unrelenting violence against migrants and allies who were mobilized against racism and fascism.
As this dissertation has demonstrated, anti-immigrant violence was not new in the 1970s.
However, as the Asian population grew in the postwar era and was progressively organized into
community and political organizations, the response to this violence was more visible. The
stabbing murder of Gurdip Singh Chaggar was a mobilizing event for Asian youth as it
confirmed to them that the National Front was an existential threat to the British Asian
community. By 1979, because of government’s abdication of the responsibility to protect its
citizens and residents, there was open street-fighting between Nazis, often with police backing.
In West Bromwich, several Indians were charged with menacing behavior and assault during a
National Front rally. Violence erupted during the National Front’s General Election meeting in
Southall in April 1979, during which Blair Peach, a New Zealand-born teacher and activist, was
killed by a Metropolitan Police officer. Southall and West Bromwich represent a turning point
for the political organizing among second generation British Asians. Epitomized by the Asian
Youth Movements (AYMs) and the Southall Black Sisters (SBS), these shifts sought a distinct
path from that which had been blazed by the Indian Workers Association, the Association of
Indian Communists, and the myriad anti-Indira Gandhi groups. Although the AYMs and SBS
continued to resist racism in Britain, this generation of British Asians navigated British social
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upheaval using new political alliances that focused on the salience of New Social Movements
and cultural expressions that were beyond the vicissitudes of India and unmoored from
ideological constraints of a previous era.7
As violence erupted on British streets, the Maoist influence on Joshi’s IWA became
untenable. In January 1979, just after Soviet-backed Vietnamese forces invaded Pol Pot’s
Cambodia, the secretary of the Workers’ Party of Scotland (Marxist-Leninist) appealed to the
IWA to join a “solidarity-friendship organization” as a show of support to “Democratic
Kampuchea,” demonstrating the continued chasm between the votaries of the Soviets and the
Chinese in radical politics in Britain. At a demonstration in London on 18 February, the IWA
expressed its support for the “Kampuchean people” as a rejection of “Soviet social imperialism”
and its manipulation of Vietnamese authorities. In addition to the invasion of Cambodia, the
IWA was horrified that the Vietnamese government had congratulated Indira Gandhi on her
declaration of Emergency in 1975 “at [Moscow’s] behest.”8
The case of Cambodia provides an important lesson in the limits of the rhetoric of
oppression that Indian radicals deployed during this period. Ideologically it was rooted in the
mobilizations against Soviet imperialism that had emerged in the era of Bandung. Substantially,
the defense of Pol Pot was morally bankrupt.9 The genocidal violence of the Khmer Rouge
against Cambodians was a magnification of the violence of the Cultural Revolution in China a
decade earlier. The annihilation of class enemies was a fundamental Maoist doctrine that was
embraced by Naxalites and supported by its sympathizers in Britain. In this moment, the anti-
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imperialism of migrant radicalism became unmoored from the moral righteousness of selfdefense and was transformed into an apologia for Pol Pot’s genocide. During World War II, the
forebears of the Indian Workers Association stood for national liberation and against imperialist
war. At the same time, the leadership in the era refused to show support for Stalin’s Soviet Union
because entering the war made it complicit in the maintenance of the imperialism. However, the
defense of genocide in Cambodia undermined the moral imperative of decoloniality and the
emancipatory politics of migrant internationalism; in short, this was an unusable future.
South Asian migrants and settlers in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s identified as black
“as a signifier of the entangled racialized colonial histories of ‘black’ settlers” in order to
“affir[m] a politics of solidarity against racism centred around colour.”10 In Britain, the use of
black as a signifier of solidarity manifested in the names of organizations such as the Black
Peoples’ Alliance, the Southall Black Sisters, and the United Black Youth League. However, the
use of “black” as an umbrella designation for those who are subject to race-based oppression
began to fade in this moment as identification according to religion and culture began to rise.
Ralph Grillo suggests that “the construction of difference and diversity in Britain has moved
from ‘race’…to ‘ethnicity’, to ‘culture’, and thence to ‘faith’.”11 Thus, for a series of geopolitical
reasons, South Asian migrants actively began to cultivate religious identities rather than the
inter-racial and international coalitions that were pursued throughout the mid-twentieth century.
The anger that Gandhi provoked in 1978 during her visit to the United Kingdom did not
signal the end of her political career. Having been re-elected to parliament in 1978, she formed a
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new government in January 1980, once again as the leader of the Congress Party. Her tactics of
violent conflict with dissenting and destabilizing forces continued in her second ministry. In June
1984, Gandhi ordered the Indian army raid of the Golden Temple complex, code named
“Operation Blue Star,” because it had been occupied by militant Sikhs who sought greater
autonomy for Punjab. The violence that followed the raid caused many Sikhs to flee the
subcontinent. It also resulted in Gandhi’s assassination and her memorialization as a victim of
ethno-nationalist violence; rather than, as the Indian dissent in the 1970s would have preferred,
the architect of Indian authoritarianism.
Operation Blue Star and its aftermath had an immutable influence on Sikh identity
formation and political organization. The events of 1984 in Amritsar and the ensuing migration
of Sikhs who hoped to avoid mob violence, transformed the way identity was expressed among
many Sikhs in Britain and North America. The internationalization of Sikh separatism and the
campaign for Khalistan, helped to shift diaspora politics away from the cultivation of affective
communities toward that of the ethno-nationalism and religious identity. It is tempting to draw a
line between the transnational politics of the Ghadar and Khalistan movement. In both cases, the
articulation of place-based identities was deterritorialized due to colonial or postcolonial
violence. However, the Ghadar movement actively pursued a future-oriented politics of
internationalism that connected struggles against British hegemony and imperialism. Khalistan,
in contrast, sought to legitimate the nationalist ambitions of a homogenous religious
community.12 As support for Khalistan eclipsed the politics of race and class solidarity, and as
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notions of a Sikh diaspora displaced politics organized around anti-racism and anti-imperialism
among Punjabis in Britain, the era of migrant internationalism that characterized much of
Punjabi experience in twentieth century Britain dissipated and dissolved.
The immediate post-World War I period was one of heightened British anxiety over
aliens and the mobility of colonial subjects, the Communist International’s focus imperialism,
and economic contraction during the Great Depression; all of which were important factors in
diaspora political formation. By the late-1970s, the promise of migrant internationalism appeared
to be on the wane and the threads of inter-group alliances were beginning to fray. The limits of
armed revolution appear to have had a disintegrating effect on the politics of internationalism
and the radicalism of the far left among Indian migrants that were unsustainable. The elections of
Margaret Thatcher in 1979 and Indira Gandhi 1980 indicate that this was a period of profound
political reorientation that sharply transformed British Asian and working-class identity. Trade
unionism, once a primary source of working-class migrant militancy, was eviscerated as
industries shifted abroad, and essential goods and services were privatized. Moreover, Indira
Gandhi’s aggressive policies toward Sikh extremism facilitated the rise of Khalistani separatism
for an independent Sikh state, which transformed Sikh relationships to their subcontinental
homeland and led scholars to isolate and define the contours of a Sikh diaspora at the expense of
the politics of internationalism.

305
“Peoples War”13
In each heart we shall awaken the flames of rebellion
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
This world will return to those who deserve it
The workers, the peasants, the hungry, the poor
The miserable oppressed we shall make them blessed
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
Once sense of right awakens, oppression’s days are numbered
Then all the fields are ours, and all the factories too
‘Everything on this earth is ours’ we shall tell the jailers
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
With tawdry gimmicks we were sought to be amused
With lies and falsehood our lives were utterly ruined
This monument of lies we will topple with our kicks
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
After reflection we have finally unsheathed our sword
Tired of our condition we have snatched up the gun
Now with the blood of the oppressor we will decorate the earth
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
Then awoke Telangana and Bengal turned restless too
Then fields lit up with fire and grief burst into flame
With sparks of this fire we will burn down the evil
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!
O rulers of Delhi: This is our affirmation
O killers and evil-doers: This is our proclamation
You are enemies of humanity, we will wipe you out thoroughly
With Peoples War we shall make conflagration!

Jagmohan Joshi, “Peoples War,” Newsletter: Indian Workers Association GB, no. 3 (July/August 1978).
MS2141/A/8/11/7. Wolfson Centre.
13
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